Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 18, 2025
Excerpts:
The Russian military command continues to signal its commitment to Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that posits that Russia can win a war of attrition against Ukraine. Putin claimed on September 18 that there are over 700,000 Russian soldiers on the frontline in Ukraine.
Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on September 17 that Russian forces are advancing on “practically all fronts” in the war.
Putin's and Gerasimov’s statements are in line with Putin's overarching theory of victory that assumes that Russia has the resources and combat capability to continue gradual advances indefinitely and win a war of attrition against Ukraine.
Putin's theory of victory is predicated on the assumption that Russia will be able to outlast Western support for Ukraine and Ukraine's ability to resist Russian aggression. Putin has repeatedly indicated that he believes that Russian forces will be able to achieve his war goals on the battlefield, even if they are only making creeping advances, as Putin likely assesses that his troops will be able to leverage their manpower and materiel advantages to overwhelm Ukrainian forces.
Putin's and Gerasimov’s recent statements are part of wider Kremlin efforts to push Ukraine and the West to immediately acquiesce to Putin's maximalist demands out of fear that a Russian victory is inevitable and that Russian aggression will only increase in the future.
ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory is not inevitable, however, and that Ukraine and the West can leverage several key Russian weaknesses to force Putin to change his calculus and engage in good-faith negotiations. Russian gains on the battlefield have come at a high cost, with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reporting on September 9 that Russian forces have suffered 299,210 casualties killed and wounded in action since January 2025 alone.
Russian forces have been advancing at a creeping foot pace throughout 2025, and Russia's casualty rates have been disproportionately high compared to the amount of territory seized. Putin has also mismanaged Russia's economy throughout the war, resulting in increased and unsustainable wartime spending, growing inflation, and significant labor shortages.
Putin's focus on defense spending and the buildup of Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) has notably come at the expense of the civilian economic sectors. Russia's ability to fund its war machine is in part reliant on Russian oil exports, which fund a significant portion of Russia's federal revenues. US President Donald Trump noted these Russian weaknesses, stating on September 18 that Russia is incurring more losses in the war than Ukraine and that Putin will have to “drop out” of the war should oil prices come down.The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its commitment to its original war aims in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated on September 18 that Russia is only willing to compromise in Ukraine if a peace settlement ensures Russia's “legitimate security interests” as well as the interests of Russians who live in Ukraine. Lavrov also claimed that the United States understands the need to address the so-called “root causes” of the war.
Kremlin officials, including Lavrov, have consistently used “legitimate security interests” and “root causes” as shorthand to reiterate Russia's original war demands, which Kremlin officials have continuously asserted Russia will achieve either militarily or diplomatically.
Lavrov is attempting to falsely posture Russia as willing to compromise despite the Kremlin's repeated demands that Ukraine capitulate and acquiesce to Russia's maximalist demands.
The Kremlin is also attempting to manipulate the Trump administration into normalizing US-Russian bilateral relations without concluding the war in Ukraine - contrary to Trump's desired timeline of working on bilateral relations after concluding a peace in Ukraine.
Lavrov claimed on September 18 that US President Donald Trump aims to “remove the topic of Ukraine” from the US-Russian agenda in order to “normalize” bilateral economic, technological, and other relations ... that efforts to “entice” Russian President Vladimir Putin into economic deals with the United States will not stop the war.
The Kremlin is attempting to push Trump to separate the war in Ukraine from discussions about US-Russian bilateral relations, particularly in the economic sphere. The Kremlin likely aims to simultaneously continue its war in Ukraine while alleviating the pressure that existing and possible future sanctions are putting on the Russian economy, particularly sanctions targeting the energy revenues that largely fund the war.
The Kremlin has similarly leveraged the CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev to promote the prospect of expanding US-Russian economic and business relations in order to gain concessions from the Trump administration on Ukraine.
The Kremlin appears to be conducting a coordinated information campaign threatening Finland. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on September 18 that the Finnish government's “neutral veneer peeled off” and that revanchism is “literally on the rise” in Finland.
Russian Environmental Protection, Ecology, and Transport Special Presidential Representative Sergei Ivanov claimed on September 18 that Russian-Finnish relations “practically do not exist” and will not improve in the near future as Finland is a NATO member and is “actively calling for strengthening [its] eastern border.”
Ivanov claimed that the Finnish population is unsatisfied with the Finnish government and alleged that the lack of Russian tourists has led to “depopulation” and a weakening economy in southeastern Finland. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa similarly claimed on September 18 that Finland's NATO membership caused Russians to stop buying property and visiting Finland, leading to “depopulation.”
Ivanov is a member of Putin's inner circle, serving as the deputy director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) from 1998 to 1999 when Putin headed the organization. Ivanov also served as the defense minister, deputy prime minister, and chief of staff of the Presidential Administration. Ivanov’s removal from his position as the chief of staff of the Presidential Administration in 2016 was likely a demotion at the time, but the Kremlin appears to be using him to reinforce ongoing Russian efforts to threaten Finland ... High-ranking Kremlin officials have increased threats against Finland in recent weeks, including by using language that mirrors the Kremlin's false justifications for its invasions of Ukraine.
ISW continues to assess that the playbook Russia is currently using to threaten NATO mirrors the playbook Russia previously used to set informational conditions justifying its aggression against Ukraine.
Lithuanian authorities connected Russian military intelligence to several incidents of arson in Europe in late July 2024 that were likely part of Russia's ongoing hybrid warfare campaign that aims to sow fear and discord within Europe. The Lithuanian Prosecutor General's Office and Criminal Police Bureau reported on September 17 that three individuals, two of whom are Russian citizens affiliated with Russian military intelligence services, shipped four packages with incendiary devices from Vilnius to various European countries in late July 2024.
