Author Topic: Cognitive Warfare at the Crossroads: Defining and Developing Capabilities  (Read 22 times)

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Cognitive Warfare at the Crossroads: Defining and Developing Capabilities
by Robert Schmidle, by James Giordano
 
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06.05.2026 at 12:54pm
 
Introduction:  The Biopsychosocial Complementarity of Cognitive Warfare
To date, there continues to be some discussion, including essays that have appeared in this forum, as to whether and to what extent cognitive warfare represents anything other than psychological operations (PSYOPS) with more sophisticated tools and methods, or if it actually is a unique and evolving domain of combat. To be sure, given that (1) a formal definition of cognition describes mental processes of assimilating information, comprehending and gaining knowledge; (2) mental processing is defined as those operations that mediate sensory input and behavioral output; and (3) the psychologic realm is defined as the unconscious and conscious events and mechanisms that affect behavior; it is axiomatic that any engagement(s) in the cognitive domain will entail psychological factors. But cognitive warfare is not limited to the psychologic realm. Rather, we posit that it entails complementary, interdependent operations in and across the spectrum of biological, psychological and social dimensions (See figure 1), and in this way, (2) can influence operations in all other domains of warfare.



Figure 1 Caption: Diagrammatic representation of the multidimensionality of the cognitive domain battlespace (details in text).

Yet, despite growing recognition of the cognitive domain as a viable and valuable operational arena, a recent Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) assessment soberingly concluded that the Pentagon currently lacks both the strategic clarity and the operational capability required to conduct an effective cognitive warfare campaign. Such capability includes the means and methods to both change an adversary’s beliefs, attitudes, values and behavior, and to deter and counter an adversary’s cognitive warfare initiatives. The SASC’s critique affirms our longstanding view that neurocognitive targeting is no longer science fiction but instead has rapidly emerged as scientific fact that should foster profound operational concerns about threat(s) to the United States (US)’ security.

To adequately prepare for and respond to such threats, we believe that U.S. military planners must conceptualize cognitive warfare not as a discrete set of techniques but as a campaign. They should view cognitive warfare as a palette of capabilities that are leverageable across the entire cognitive battlespace, as depicted in figure 1. Understanding these interdependences is crucial for effective operational planning over time.

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/06/05/cognitive-warfare-at-the-crossroads-defining-and-developing-capabilities/
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