Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 29, 2025
Excerpts:
A Russian official threatened to supply nuclear missiles to Venezuela and Cuba and called the United States a Russian enemy. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov said on October 29 that Russia can deliver nuclear-capable missiles to “Venezuela or Cuba,” which Zhuravlyov noted are located near Russia's “main geopolitical adversary” - the United States.
Zhuravlyov said that Russia has an “entire range” of missiles at its disposal and will use “what is needed.” Zhuravlyov said that the United States is “not a friend or partner” of Russia but is an “enemy.”
Zhuravlyov's threats are meant to evoke memories of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as Russian officials have done in the past.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to tout new Russian nuclear missiles to threaten the United States. Putin announced on October 29 that Russia tested the Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle on October 28 and touted the vehicle's alleged speed and power.
Putin also recalled Russia's recent test of the Burevestnik missile, which is similarly nuclear-powered and has similar characteristics. Putin's announcements of even more newly tested nuclear-powered weapons defy US President Donald Trump's call on October 27 for Putin to focus on ending the war in Ukraine, not testing missiles.
Putin is detailing the alleged attributes of the weapons to add weight and urgency to his nuclear threats to enact concessions from the United States on Ukraine. Putin is raising the specter of nuclear war to get Trump and European officials to concede to Russian demands that Russian forces cannot secure on the battlefield. The alleged features of the weapons that Putin touted may be novel, but the systems do not change the underlying framework of deterrence that has prevented nuclear war since 1945. The United States and its French and British NATO allies still retain strong nuclear triads to deter nuclear attack.
Russia continues to use Belarus to threaten Europe with the Oreshnik missile. Belarusian Presidential Press Secretary Natalya Eismont told Kremlin newswire TASS on October 28 that Belarus will put the Oreshnik missile system on combat duty in December 2025.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 29 that Russia and Belarus do not feel safe given European officials’ “Russophobic statements” and militaristic aspirations and hysteria.
Peskov claimed that statements from the Baltics, Poland, France, and the UK show “how dear” the Oreshnik is to Belarus and Russia. Putin announced in August 2025 that Russian and Belarusian specialists were working to identify future Oreshnik deployment locations by the end of 2025.
ISW continues to assess that Russia is leveraging the Oreshnik system as part of a reflexive control campaign aimed at undermining Western resolve to militarily support Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is performatively offering an hours-long micro-ceasefire in Pokrovsk likely in part to claim that Russia is not the impediment to the peace process. Putin continued to claim on October 29 that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk and Pokrovsk and proposed a ceasefire lasting two to six hours to allow journalists into Pokrovsk.
ISW does not assess that Russian forces have encircled either town at this time. Putin claimed that Russia is mainly concerned about Ukraine executing a provocation during the proposed ceasefire to blame Russia. Putin is likely trying to use micro-ceasefire proposals to show that Russia is interested in a ceasefire, particularly as Russia has publicly rejected US President Donald Trump's proposed ceasefire on the current frontline. Putin's proposed ceasefire would be a staged media opportunity to portray the situation in a way that benefits Russia. He announced the offer in a staged fashion to call attention to his exaggerated claims about Russian progress in Pokrovsk. Putin likely assesses that Ukraine would not agree to this strange and disingenuous proposal, furthering the long-standing Kremlin narrative that Ukraine is the obstacle to peace.
Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction but remain unlikely to immediately collapse the Ukrainian pocket. Geolocated footage published on October 28 and 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Pokrovsk and in northeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).
Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian forces have begun infiltrating into northern Pokrovsk past the railway station in central Pokrovsk, and some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces reached the northern outskirts of the town.
A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence noted that the frontline remains porous and that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in southern Pokrovsk.
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Hnativka, entered Rih (both immediately east of Pokrovsk), and advanced west of Pokrovsk.
Geolocated footage published on October 29 shows a Russian flag on the western entrance to Pokrovsk, and Russian sources claimed that there are large contested “gray zones” within Pokrovsk and west of the town.
Ukrainian Eastern Command Spokesperson Captain Hryhorii Shapoval reported on October 28 that Russian forces entered the outskirts of Myrnohrad, but the Ukrainian Eastern Command stated on October 29 that Russian forces are not operating within Myrnohrad and that Shapoval was referring to the Pokrovsk situation instead.
The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian assault groups conduct infiltration missions into the town and engage Ukrainian drone and mortar crews in firefights to inhibit Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes. The commander noted that Ukrainian forces are struggling to distinguish between civilians and Russian soldiers disguised as civilians - considered perfidy under international law - making it difficult for Ukrainian forces to conduct defensive operations.
A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are conducting heavy drone and artillery strikes and airstrikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and that Ukrainian forces are relying on unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to support logistics to forward positions and conduct some strikes against Russian positions.
Russian forces will likely expend large amounts of manpower and equipment to close the Ukrainian pocket in the Pokrovsk direction, as they have during the past 18 months of fighting for Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on October 29 that Russian forces have concentrated 11,000 personnel for the Pokrovsk effort and deployed a total of 29,000 personnel to the corps’ area of responsibility (AoR).
The 7th Rapid Reaction Corps published a map indicating that Russian forces are currently attacking in three different areas: north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske, east of Pokrovsk into Myrnohrad and eastern Pokrovsk, and into Pokrovsk from the south. The corps assessed that Russian forces entering southern Pokrovsk aim to attack into northwestern Pokrovsk and then into Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and eastern Pokrovsk. Russian forces are primarily conducting infiltration missions into Pokrovsk and do not currently exercise the degree of control necessary to push Ukrainian forces entirely from the town and establish enduring positions.
Russian forces will likely need to threaten the entire Ukrainian pocket with imminent encirclement in order to seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad without fighting all the way through both settlements. Russian forces have struggled to advance on the eastern and northeastern flanks of the Pokrovsk area to support this larger encirclement effort over the entire pocket, however.
