Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 23, 2025
Excerpts:
The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Indian oil companies are reportedly significantly reducing direct purchases of Russian oil in the short term, and the European Union (EU) passed its 19th sanctions package against Russia, primarily targeting the Russian energy sector. Reuters reported on October 23, citing multiple trade sources, that major PRC state oil companies - including PetroChina, SinoPec, CNOOC, and Zhenhua Oil - suspended purchases of seaborne Russian oil “at least in the short term” following the October 22 US sanctions against Russian state oil company Rosneft and the private Russian oil company Lukoil.
Trade sources told Reuters that Rosneft and Lukoil sell most oil to the PRC indirectly by going through intermediaries, but that independent PRC refiners are more likely to pause buying to assess the impact of sanctions ... stated that independent PRC refiners would still likely seek to purchase Russian oil, despite the sanctions. Bloomberg and Reuters reported on October 23 citing refineries and industry sources that Indian oil refineries will significantly cut Russian oil imports due to the US sanctions.
An industry source told Reuters that India's cut of Russian oil imports will be “massive,” but not total or immediate, as Indian refineries will still import some barrels of Russian crude oil through intermediaries ...
The package also targets tankers assessed to be part of the Russian shadow fleet, a United Arab Emirates (UAE) entity that serves as a conduit for the Russian shadow fleet by circumventing EU sanctions, and four PRC oil refineries ...
Senior Kremlin officials publicly characterized the United States and US President Donald Trump as Russia's adversary and “unfriendly” to Russia in response to the October 22 US sanctions against Russia's energy sector. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on October 23 that Trump imposed these sanctions to pressure Russia and noted that the sanctions are “an unfriendly act toward Russia.”
Putin claimed that Trump's actions are damaging Russian-US relations and disrupting the global energy market. Putin continued to posture Russian economic resilience regarding Western sanctions, claiming that “(Russia) feel(s) confident (and) stable despite certain losses,” but noted that “there is nothing good or pleasant” about the new US sanctions against Russia - an implicit acknowledgement that the sanctions will harm Russia's economy.
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on both his English - and Russian-language Telegram accounts on October 23 that “the United States is (Russia's) adversary” and that the United States is now fully embracing its “warpath against Russia.”
Medvedev added that Russia's war in Ukraine is now Trump's war and that the United States recent policy decisions are an “act of war against Russia.” The Kremlin typically permits Medvedev to insert hyperbolic statements into the information space that reflect the fringe of the Kremlin's positions and directly communicate the subtext of messages from other Russian officials ...
Putin and Medvedev’s statements are a significant rhetorical inflection that likely seek to exculpate Russia for refusing to negotiate with Ukraine or agree to ceasefires previously proposed by the United States and Ukraine.
Other Russian officials continue to posture economic resilience and the necessity of achieving Russia's war aims, likely to prepare Russian domestic audiences for the economic impact of Western sanctions and a prolonged war effort. Russian State Duma Deputy Svetlana Zhurova claimed on October 23 that sanctions against Russia will not impact Russia's policies - likely referring to the war in Ukraine - and that the Trump administration's pressure against Russia does not address the issues necessary to end the war.
Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa responded on October 22 ... claiming that Trump's “blunt and sweeping” statements and cancellation of the Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest do not mean that the United States and Russia have stopped preparations for the next summit ... claimed that Trump's proposal for an immediate ceasefire will have no effect as it does not address the “root causes” of Russia's war in Ukraine, justifying to domestic Russian audiences Putin's rejection of Trump's peace efforts.
... Trump, when asked a question about how Putin stated that sanctions will not meaningfully impact Russia, stated, “I'm glad (Putin) feels that way. I'll let you know about it six months from now … Let's see how it all works out.”
Geolocated footage from Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo published on October 22 shows a Russian service member raising a flag on Karantynnyi Island in 5th Selishche Microraion in southwestern Kherson City.Saldo claimed that unspecified Russian reconnaissance and airborne (VDV) units conducted an operation to cross the Dnipro River and seized a bridgehead on Karantynnyi Island. Saldo claimed that the Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks, secured a bridgehead, mined the approaches to the new Russian positions, and are now organizing logistics to Karantynnyi Island.
