Well, that is the only narrative point they have agreed upon.
The idea that they let two (or more) shooters breach their alleged security cordon would be considerable egg on their faces, and it might be easier for the rubes to swallow the lone gunman idea who slipped through, despite their herculean efforts to keep Trump safe...or some such BS.
He snuck in there with a van and a car and a bike, evidently...
I would guess that there were two shooters, a patsy and a pro, and that the bad security, led by the SS, was compromised in at least as much as being downplayed, information/observations stovepiped*, and not having a common channel all could readily communicate on and monitor.
I would follow you there, except there is exactly ZERO evidence of a professional shooter - Particularly and decisively because Tumpy is still walking around. No one worth their salt is gonna miss at 130 yards and certainly not given just one more shot. Any given drunken redneck on any given day can shoot better than that.
I think there were more than two guns. That's right. But I think the other guns were return fire from the LEOs and they were just that bad. Can't prove it because I don't know where the other sniper nests were, but the big shots... about 6 of them - sound like the same gun ... Different from the shooter, but not many different guns of different calibers either... A very consistent, ordered fire from the same place.
It seems to me the LEOS tried to take him out, he got rushed and snapped off a clip - missing with all but one by a long way, and the last shot, different from the six, different from the shooter, was the final LEO that nailed him down.
That's what I am going by right now.
*As happened prior to 9/11, agencies supposedly working on counterterrorism had distinct and separate channels of communication. had they been able to compare notes and put the pieces together, the attacks may have been preventable. But when one agency sees one piece of the puzzle (which in itself may seem notable, but not imminently significant) and another agency sees another piece, the puzzle pieces which may otherwise have been assembled to form a more complete threat picture may get lost within their respective organizations' data, because they individually do not seem to constitute a threat, which might be more obvious were those bits combined.
That's right. The sheriff's office says comms were siloed. That means one agency was not in comms with any other - All comms went through dispatch. That's a glaring error. Par for the course, I know, but there should be a tactical channel that they all could switch to and have realtime comms. That's a huge operational error.
