Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2025
Excerpts:
Ukrainian and Russian media published the major points of both sides’ memorandums on June 1 and 2, respectively. Ukranian outlet Suspilne published the full text of Ukraine's memorandum on June 1, which reflected Umerov’s statements about Ukraine's proposals during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks. Ukraine's memorandum calls for:
A complete and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land, and at sea as a precondition to peace negotiations;
Confidence building measures, including the return of all Ukrainian children and civilians and the exchange of all POWs;
The goal of negotiations to be a permanent, lasting peace agreement, as part of which Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees and maintains its territorial integrity and ability to join any security alliance, including NATO;
And for Russia and Ukraine to continue negotiations after the June 2 Istanbul meeting, work towards confidence building measures, and prepare for a future Zelensky-Putin meeting.
Russia's memorandum is divided into 3 sections:
the 1st section defines Russia's demands for the “final settlement” of the war;
the 2nd section proposes 2 different sets of pre-conditions that Russia would accept as part of a ceasefire;
and the 3rd section outlines Russia's ideal timeline for negotiations.
The 1st section of Russia's memorandum lists demands that Ukraine should concede to as part of a long-term peace agreement, including:
International recognition of Russia's occupation of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea and the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from these oblasts;
Indefinite Ukrainian commitment to neutrality (a promise to never join military alliances and coalitions), a ban on future foreign military deployments and infrastructure in Ukraine, termination of all of Ukraine's existing security agreements, and a permanent ban on Ukraine having nuclear weapons;
And protection of the “full rights, freedoms, and interests” of Russians and Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine and legislation against the “glorification and propaganda of Nazism.”
The 2nd section of Russia's memorandum demands that Ukraine and Russia pursue 1 of 2 paths toward a ceasefire.
The 1st path requires Ukraine to completely withdraw from the unoccupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts up to an unspecified distance beyond the oblasts’ borders [ 'buffer zones' ].
The 2nd path requires Ukraine to agree a different set of Russian demands, including:
Ban redeployments of all its units, except as part of withdrawals from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts;
End all Ukrainian force generation efforts, begin demobilization, end martial law, and organize Presidential elections within 100 days of ending martial law, and elect a new government;
And terminate all foreign military assistance, including the supply of satellite imagery and intelligence, and ban all foreign military deployments to Ukraine.
The 3rd section of Russia's memorandum recommends that Russia and Ukraine sign a longer-term ceasefire agreement after exchanging the bodies of dead service members and a 2-to-3-day general ceasefire to retrieve bodies from the battlefield [ a pause before continuing advancing Russian forces ].
The memorandum demands that Ukraine completely withdraw from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts within 30 days of the beginning of the ceasefire and that Ukraine elect a new government before Russia and Ukraine sign a formal peace agreement.
Russia's memorandum reflects the Kremlin's long-standing public demands for Ukraine to make significant territorial and political concessions while Russia offers no concessions of its own. Russia's memorandum is imbued with its long-standing demand that any peace settlement address Russia's perceived “root causes” of the war - namely the eastern expansion of NATO since the early 1990s and Ukraine's supposed discrimination against Russian-speakers and Russian culture.
Putin demanded during a speech on June 14, 2024 that Ukrainian forces must begin to “completely withdraw” from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts (which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in September 2022) and that Ukraine officially abandons its goal to join NATO before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations.
The Russian delegation dismissed Russia's systemic kidnapping of Ukrainian children. Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak [ former KGB operative ] reported that the Ukrainian delegation gave Russia the names of “hundreds” of kidnapped Ukrainian children that Russia must return to Ukraine. Medinsky claimed that the Ukrainian list contained 331 names yet downplayed this list as not “thousands” or “millions” of children but “dozens.”
Open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series on June 1. Open-source analysts on X assessed that available imagery published on June 2 indicates that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged 4 Tu-95 bombers and 3 Tu-22M3 bombers at Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast and 1 A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft at Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast.
Open-source analysts on X claimed that available video footage published on June 1 and 2 indicates that Ukrainian special services destroyed or damaged 5 Tu-95 bombers and 1 An-22 transport aircraft at Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast.
[ 12 bombers, I AWACs, 1 transport aircraft ].
Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko ... reported on June 2 that Ukrainian forces destroyed at least 13 Russian fixed-wing aircraft and damaged over 40 aircraft in total during the strike.
Ukrainian military observer Tatarigami stated on June 2 that Russia has not built new Tu-95 or Tu-22M3 since 1991 and that Russia only had 70 to 90 Tupolev aircraft before the June 1 strike series. 