Some Russian milbloggers amplified Saldo’s claims and credited drone operators of the 31st VDV Brigade with gaining air superiority for the Russian crossing and artillery elements of the 18th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) with striking Ukrainian positions on Karantynnyi Island and bridges from mainland Kherson City to the island.
A milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and assault groups are preparing to search for and eliminate groups of Ukrainian forces in Korabelnyi Microraion (northeastern Karantynnyi Island).
Available evidence continues to indicate that Russian forces have not established a bridgehead or begun an offensive in west bank Kherson Oblast. A Ukrainian brigade published footage on October 23 that ISW geolocated showing Ukrainian forces freely operating in Kherson City's Ostriv Microraion (on Karantynnyi Island immediately north of 5th Selishche Microraion).
The Ukrainian brigade reported that Karantynnyi Island and the areas of Antonivka and Sadove (both east of Kherson City on the west bank) are “silent” and that Russian forces are not operating on the west bank of the Dnipro River. A Russian milblogger focusing on the Kherson direction recently claimed that Russian forces conducted sabotage and reconnaissance operations near Antonivka and Sadove and forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Sadove - claims that are not supported by any available reporting of Russian operations.
Russia is likely conducting a cognitive warfare effort to portray limited Russian sabotage and reconnaissance operations in the Kherson direction as the start of a dedicated Russian offensive to cross the Dnipro River and recapture Kherson City and Oblast.
The Kremlin likely intends to convince the West, European Union (EU), and Ukraine that a Russian victory is inevitable such that Ukraine should submit to Russia's demands to cede territory and that allies should stop supporting Ukraine.
ISW continues to assess that this Russian cognitive warfare effort is incompatible with any claim that Russia is willing to make territorial concessions in southern Ukraine.
Russian forces continue to increase the frequency of mechanized assaults in eastern and southern Ukraine, likely to take advantage of rainy and foggy weather conditions that complicate Ukrainian drone operations. Geolocated footage published on October 23 shows a Russian roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized and motorized assault toward Siversk from Serebryanka (north of Siversk) and Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk).
A Ukrainian drone battalion that repelled the assault reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a tank, three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), three buggies, and roughly 20 motorcycles in the assault.
Ukrainian 11th Army Corps Spokesperson Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on October 23 that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in Chasiv Yar, destroying two MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) and two all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and killing roughly 40 Russian servicemembers.
Weather monitoring services indicate that the Siversk and Chasiv Yar areas experienced cloudy conditions on October 23, and that it rained in Chasiv Yar on October 23.
Russian forces conducted an at least reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) on October 22 as the area experienced cloud cover.
ISW observed that Russian forces exploited precipitation to conduct a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv) on October 20.
ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are exploiting poor weather conditions to conduct mechanized assaults as foggy and rainy conditions degrade the effectiveness of Ukrainian drone surveillance and strikes.
The season change to autumn is also reportedly making drones more effective by depriving Russian soldiers of some concealment. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that the autumnal lack of foliage is complicating Russian forces’ ability to evade Ukrainian drones.
Ukraine's partners continue to support Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative to purchase US military equipment for Ukraine. Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo announced on October 23 that Finland will allocate 100 million euros (about $116 million) in its first contribution to the PURL initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Spain is joining the PURL initiative.
Russian forces continue to target and kill civilians, first responders, and journalists. The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on October 23 that Russian forces executed at least four civilians sheltering in private homes in Zvanivka, Bakhmutsky Raion on October 20, 2025.
Russian soldiers have committed extreme atrocities against civilians and soldiers in occupied Ukraine, and ISW continues to assess that Russian battlefield commanders enable and even order atrocities including summary executions.
The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported on October 23 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against first responders in Zelenyi Hai, Kharkiv Oblast, killing one first responder and injuring five others.
Russian forces have conducted double-tap strikes targeting first responders in Ukraine to spread fear among Ukrainian civilians and maximize the degree of casualties and damage from Russian strike series in Ukraine.
Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on October 23. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported on October 23 that Russia released 1,000 bodies that it claimed belonged to deceased Ukrainian servicemembers.
Ukraine's “I Want to Find” project reported on October 23 that Ukraine released the bodies of 31 KIA Russian servicemembers.
Belarus is strengthening military cooperation and import substitution initiatives with Iran. ...
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2025/
