Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 10, 2026Excerpts:
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov continued to explicitly blame the United States on February 10 for the lack of progress in ending Russia's war against Ukraine and reinvoked the Spring 2022 Istanbul talks to justify Russia's rejection of Ukraine receiving meaningful security guarantees ...
Lavrov claimed that US policies toward Russia under US President Donald Trump are “moving in the wrong direction” ...
The 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft document stipulated that Russia - the aggressor in the war in Ukraine - would be treated as a neutral ”guarantor state” of Ukraine; that Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) would have veto power over a mechanism to respond to future aggression in Ukraine; and that Ukraine commit to neutrality, severe restrictions on military size and composition, and never accepting military assistance from its allies.
The Kremlin has been attempting to push the United States to abandon the recent US-led negotiations with Ukraine and Europe in favor of a US-Russian settlement based almost entirely on Russia's demands, which have not changed over the course of the war.
The Kremlin throttled Telegram on February 9 and 10 - a significant intensification of Russia's three-year campaign to reassert control over the Russian information space ...
Russian outlet RBK claimed on February 10 that a source in the Russian IT industry and 2 sources in unspecified “relevant” Russian agencies stated that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor decided to start throttling Telegram on February 10 ... confirmed to Russian business outlet Kommersant that it is restricting Telegram's operations in order to force it to comply with Russian laws ... claimed that Telegram needs to protect Russian citizens from fraud and create conditions to combat extremism and terrorism.
Russian authorities began to restrict calls on Telegram in August 2025, but the February 9-10 throttling marks a more significant Kremlin effort to block access to the platform. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported that sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the recent throttling of Telegram is a “test” and that Russian authorities may completely block Telegram ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections, as the Kremlin fears a negative domestic reaction to the United Russia Party winning 70 percent of the vote ...
Russian milbloggers complained about the Telegram restrictions on February 10 and expressed concern about possible implications on Russian command and control (C2). A Russian milblogger claimed that Telegram slowdowns will have a “profound” negative impact on Russian military communications.
Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian authorities began to slow down Telegram “some time ago” and that the decision is “clumsy” as Telegram serves as a “lifeline” for Russian military communications.
The milblogger claimed that the throttling of Telegram will negatively impact interoperability among air defense units and maneuver groups that need to be able to cooperate in the face of Ukrainian drone strikes. Telegram slowdowns could exacerbate C2 issues Russian forces are reportedly facing after SpaceX shut down Russian Starlink terminals operating in Ukraine as of February 1.
Russian strikes and assaults have not stopped entirely since the shutdown of Starlink and throttling of Telegram, however, and Russian forces likely maintain alternative C2 networks, such as mesh networks, that they can use in the meantime.
The Kremlin has been engaged in a widespread censorship campaign to regain control over the Russian information space since late 2022, when the Kremlin began to censor, arrest, and co-opt Russian milbloggers who criticized the Kremlin and its methods of waging war in Ukraine.
Russian authorities justified their initial efforts to deliberately restrict Telegram by blaming the platform for enabling scammers to commit fraud against Russian citizens.
The Kremlin introduced the state-controlled messenger app Max in March 2025 and has been attempting to entice and coerce Russian citizens to abandon other messaging platforms for Max. The Max platform has remained largely unpopular among Russians, however.
The Kremlin is likely more significantly restricting Telegram now in order to incentivize Russians to switch to Max, as previous Russian efforts to do so have been largely ineffective ...
Russia's ability to acquire foreign machine tools despite Western sanctions is reportedly allowing Russia to increase its production of tank and artillery barrels - a key constraining factor on Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian open source intelligence outlet Frontelligence Insight reported on February 9, citing internal Russian procurement documents that Russia is modernizing the Uralmash Plant No. 9, which manufactures barrels for the Koalitsiya and Msta self-propelled howitzers and for various Russian tanks, including the T-14 Armata, T-90, and modernized T-62 and T-72.
Frontelligence Insight reported that Russia has been modernizing the Uralmash Plant No. 9 since 2016 and that the plant has acquired at least 22 of machine tools manufactured by companies in Taiwan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy for its production efforts. Frontelligence Insight noted that Russia determined it cannot compensate for its dependency on foreign machine tools for its defense industrial base (DIB) and that the planning documents indicate that Russia feels confident about its ability to acquire these machine tools despite Western sanctions.
Russia's struggles to acquire foreign-produced machine tools have historically limited its DIB production, including tank and artillery barrels. Russia was reportedly able to produce about 50 artillery barrels per year as of October 2024 - a major bottleneck to Russia's ability to produce new and maintain existing artillery systems.
Russia has not been able to produce tanks and artillery systems to match its losses of these systems in Ukraine, but successful sanctions evasion schemes may allow Russia to scale up its rate of production and refurbishment of artillery systems in particular.
Russia's production of the precision machine tools it needs for its DIB has atrophied in the past 30 years, and Russia has been increasingly relying on the PRC to obtain these machine tools.
Russia will likely continue to intensify its sanctions evasion efforts to acquire foreign-made machine tools for both its near- and long-term armament efforts, highlighting the critical importance of Western sanctions in countering these efforts and inhibiting Russia's war machine.
Unconfirmed media reports suggest that Japan may fund non-lethal military aid to Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative...NATO jets intercepted another Russian fighter jet close to NATO airspace in the Baltic Sea in late January 2026. The Spanish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on January 28 that Spanish EF-18M Hornet jets intercepted a Russian Su-30SM2 fighter jet flying over the Baltic Sea close to NATO airspace as a part of the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission.
ISW continues to assess that Russia is intensifying its ”Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe and undermine NATO cohesion in preparation for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2026/
