Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 25, 2025
Excerpts:
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to artificially inflate its claims of advance in Ukraine to support the Kremlin's false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable ...
ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized only 3,434 sq km since January 1: 151 sq km in Luhansk Oblast; 2,481 square kilometers in Donetsk Oblast; 248 sq km in Zaporizhia Oblast; 96 sq km in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 255 sq km in Kharkiv Oblast; and 210 sq km in Sumy Oblast.
ISW assesses that the Russian MoD is inflating its claimed advances by 36% in Luhansk Oblast; 33% in Donetsk Oblast; 5% in Zaporizhia Oblast; 83% in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 112% in Kharkiv Oblast; and six percent in Sumy Oblast.
The Russian MoD often inflates its territorial claims in order to shape Western thinking about Russia's military capabilities and prospects for victory ...
The Russian MoD’s September 25 claims are a continuation of these wider efforts to use large amounts of false quantitative data to create the impression that Russian forces are advancing at a fast rate on the battlefield, even though Russian forces continue to advance at a slow foot pace.
ISW also assesses that the Russian MoD has been leveraging footage showing Russian soldiers holding flags within specific settlements to claim that Russian forces had seized entire settlements.
The Russian footage only shows small group infiltration missions into areas where Russian forces are unable to secure enduring positions, however. The Kremlin is attempting to convince the West that Russia will inevitably achieve its original war goals on the battlefield in order to force Ukraine and its partners into conceding to Russian demands.
Russian forces are reportedly rearranging forces to prepare for offensive operations across several sectors of the frontline but lack the forces and means required to sustain these operations simultaneously. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 24 that the Russian military command is rearranging forces in order to conduct several operational-level efforts across the frontline, including offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Lyman, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Zaporizhia directions, as part of Russia's wider strategic-level plan for 2025.
Many of these Russian efforts are not mutually supportive in that forces assigned to one sector of the front are not conducting offensive operations in a way that supports the offensive operations of another sector ... stated that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division from Sumy Oblast to the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) in the south Donetsk direction (likely referring to the Novopavlivka and Velykomykhailivka directions) and to the AoR of the 35th CAA (EMD) in the Hulyaipole direction ...
... reported that unspecified sources expected Russia to redeploy elements of the 76th VDV Division to western Zaporizhia Oblast to participate in offensive operations south of Zaporizhzhia City ... reported that Russia is establishing operational reserves in the 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) operating in the deprioritized Kherson direction from the 25th CAA (Central Miliary District [CMD]) that is currently operating in the Lyman direction, rather than from units and formations of the 58th CAA itself ...
... reported that the Russian command is similarly establishing operational reserves in the 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps, SMD), which is currently operating in the Lyman direction, from elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) in the Kherson direction.
Russia's decision to reorganize forces from the Lyman direction to the operational reserve in the Kherson ... is unusual given Russia's current focus on operations in Donetsk Oblast, particularly between Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently redeployed VDV and the relatively elite naval infantry elements to this area, and some of these forces have since reportedly entered combat. Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and of the 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades (both Pacific Fleet) recently entered combat near Poltavka after redeploying from northern Sumy Oblast, and elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are reportedly fighting near Nove Shakhove after redeploying from the Novopavlivka direction.
The Russian military command is reportedly holding elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) in reserve in the near rear of the Dobropillya area after redeploying from the Kherson direction.
ISW continues to observe reports that elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade are operating in the Kherson direction, indicating that elements of the brigade are likely split across the front.
The Russian offensive in Kupyansk is reportedly vulnerable due to the lack of sufficient forces to sustain simultaneous offensive operations against Kupyansk and several other areas along the frontline. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 6th CAA (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) fighting within and on the northwestern outskirts of Kupyansk are “fragile” and would be vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks should Russian forces stop attacks within Kupyansk and from the Russian foothold north of Kupyansk on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River.
... noted that Russia must simultaneously allocate forces and means to offensive operations within and north of Kupyansk to protect the flanks and logistics of the Russian forces assaulting Kupyansk.
... assessed that Russian forces will need to allocate one to two additional divisions’ worth of forces to offensive operations to actually seize Kupyansk. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command is aware that it needs to reinforce, break through Ukrainian defensive positions, and consolidate in the Kupyansk direction, and that these efforts are in tension with the Russian strategic objective of maintaining several simultaneous offensive operations across the frontline - an objective that Russian forces have struggled with since Summer 2022.
... assessed that Russian forces would have to redistribute resources in order to stabilize the situation in the Kupyansk direction.
Russian forces will likely continue to struggle to maintain simultaneous offensive operations across discrete areas of the frontline ...
Russian officials privately admitted that Russia is responsible for the September 19 incursion of 3 MiG-31 interceptor jets into Estonian airspace ...
The officials reportedly concluded that Russian commanders deliberately ordered the jets into Estonian airspace. A Russian diplomat reportedly told the European diplomats that the incursions ... were a response to Ukrainian strikes on occupied Crimea ... claimed that NATO support enabled the Ukrainian strikes and stated that Russia considers itself to be already engaged in a confrontation, including against European states. Russia has publicly denied its involvement in the incursion into Estonia, claiming that the 3 Russian jets were completing a “scheduled flight” from an airfield in Karelia.
ISW continues to assess that Russia is deliberately gauging NATO's capabilities and reactions to various air incursions.
Polish Border Guards reported on September 19 that 2 Russian fighter jets performed a low altitude pass over the Polish Lotos Petrobaltic oil and gas drilling platform in Poland's exclusive economic zone in the Baltic Sea, violating the platform's safety zone.
Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen stated on September 25 that unidentified drones flew over at least 4 airports in Denmark on the night of September 23 to 24 and that the near-simultaneous deployment of drones in multiple locations indicates that a “professional actor” was involved in a “systematic operation” and “hybrid attack.”
Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braže reported to Reuters on September 25 that Denmark told NATO allies that unspecified “state actors” conducted the drone incursion over Denmark overnight on September 24 to 25, though unspecified other Danish officials told Reuters that the actor behind the incidents is unclear.
... NORAD ... detected and tracked 2 Russian Tu-95 bombers and 2 Su-35 fighter jets operating in the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on September 24.
NORAD scrambled an E-3 airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft, 4 F-16 fighter jets, and 4 KC-135 tankers to identify and intercept the Russian aircraft. NORAD clarified that Russian activity in the Alaskan ADIZ is normal and nonthreatening and that the Russian aircraft did not enter US or Canadian airspace.
Russian officials continued attempts to convince the Trump administration to allow Russia to continue its war against Ukraine unimpeded ...
Lavrov stated that he and Rubio “exchanged views” on resolving the war and claimed that Russia is ready to coordinate with the United States to address the “root causes” of the war. The Kremlin has repeatedly defined the “root causes” as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers.
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev used his English-language X ... account on September 25 to claim that Russia can use weapons that “a bomb shelter will not protect against” and threatened Americans to “keep this in mind.”
... Dmitry Peskov claimed on September 25 that Russia assumes that Trump “maintains the political will” to resolve the war and that Russia remains open to entering peace talks.
Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO and key Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev amplified an opinion piece in the Telegraph claiming that Trump is washing his hands of the war in Ukraine.
Russian officials have launched several different information operations in recent days trying to dissuade Trump and the West from continuing to support Ukraine, including using narratives decrying the Kremlin's continued commitment to its original war aims, claims that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, and claims that the United States should focus on bilateral US-Russian economic relations.
The Kremlin reportedly plans to allocate less to national defense spending in 2026 than in 2025 but acknowledged that it is increasing some taxes to fund “defense and security.” Reuters reported ... that Russia plans to allocate 12.6 trillion rubles (about $150 billion) to “National Defense” spending in 2026 - down from 13.5 trillion (about $160 billion) in 2025.
The Russian Finance Ministry stated on September 24 that the key priorities in the 2026-2028 draft budget include the fulfillment of social obligations to citizens, support for Russia's defense and security needs, and social support for families of Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine.
The Finance Ministry stated that the budget allocates funding to ensure that Russia can equip the military, pay military personnel and their families, and modernize the defense industrial base (DIB), including through the allocation of 87.9B rubles (about $1B) toward the Unmanned Aircraft Systems project over three years.
The Finance Ministry also announced an increase in value-added tax (VAT) from 20-22% starting January 2026 and a decrease in the annual revenue threshold for businesses that must pay VAT from 60M rubles (about $714K) to 10M rubles (about $119K). The Finance Ministry noted that the VAT changes are primarily meant to fund defense and security. Reuters reported that unpublished documents from the Russian Finance Ministry estimated that the VAT increase would generate about 1.2T rubles (about $14.2B) in additional revenue in 2026.
Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov claimed on September 18 that Russian authorities expect the share of Russia's revenues from oil and gas sales funding the Russian federal budget to be about 20-22% in 2026, which Siluanov noted is a decrease from about 50% previously
The Kremlin is likely seeking other revenue streams as oil and gas revenues, on which Russia has relied to fund its war in Ukraine, are decreasing in the face of impending Western sanctions and Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure.
The Kremlin is likely looking for different avenues to raise funding for defense and national security spending without aggravating existing socio-economic tensions. Recent Kremlin state media coverage and social media campaigns following the announcement of the VAT increase suggest that the Kremlin is aware of the possibility of social discontent due to the resulting increase in prices of everyday goods.
Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on September 24 that Russia's main state television channels reported on the VAT increase “discreetly,” only mentioning the change at the end of broadcasts ...
... noted that Russian state outlets Pervyi Kanal, Rossiya 1, and NTV each mentioned the VAT change in only one sentence. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on September 25 that pro-Russian government bots have written nearly 1,000 comments on Kremlin-controlled social media outlet VKontakte (VK) in support of the VAT rise. [ Obviously, they have not counted the bot comments on TOS in this report. ]
The bots reportedly focused on how the VAT revenue will go “to defense” and help those involved in the war in Ukraine, how tax raises are better than cuts to social programs, and how Russian citizens “will not really notice” the 2% difference.
Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira [ Mistress of the Russian Financial Night ] Nabiullina attempted to downplay the effect that the VAT increase could have on inflation but acknowledged that VAT hikes have worsened inflation in the past. Nabiullina claimed on September 25 that the VAT increase is a “very positive factor” and that a balanced budget is better than an increasing deficit.
Nabiullina claimed that the Central Bank would have had to significantly raise its rate forecasts for 2026 ... stated that the Central Bank sees “certainty” in the federal budget and will take this into account when making a decision about possibly cutting the key interest rate further in October 2025.
... claimed that the 2026 draft budget is disinflationary but that the experience of 2019 - when a 2% rise in VAT increased inflation by 0.6-0.7% - suggests that prices will likely rise in the short-term.
ISW continues to assess that the Russian Central Bank's efforts to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability by pursuing economic policies will likely exacerbate Russia's economic instability.
Russia continues to suffer from gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries.
Kremlin officials are attempting to downplay the gasoline shortages to domestic audiences as a result of reduced production at refineries, however.
Several milbloggers from Russia's ultra-nationalist community - one of Russian President Vladimir Putin's most important constituencies - complained about the gas shortages and rising taxes on Russian citizens.
Continued or worsening gasoline shortages, possibly coupled with rising inflation due to the VAT increase, may fuel additional social discontent in the near future.
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2025/
