Oh, and Mr. Sam Houston,
Read up on Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) before responding.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/401/815/
Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971)
Rogers v. Bellei
No. 24
Argued January 15, 1970
Reargued November 12, 1970
Decided April 5, 1971
401 U.S. 815
Syllabus
Appellee challenges the constitutionality of § 301(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which provides that one who acquires United States citizenship by virtue of having been born abroad to parents, one of whom is an American citizen, who has met certain residence requirements, shall lose his citizenship unless he resides in this country continuously for five years between the ages of 14 and 28. The three-judge District Court held the section unconstitutional, citing Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U. S. 253, and Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163.
Held: Congress has the power to impose the condition subsequent of residence in this country on appellee, who does not come within the Fourteenth Amendment's definition of citizens as those "born or naturalized in the United States," and its imposition is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful. Afroyim v. Rusk, supra, and Schneider v. Rusk, supra, distinguished. Pp. 401 U. S. 820-836.
296 F. Supp. 1247, reversed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and HARLAN, STEWART, and WHITE, JJ., joined. BLACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 401 U. S. 836. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, J., joined, post, p. 401 U. S. 845.
Page 401 U. S. 816
Thanks
@art.prout. You will find a friend and strong ally on this topic here in my friend
@Bigun, and a different opinion but also a friend in me.
The issue in Rogers v. Bellei was not whether Bellei was a Natural Born Citizen, but whether Congress could impose a requirement on him because he was born outside the US.
SCOTUS did not say that Bellei was not a Natural Born Citizen, it said that the 14th Amendment did not apply to him. Bellei was a US citizen
by virtue of his birth which is the only possible ontological understanding of "Natural Born Citizen" and obviously the only basis on which the US Congress could make any assertion about his citizenship since he was not naturalized.
You've stated the essence of your position above : "Simply put, if the existence of one's citizenship requires and is based upon statutory law, then it is, by definition, not Natural Born citizenship." Please cite the definition of "Natural Born citizenship" to which you refer, and the source of authority for that definition.
Who says that Natural Born citizenship cannot be based on statutory law? Where can I find the dictionary that defines "Natural", "Born", and "Citizenship" in such a way that "Natural Born Citizenship" means immune to the application of statutory law? None of the three words "Natural", "Born" or "Citizenship" imply anything about their conjunction being outside the authority of statutory law, so I really need to know which dictionary you are consulting when you say "by definition."
And if your thesis is correct, of what possible relevance can any court citation be? The only thing the judiciary can do is deliver opinions about statutes; if statutes are not relevant to Natural Born citizenship then no court cite can possibly illuminate this question. Your thesis is an inference, not the law, and it's a circular inference rebutted by the very nature of the evidence you provide. One can only be a citizen of a political entity, a political entity operates by virtue of statutory law, so citizenship cannot exist apart from statutory law, and you reinforce that fact by citing judicial opinions, which have as their object statutory law.
Why limit your position to statutory law? Can Natural Born citizenship require or be based on Constitutional law? Is there some distinct character of Natural Born citizenship that is amenable to Constitutional interpretation but immune from statutory interpretation? Please clarify what that distinct character is. Both Constitution and statute derive their authority from the consent of the governed. Why should the consent of the governed have authority over concepts of citizenship when exercised through one law but not through another, when the latter is merely a particular expression of the former?
I'm sure you are not swayed by my challenges to your basic reasoning; perhaps the understanding of the Founders themselves would be more persuasive. bigun has argued that the Founders would have accepted the definitions in Vattel's
Law of Nations and he has cited good evidence that they had great respect for Vattel's work. I consider it far more likely they would have taken legal definitions from the actual law, not from scholarly works; the existing legal definition for the Founders would have been the British Nationality Act of 1730 (
http://www.uniset.ca/naty/BNA1730.htm) from which I quote :
"May it please your most Excellent Majesty that it may be declared and enacted, and be it declared and enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, That all Children born out of the Ligeance of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, or which shall hereafter be born out of such Ligeance, whose Fathers were or shall be natural-born Subjects of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, at the Time of the Birth of such Children respectively, shall and may, by virtue of the said recited Act, be adjudged and taken to be, and all such Children are hereby declared to be natural-born Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, to all Intents, Constructions and Purposes whatsoever. "
Born "out of Ligeance of the Crown of England" means born outside English territory. This clearly establishes what we now call jus sanguinis citizenship as natural born, and would have been the Founders' understanding of "natural born". While Vattel's definition might be narrower, limited to jus soli, I argue that the Founders would have used *prior statutory terms* rather than scholarly ones. As Originalists we are obligated to perpetuate the Founders' understanding absent an amendment.
So why should I find my own inference more compelling than yours, and more compelling than similar cites bigun has provided? Because I cite
an actual law that the Founders would have recognized and understood, a hard, written, unambiguous legal statement that specifically clarifies who is a "Natural Born Citizen", not a conclusion drawn from other peripheral issues which rely on similar terms and concepts but do not directly address that question. If the Founders intended "Natural Born Citizen" to mean something other than what it meant in the law in which they had been educated and that I directly quote above, why didn't they say so in the Constitution?
Here's the bottom line - neither Constitution nor statute says that POTUS must be born on US soil. The contrary assertion - "Natural Born
means born on US soil" - is based on derivative definitions and conclusions, not on the actual words of the actual law, and it flatly contradicts the actual words of the actual law the Founders studied and understood. We Conservatives tend to frown on these penumbras and emanations of eisegesis when they are built by activist left-wing judges; I think we should steer well clear of them ourselves.
