Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 4, 2025
Excerpts:
Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his commitment to his original war aims from 2021 and 2022 and unwillingness to compromise during an interview with Indian media - likely as part of the Kremlin's efforts to shape the international information space during the ongoing negotiations process. Putin gave an interview to India Today English-language news magazine ahead of his December 4 state visit to India.
Putin stated that Russia will end its war in Ukraine when it achieves the goals that Putin set forth at the start of the full-scale invasion ... Ukraine must understand that the “best way” to solve the war is for Ukraine to agree to a peace settlement like the one Russia tried to impose on Ukraine in 2022 - referencing the 2022 Istanbul agreement that amounted to Ukraine's full capitulation.
Putin responded to a question about what constitutes a victory for Russia, stating that Russia wants to “protect” ethnic Russians, the Russian language, and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Ukraine, justifications the Kremlin has often used for its demand for the removal of the current Ukrainian government and its replacement with a pro-Russian government.
Putin also demanded that NATO not expand further, essentially calling for a revocation of NATO's Open Door Policy and return to NATO's 1997 borders.
ISW continues to assess that Putin, in part, launched his full-scale invasion in order to destroy NATO and seize control of all of Ukraine, and Putin's original war demands notably include not only demands of Ukraine but of NATO and the West as well.
Putin is attempting to falsely frame his war aims as solely geographically limited to Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Putin falsely claimed that Russia “had no choice,” but to recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DNR and LNR), that he offered Ukraine to withdraw its forces from all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to avoid hostilities in 2022, and that Ukraine subsequently refused.
Putin claimed that Russia will now either seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts through military means or Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the areas of the 2 oblasts that Ukraine still controls.
Putin's focus during the December 4 interview on Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts ignores the way that his full-scale invasion initially sought to capture far more territory than just those two regions, including Kyiv City, and to fully control Ukraine through a Kremlin-installed government. Russia had to rescope its strategy after its failure to take Kyiv City to focus instead on more limited operations in eastern Ukraine.
Putin attempted to obfuscate his rejection of the latest US peace proposal in the December 4 interview ... claiming that the peace proposals from the US delegation were “in one way or another” based on the agreements from Putin's previous meeting with US President Donald Trump in Alaska ... that there were points in the US-proposal to which Russia could not agree, but that he would not offer more specifics so as to not “disrupt” Trump's peace process.
ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is purposely refraining from publicly discussing the December 2 meeting in order to obfuscate Russia's rejection of the US-Ukrainian peace proposal that did not concede to all of Russia's absolutist war demands.
Other Kremlin officials continued to publicly display their commitment to Putin's original war aims. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky stated that Russia will not change its “basic” demands, including the prohibition of NATO membership for Ukraine and Ukraine's demilitarization (Ukraine's disarmament such that Ukraine cannot defend itself in the future), and denazification (a term the Kremlin uses to call for the removal of the current Ukrainian government) ... claimed that Russia can “entirely” achieve this “baseline” on the battlefield. State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Ukraine could lose its statehood, not just territory, such that it is “better” for Ukraine to reach a negotiated settlement before “things will get worse.”
ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has been engaged in widespread cognitive warfare efforts in the lead up to and during the ongoing negotiations process that aims to paint a Russian victory on the battlefield as imminent and inevitable, such that Ukraine and the West should give in to Russia's demands now. [ A proposition that US Sec State Rubio seems to agree with. ]
Russian military victory is not imminent or inevitable, however, and the West maintains significant agency in how Russia's war against Ukraine ends.
The Kremlin is setting conditions to frame any future agreement to not attack and seize Odessa and Mykolaiv cities as an alleged Russian “concession” in peace negotiations, even though Russia is currently incapable of seizing these cities. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on December 3 that Russian commanders have not been publicly reporting on activity in the Kherson direction recently because Russian forces are “deliberately” not intensifying offensive operations there ... that Russian forces “definitely could” intensify in the area and then could launch an offensive on Odessa and Mykolaiv cities such that Ukraine would have “no other major cities left on the Black Sea coast.”
... threatened that Russian forces could use occupied Crimea as a launch point for such offensive operations “both on land and at sea” ... that Ukrainian authorities are discriminating against Russian-speakers in Odessa, Kherson, and Mykolaiv cities and that residents in Odessa and Mykolaiv oblasts would vote to “join” Russia should there be referendum in those regions - calling back to the sham referendum that Russia held in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts in 2022 to justify its illegal annexation of the four regions.
