Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 22, 2025
Excerpts:
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on September 22 that Russia will adhere to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for one year following its expiration in February 2026 and used threats to urge the United States to do the same. Putin claimed that Russia is prepared to continue to adhere to New START’s nuclear arms limitations for one year after it expires on February 5, 2026.
New START limits the number of deployed US and Russian strategic nuclear warheads and bombs to 1,550; the number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers for nuclear missions to 700; and the number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and bombers to 800.
New START went into effect in 2011, and Russia suspended its participation in the treaty in February 2023, claiming that the United States was developing new nuclear weapons.
Putin claimed that Russia will decide between continuing its “voluntary self-restraint” in February 2027. Putin called on Russian agencies to monitor US adherence to New START until then and threatened that Russia “will respond accordingly” ... completely abandoning New START would be a “mistake” and “short-sighted” ... Russia can respond to any threats “not with words but through military-technical measures.” Putin's veiled threats are the latest in Russia's nuclear saber rattling, a tool that the Kremlin often employs as part of its wider reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.
Putin blamed the West for undermining Russian-US arms cooperation and violating bilateral arms agreements - ignoring how Russia has violated numerous multilateral and bilateral treaties in the past decades. Russia has violated multiple treaties since Putin first became president in 2000.
Russia exploited provisions of the Open Skies Treaty (which provided for mutual surveillance flights over member states’ territory) to collect imagery for intelligence purposes and instituted illegal overflight restrictions and airfield designations to legitimize Russia's occupation of Ukraine and Georgia. Russia suspended its adherence to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (which placed limits on the deployment of heavy military equipment in Europe) in 2007 and continues to violate the treaty by stationing troops in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine without these states’ consent ...
A 2020 State Department report noted that Russia “no longer feels bound” by the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives that the United States and Russia agreed to in the early 1990s on the non-deployment and elimination of Russia's arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons and that Russia maintained up to 2,000 such weapons in its stockpiles.
Russia has repeatedly violated the Chemical Weapons Convention (which prohibits the use of chemical weapons and the development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their precursors) both on the battlefield in Ukraine and with its poisoning of political opponents in Europe; Russia has refused to fully declare its chemical weapons stockpiles and production and development facilities.
The State Department noted in response to Russia's suspension of its participation in New START in 2023 that Russia refused to comply with the treaty's requirements that the parties exchange data, including ICBM location and status updates and missile launch telemetry data; Russia denied US inspectors’ right to inspect ballistic missile sites in Russia.
The United States suspended its participation in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (which banned US and Russian ground-launched nuclear and conventional intermediate - and shorter-range missiles) in February 2019 due to Russian violations with its development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) [ Novator ] missiles.
Russia has also used Oreshnik ballistic missiles (which reportedly have a range banned under the INF Treaty) against Ukraine in November 2024 and announced that the missile entered into service in August 2025.Putin is attempting to pressure the Trump administration to engage in arms control talks to facilitate US-Russian rapprochement and extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine, as ISW forecasted Russia would in August 2025 ... ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks in front of the United States to secure Russia's desired demands in Ukraine and deflect from Russia's responsibility for the lack of progress in Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations ...
Putin's September 22 statements aim to present himself as equal to US President Donald Trump and to present Russia as a global power comparable to the United States, and Putin has been trying to posture Russia as the heir of the Soviet Union's “superpower” status, since Trump assumed office in January 2025 ... to reinforce the Kremlin's false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, so Ukraine and the West should concede to Russia's maximalist demands now out of fear that Russian aggression will only worsen in the future.
Some Russian defense industrial enterprises are reportedly struggling to expand their production and work-forces due to economic constraints, while the Kremlin is prioritizing funding for high-priority enterprises such as drone and missile manufacturers. Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported on September 22 that
wages within the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) are declining for the first time during Russia's full-scale invasion and that expansion is slowing due to economic constraints ...
Russian DIB reached “saturation” in 2024, at which point the DIB’s need for new employees began to decline, and that many defense industrial enterprises need to build new production facilities, equip new production lines, and purchase more machine tools to expand production ... the Russian DIB is struggling to further expand, as
current factories are already operating at capacity and cannot afford to build new factories and production lines ... current financial constraints and inflation issues are limiting Russia's ability to offer subsidized loans to all defense industrial enterprises, limiting the enterprises’ ability to increase production and hire new employees.
Novaya Gazeta reported that Russia is prioritizing directing funding toward the production of higher demand weapons, like drones and missiles, further restraining production within other defense industrial enterprises. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) manufacturers, such as Tactile Missile Weapons, Zaslon, Agregat, and Kalashnikov, are reportedly increasing salaries.
CIT reported that many defense industrial enterprises that produce lower priority products do not see the point in expanding production, including armored vehicle manufacturers, which are primarily repairing and modernizing vehicles, as Russia reduces its use of armored vehicles on the battlefield, and aircraft manufacturers, which are already able to replace Russian military aircraft losses. The Kremlin's prioritization of drone and missile manufacturers underscores the ways the Russian DIB is evolving to address Russia's needs on the battlefield.
ISW has previously assessed that Russia is increasing its domestic drone production while decreasing its frontline use of armored vehicles in Ukraine - in line with reports that the Kremlin is increasing funding to drone producers and not vehicle producers.
Russia's emphasis on building up the DIB throughout the war has, in part, led to many of Russia's current economic issues, such as inflation.
ISW continues to assess that the Russian government is over-prioritizing investment in the DIB at the expense of other sectors and that the Russian economy continues to flag under the weight of the war in Ukraine.
The United Nations (UN) reported that the number of casualties from Russian drone strikes targeting Ukrainian civilians has increased by 40% so far in 2025 as compared to 2024. UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine Head Erik Møse reported on September 22 that the commission found that Russian forces conducted strikes against Ukrainian civilians walking or using transport, residences, and critical infrastructure in Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts since July 2024 ... Russian forces are systemically conducting “double tap” strikes against Ukrainian rescue workers responding to Russian strikes.
The commission concluded that Russia's deliberate drone strikes against civilians violate international law, amount to the crimes against humanity of murder and forcible population displacement, and are in accordance with a concerted state policy that aims to sow terror among the Ukrainian population.
ISW has observed numerous instances of Russian drone strikes and war crimes against civilians throughout 2025, and Ukrainian authorities have reported on numerous such instances in the past day alone. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on September 22 that Russian forces shot and wounded an elderly civilian riding a bike in Kupyansk and wounded a civilian during a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a civilian car in Borova ...
Ukrainian forces may have targeted high-ranking Russian officials in a reported strike against occupied Crimea on the night of September 21 to 22. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a resort area in occupied Crimea, killing 2 and injuring 15 others. Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed on September 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a sanatorium in occupied Foros, Crimea. Several Russian sources reported that there was a closed-door private party at the sanatorium and that high-ranking Russian officials, possibly including military officials, were present at the time of the reported strike.
Ukrainian forces conducted a separate confirmed strike against a Russian airfield near occupied Kacha, Crimea. Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 22, and geolocated footage confirmed, that it conducted a strike against occupied Crimea on the night of September 21 to 22. The GUR reported that it struck 2 Russian Beriev Be-12 maritime patrol aircraft and 1 Mi-8 helicopter.
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2025/
