Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 19, 2026
Excerpts:
Western sources continue to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin's objectives are not limited to control of Ukrainian territory - in line with ISW’s longstanding assessment based on repeated Kremlin public statements. 5 anonymous European intelligence agency heads told Reuters in an article published on February 19 that Putin does not want to end the war in Ukraine quickly.The head of one European intelligence agency stated that the Kremlin's strategic goals remain unchanged and include the removal of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and the imposition of Ukrainian neutrality. Reuters’ intelligence sources, added that Ukraine's cession of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would not satisfy Putin's desire to overthrow Ukraine's democratically-elected government and would not in and of itself lead to a final peace agreement, as Putin would then make further demands. The European intelligence heads’ statements are consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment that Putin is committed to achieving his original war aims.
Putin has repeatedly indicated that his war aims extend beyond territory in eastern Ukraine and include changes to the NATO alliance that amount to a total restructuring of the European security architecture, Ukraine's abandonment of its NATO membership aspirations, severe limitations on the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself, and the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government.
Senior Kremlin officials continued on February 18 to reject any resolution to Russia's war that does not capitulate to all of Putin's maximalist demands, supporting ISW’s assessment and the assessments laid out to Reuters by senior European intelligence officials. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov gave an interview to Saudi Arabian state-owned television channel Al-Arabiya - the latest in a string of interviews Lavrov has given to media sources targeting international audiences ...
Lavrov claimed that this “understanding” addresses the alleged “root causes” of Russia‘s war in Ukraine, which Lavrov again claimed include Ukraine's NATO aspirations and the Ukrainian government‘s alleged discrimination of ethnic Russians and the Kremlin-backed Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). Lavrov called for recognition of Russia's illegal 2022 annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Lavrov further claimed that Ukraine has been the “main obstacle” to peace since 2014 and blamed the European Union (EU) for the failure of the Minsk Agreements, obfuscating Russia‘s own role in violating the Minsk Agreements and delaying ongoing peace talks ... further denounced Western security guarantees for Ukraine as posing a threat to Russia.
Kremlin officials continue to indicate that Russia's aims extend beyond simply removing Zelensky to the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government in postwar Ukraine, further undermining the Russian narrative the demands are only tied to questions of territorial control. Lavrov claimed that former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Zelensky both discriminated against ethnic Russians living in eastern Ukraine.
Lavrov recently explicitly demanded that any future Ukrainian government be “friendly” toward Russia and “benevolent,” demonstrating that the Kremlin's demands extend beyond the removal of Zelensky.
The Kremlin will not be satisfied with another democratically elected Ukrainian government that rejects Kremlin rule, even if Ukraine gives in to Russia's demand that it hold elections.
Western sources tied Putin's unwillingness to compromise in negotiations to his belief that the Russian economy can continue to support a protracted war, which is consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment of Putin's theory of victory. Reuters reported that one intelligence chief assessed that the “main issue” is that Putin neither wants nor needs a quick peace as the Russian economy is not on the verge of collapse.
Another Reuters source stated that Russia will face “very high” financial risks in the second half of 2026, however, as Western sanctions and Russia's high borrowing costs have limited Russia's access to capital markets. Putin has grossly mismanaged Russia's economy, which is suffering due to unsustainably high spending on the Russian military and the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund ... The Kremlin appears to currently believe that it can absorb and deal with these economic friction points in the immediate term.
ISW assessed in February 2025, however, that Putin's ability to manage these friction points is not indefinite. Putin will have to balance his theory of victory, which posits that the Russian economy can continue to support Russian battlefield advances longer than Ukraine is able to defend itself and the West is willing to support Ukraine, with the need to reckon with the increasingly difficult economic situation in Russia in 2026.
Putin is likely pushing for Ukraine and the West to capitulate now to Russia's demands in negotiations, before Putin must face these difficult economic decisions.
The Kremlin is attempting to distract the United States with bilateral economic deals in order to secure concessions during US-led peace negotiations on Ukraine. Reuters reported that four of its European intelligence chief sources assessed that the Kremlin has been using talks with the United States over the past year to push for sanctions relief and bilateral business deals.
Two of the sources noted that Russia is trying to separate ongoing talks between those focused on the war in Ukraine and those focused on bilateral US-Russian deals.
ISW has assessed since the Trump administration took office in early 2025 that the Kremlin has been trying to entice the United States with carrots unrelated to the war in Ukraine, such as bilateral economic deals, to push the United States to agree to Russia's demands related to the war. [ 47 loves these enticements, and is likely one reason he seems to love Putin so much. ]
Kremlin officials continued on February 18 to try to push the United States to focus on improving US-Russian economic relations. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev claimed that US sanctions on Russia are costly for US businesses and that a US decision to lift its sanctions against Russia would therefore be in the United States’ best interest.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that “illegal” US sanctions are hindering the development of US-Russian trade and economic cooperation.
Peskov called on Russia and the United States to “revive” their relations in order to benefit from such cooperation. Lavrov noted to Al-Arabiya that Russia and the United States are engaging in bilateral economic working groups in addition to the ongoing trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian talks that aim to resolve the war in Ukraine.
The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to move toward self-sufficiency, but Western support remains critical to this endeavor. Advisor to the Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Gvozdiar reported on February 19 that the Ukrainian DIB has increased production fifty-fold, since the start of the full-scale invasion, reaching an estimated $50 billion worth of production.
Gvozdiar stated that the Ukrainian DIB provides over 50 percent of the Ukrainian military's needs and is expanding its joint production facilities with European states. Sweden announced on February 19 a new military aid package worth almost 12.9 billion Swedish kronor (about $1.4 billion), which includes short-range air defense systems and ammunition.
The package will also support projects expanding cooperation projects with Ukraine to procure and develop long-range drones and provide Ukraine with unmanned surface vehicles. Ukraine began in 2023 to pursue its long-term objective of ensuring the self-sufficiency of its DIB, and Western security and financial aid has helped Ukraine in past work towards this goal.
Ukraine's partners stands to benefit from continuing to aid the Ukrainian DIB in this endeavor, as Western states can use Ukraine's experience fighting a 21st-century war with an accelerated offense-defense technological cycle to bolster their defenses and domestic DIBs. The provision of air defenses to Ukraine is particularly necessary to not only defend Ukrainian cities in the rear and on the front but to defend Ukraine's own defense industrial enterprises. The establishment of joint Ukrainian-European production facilities outside of Ukraine throughout Europe will also ensure Ukraine‘s continued production in the face of intensified Russian long-range strikes across the country.
Russian forces have reportedly adapted their Geran-2 drones to be “mothership” drones that carry first-person view (FPV) drones deeper into the Ukrainian rear. A Russian milblogger posted footage on February 17 allegedly showing a Russian Geran-2 mothership drone releasing an FPV drone while flying over Sumy Oblast.
The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using Geran drones as signal repeaters for FPV drones, which separate from the mothership drone as they near the intended target. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces’ use of Geran-2 drones as aerial relays is particularly important after they lost access to Starlink terminals.
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov previously reported on February 3 that Russian forces began using Gerbera drones (which are the much cheaper decoy version of Russia's Shahed/Geran drone) as mothership drones to carry strike or reconnaissance FPV drones, and Russian forces have used Molniya fixed-wing FPV drones in a similar capacity.
Geran motherships drones are likely able to continue toward their own targets after releasing their FPV drones to conduct significant strikes. Gerbera drones, in contrast, carry either very small or no explosive payloads so would either crash or result in a small explosion. Geran mothership drones carrying reconnaissance FPV drones would also be able to use the FPV drones to confirm or adjust the Geran’s own strike.
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2026/