High-ranking Kremlin officials, including Putin himself, have recently reignited the longstanding Russian narratives about Russia's claim to Odessa and Mykolaiv oblasts.
These Kremlin statements in the past days are likely part of a cognitive warfare effort aimed at influencing the ongoing peace negotiations. Russian forces are notably not in a position to make such large-scale advances to take Odesa or Mykolaiv cities either by land or sea. Russian forces would need to deprioritize other sectors to deploy a significant force grouping to successfully cross the Dnipro River and make significant advances westward and northward over land - an exceedingly difficult undertaking.
Ukrainian forces have also significantly damaged and denied further usage of the Black Sea Fleet's (BSF) landing ships that Russian forces would need for an amphibious invasion, while also pushing the BSF out of the northwestern Black Sea.
The Kremlin may be setting conditions to “relinquish” its demands for these territories in the future in order to create the impression that the Kremlin is making “concessions” during negotiations.
The Kremlin may also be incorporating threats of kinetic action into this cognitive warfare effort surrounding Odessa and Mykolaiv oblasts. Putin responded to an alleged Ukrainian attack against a Russian-flagged tanker off the coast of Turkey on December 2, threatening to strike Ukrainian ports, ships traveling to Ukrainian ports, and vessels of states helping Ukraine.
Putin also threatened to cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea - possibly threatening to seize territory in Odessa and Mykolaiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk assessed, however, that Russia may have staged the attack.
The Kremlin may also try to present a Russian agreement to refrain from striking Ukrainian ports and vessels on the Black Sea as an alleged “compromise” in negotiations.
ISW continues to assess that Putin remains committed to his goal of taking control of all of Ukraine, however. Any putative Kremlin “concession” agreeing to abandon efforts to seize Odessa and Mykolaiv cities would be a short-term negotiating tactic, not a shift in the Kremlin's long-standing strategic goals.
ISW has not observed evidence to suggest that Russian forces have encircled Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), as some Ukrainian sources continue to indicate, that Ukrainian forces maintain limited ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Ukrainian media outlet Hromadske reported on December 3 that Ukrainian service members stated that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad as of November 29, and one of the sources stated that Ukrainian forces in the area have not rotated since November 12.
A source told Hromadske that Ukrainian attempts to relieve the encirclement have been partially successful. The source also indicated that Ukrainian forces could hold Myrnohrad, if Ukrainian forces retook Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman (north of Myrnohrad) and Rodynske (just northwest of Chervonyi Lyman).
Ukraine's 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Colonel Volodymyr Polevyi refuted claims that Russian forces had surrounded Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad, reporting that Ukrainian forces continue to conduct rotations and limited logistics within the town.
ISW has not observed visual evidence or official Ukrainian reports to assess that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad, though the situation is likely extremely difficult, and Russian forces very likely can disrupt narrow Ukrainian exfiltration routes and GLOCs with artillery and drones.
Ukrainian forces are still operating within Pokrovsk, as Russian forces continue infiltration missions in the area. Ukrainian military officials, including the Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi, reported on December 4 that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence within Pokrovsk and even hold unspecified areas of the town ... The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 4 that Russian forces are infiltrating in fire teams of 2 to 3 personnel into northern Pokrovsk during poor weather conditions.
The spokesperson stated that the Russian military command has concentrated roughly 150,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area, about 11,000 to 12,000 of which are conducting assaults. The spokesperson stated that Russian drones are complicating Ukrainian logistics, but that Ukrainian forces have been able to conduct several rotations and bring in supplies in the past few days.
Russia appears to have launched a new cognitive warfare [ propaganda ] campaign aimed at spreading narratives about Russian preparations for an offensive on Chernihiv City against the backdrop of the ongoing peace negotiations ...
Kovalenko observed that these narratives emerged against the backdrop of the US-led peace effort and noted that the claims aim to put additional pressure on Ukrainian society and imitate a Russian ability to simultaneously advance on multiple fronts ... that Russia does not have the manpower or materiel required for an assault on Chernihiv City and that Ukrainian forces have been repelling Russian provocations in Chernihiv Oblast.
... that Russia launched similar cognitive warfare campaigns against Kharkiv and Sumy cities in the past but that Ukrainian forces prevented Russian forces from advancing to these cities.
ISW observed on December 3 and 4 a limited number of milbloggers vaguely implying that Russian forces are preparing for offensive operations against Chernihiv City.
The Kremlin may start widely amplifying this narrative as part of its consolidated cognitive warfare campaign aimed at convincing Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Russia's demands that it cannot secure militarily.
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2025/