Russian forces have been fighting to seize Pokrovsk since February 2024 and have expended significant amounts of manpower and materiel in fighting – losses largely due to the Ukrainian drone strikes that have staved off Russian advances in the area for much of the Russian campaign.
A recent US intelligence assessment reportedly concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin is more determined than ever to gain a battlefield victory in his war in Ukraine, consistent with ongoing statements by senior Russian officials. NBC News reported on October 28, citing two senior US officials, that a US intelligence assessment given to Congress in October 2025 concluded that Putin is more committed than ever to gaining a battlefield victory in Ukraine and is showing no willingness to compromise.
The assessment reportedly found that Putin is committed to securing more Ukrainian territory to justify the human and financial losses he has imposed on the Russian people. The recent assessment is in line with ISW’s longstanding assessment of Putin's continued commitment to his maximalist war aims.[
Senior Russian officials continue to indicate that Russia is prepared to continue the war indefinitely until Ukraine and its partners capitulate to Russia's demands.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on October 28 rejected US President Donald Trump's proposal for a ceasefire along the current frontline to precede negotiations and indicated that Russia's demands are unchanged.
Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apti Alaudinov stated on October 29 that Russian forces’ task is to seize as much territory as possible to strengthen Russia's position at the negotiating table.
ISW continues to assess that Russia remains uninterested in good-faith negotiations to end its war in Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian State Duma deputies are using imperial Russian and Soviet ideologies to call for Russian society to unite against alleged internal and external threats - likely to set conditions for further repressions and intensified involuntary mobilization for the war against Ukraine or a future war against NATO. Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin gave an address to the Russian State Duma on October 29 in which he claimed that a “strong president means a strong Russia” and that “if there is Putin, then there is Russia.”
Volodin called on Russians to “consolidate around Putin, win, and preserve the traditions of both Tsarist and Soviet Russia.” Volodin claimed that membership in the Soviet Communist Party was initially an honor and that the party was full of people “who were true moral and ethical beacons,” but that the party then relegated these people to the background due to the lack of “threats,” causing the party to collapse. Volodin claimed that the Soviet Union also collapsed due to a move toward “sycophants and traitors” such that modern-day Russia must work to “respect people who selflessly serve their country and fight against those who cause [Russia] harm.” Volodin claimed that Russian “foreign agents” in the “fifth column” receive money from abroad, have betrayed their country, and are trying to harm the state.
Volodin claimed that Russia must consolidate society and prevent foreign agents from operating within Russia. Volodin specifically criticized Russians who left Russia to live in Europe. Volodin claimed that Russia must prevent its destruction “from within” and that external challenges “bring everyone together.”[31] Volodin called for stricter legislation on “foreign agents” that would be “in the interests of [Russian] citizens.”
Putin visited a military hospital on October 29 and spoke with a wounded Russian servicemember about the “continuity of the tradition of service in Russia.”The soldier and Putin reminisced about uncovering stories about their ancestors’ military service in archives. Putin claimed that the soldier is “fighting just like [his] grandfather” and that “it is in our genes without even knowing.” Soldiers at the hospital gifted Putin armor plates upon which they had painted Orthodox saints and which they had worn on the battlefield under fire. Volodin’s and Putin's statements allude to a central strongman on whom the state's entire existence rests, deference to the Orthodox Church, and the unity of the Russian people and history, calling back to the 19th century Russian imperial ideology of Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality (Narodnost’).
The Kremlin is likely trying to convince Russians that Russia is facing threats both externally and internally in order to justify future intensified repressions and the implementation of a permanent wartime footing like the one the Communist Party imposed on the Soviet Union for most of its existence. The Kremlin has long claimed that it is fighting the West and that foreign actors are trying to conduct sabotage within Russia - claims that Kremlin officials repeated today and in recent days.
The Kremlin's claims are callbacks to the Soviet Union's rhetorical justifications for enormous military mobilization during the Cold War as the answer to being “surrounded by enemies” as well as to Stalin's justification for his repressions and purges in the 1920s and 1930s as necessary to fight against “anti-Soviet” elements, wreckers, and saboteurs. The Kremlin may be preparing society and setting conditions for intensified crackdowns and repressions. The Kremlin has already intensified its control over the Russian information space and cracked down on Russian society in recent years, particularly after the failed Wagner rebellion in June 2023. These comments suggest that the Kremlin has wider plans and intentions that it fears will invoke domestic backlash even in the current repressive conditions.
The Kremlin may plan to intensify repression ahead of possible involuntary mobilization. A future involuntary mobilization may start with the callup of active reservists to protect critical infrastructure (as the Kremlin is starting to do), but may expand to the use of reservists in fighting in Ukraine.
The Kremlin may aim to use claims that Russia is facing intensified external and internal threats to demand more sacrifices from Russian society and to implement a permanent military and economic mobilization.
European officials continue to report aerial incursions in European airspace. Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken reported on October 29 that authorities spotted several unidentified drones operating near the Marche-en-Famenne military base overnight on October 25 to 26.
Francken noted that investigations are ongoing and did not attribute responsibility for the drones to any actor at this time. Lithuanian Minister of the Interior Vladislav Kondratovičius reported on October 29 that the Lithuanian government is extending the partial closure of the Medininkai border crossing and full closure of the Salcininkai border crossing with Belarus until November 30.
The closures follow several recent incidents involving Belarusian smuggling balloons violating Lithuania's airspace. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported on October 29 that two Polish fighter jets intercepted a Russian Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea on October 28.
The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command noted that the Russian aircraft was operating without a registered flight plan or an active transponder but did not violate Polish airspace.
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2025/ 