Lithuanian authorities reported that three of the packages detonated at the airport in Leipzig, Germany; on a freight truck in Poland; and at a DHL warehouse in Birmingham, United Kingdom between July 20 to 22, 2024. Lithuanian authorities reported that the fourth package reached Poland over land but did not detonate due to a technical failure. The devices reportedly contained homemade electronic timer-controlled incendiary charges as well as additional flammable substances.
Lithuanian authorities ... are pursuing charges against 15 total suspects for their involvement in the organization and execution of these acts, including several suspects implicated in the attempted attack against an IKEA shopping center in Vilnius on May 9, 2024. Russia likely intends for these attacks to sow discord and chaos within European states and undermine domestic stability and the harmony between European states. Russia has been engaged in a multipronged hybrid warfare campaign since at least 2022 against Europe that has included electronic warfare (EW) interference and GPS jamming, sabotage missions, arson attacks, and attempted assassinations.
Ukraine and Poland agreed on joint drone development and training mechanisms following the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on September 9 to 10. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on September 18 that Poland and Ukraine will create a joint unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) task force that will serve as a platform to coordinate and develop joint drone initiatives.
Shmyhal stated that Ukraine and Poland will use the task force to exchange knowledge and experiences with drones, develop and test counter-drone technologies, increase interoperability between Polish and Ukrainian forces, and train Polish forces and engineers on how to use air defense systems to protect against Russian drone and missile strikes. Shmyhal and Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz also signed a memorandum of understanding on September 18 establishing a training ground in Poland where Ukraine will train Polish forces on drone use.
Shmyhal stated that Ukraine will help Poland to create a “drone line” that works with EW systems to enable Poland to use drones to repel strikes. Shmyhal added that Ukraine will provide Poland with access to programs to monitor Russian strikes, possibly directed toward Poland. Shmyhal stated that Poland will also receive 43.7 billion euros (about $51.5 billion) from the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program, the EU’s financial instrument to facilitate common defense procurement efforts between EU states in order to boost Europe's defense industrial production capacity.
Shmyhal stated that Ukraine and Poland will establish joint defense programs through the SAFE mechanism.
ISW continues to assess that the September 9-10 Russian drone incursion was the latest in Russia's years-long efforts to conduct kinetic provocations against Europe, including through its hybrid warfare campaign, while also increasing its rhetorical provocations threatening neighboring NATO states.
The Kremlin will likely introduce a quota to systematically appoint hand-selected veterans of the war in Ukraine to positions in municipal, regional, and federal government in support of the Kremlin's long-term campaign to militarize Russian society. A Just Russia Party Leader Sergey Mironov told Russian President Vladimir Putin during a meeting with political party leaders on September 18 that his party is proposing to establish a three percent quota for Russian veterans serving in municipal, regional, and federal government positions.
Mironov claimed that he agrees with Putin's belief that veterans must form the “future elite” in Russia. Putin responded to Mironov’s proposal, claiming that it is an “attractive idea,” but warned that such a quota might turn into “formalism.” Putin claimed that there are 700,000 Russian service members fighting in Ukraine and that the Kremlin will need to be diligent about selecting the right candidates via the Time of Heroes program (the Kremlin's program that prepares loyal veterans of the war in Ukraine for work in government and state enterprises).
Putin and Mironov are likely setting informational conditions to systematically appoint veterans who are loyal to the regime to positions of power. ISW continues to assess that Putin launched the Time of Heroes program to ensure that Russian society is deeply militarized and ready to make greater sacrifices in the war in Ukraine and during potential Russian aggression against NATO in the future.
Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly extended Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s military service for 5 more years, demonstrating how Putin continues to retain an aging cadre of loyalists despite his stated efforts to raise a new, younger elite. A source close to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) told Russian outlet RBK on September 18 that the Kremlin extended Gerasimov’s service term, with another source specifying that the Kremlin extended his term for five more years.
Gerasimov turned 70 years old on September 8, reaching the standard mandatory retirement age. Putin notably signed a decree in March 2021 that removed the mandatory retirement age for senior presidential appointees, allowing them to serve past the age of 70.
Putin awarded Gerasimov with the Order of Courage on September 8, despite the fact that Russian veterans and ultranationalists frequently criticize Gerasimov for his command incompetence.
A Kremlin insider source assessed on September 9 that Putin retained Gerasimov in order to maintain stability in the chain of command.
Russian independent newspaper The Moscow Times reported that Gerasimov is likely at least the fourth known senior Russian military and security official who has maintained his role after reaching the mandatory retirement age.
Putin's commitment to retaining aging but loyal military and security officials within his inner circle contradicts the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to appoint younger veterans of the war in Ukraine to positions of power. Putin is also contradicting his promises from the early 2000s not to remain in power past the age of 65.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed the departure of Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Dmitry Kozak from his senior Kremlin position. Peskov claimed on September 18 that Kozak resigned voluntarily but did not offer details about his departure.
ISW continues to assess that Kozak’s repeated disagreements with Russian President Vladimir Putin over the war in Ukraine suggest that Putin and possibly other Kremlin power-brokers, such as Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko, removed Kozak from his position or pushed him to “resign” on his own.
A Russian insider source Kozak’s departure demonstrates the ineffectiveness of his policies, particularly those related to former Soviet states, including Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and the Baltics, and is a signal that the Kremlin views its current foreign policy model in the post-Soviet space as insufficient.
Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on September 18. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported on September 18 that Russia released the bodies of 1,000 deceased Ukrainian soldiers.
Ukraine's “I Want to Find” project reported on September 18 that Russia received the bodies of 24 KIA service members.
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/
