What is the US Military Preparing For? Force Design and the Pathology of Lessons Learned
Shane Praiswater | 09.19.25
In 2006, Jonathan Bailey published “Military History and the Pathology of Lessons Learned: the Russo-Japanese War, a Case Study,” a chapter in an edited volume on history and the military profession. Bailey, a historian and retired British Army general, focused on why militaries failed to incorporate lessons learned during the 1904–05 conflict into pre–World War I planning. Nearly two decades later, his work is worth revisiting as militaries struggle to modernize and balance the potential need to “fight tonight” with the imperatives of future force design. Planners reasonably consider peer competitors and expected challenges when making acquisition decisions, but Bailey’s work suggests that technology and threats are not the only pieces of the modernization puzzle. Lessons learned via humble introspection and debrief in service of rapid innovation is a sacrosanct pillar of modern militaries; by equating the concept with pathology and disease, Bailey takes a controversial stance. Militaries often excel at identifying mistakes and adapting under fire, but evolving in peacetime for future conflicts is far more difficult.
To avoid the pitfalls of the past and repeating another instance of lessons observed over lessons learned, force design must account for technological, cultural, and tactical biases. Furthermore, even an unbiased and non-parochial force design might fall short if it does not consider two distinct observations: first, that escalation is a tactical—not just strategic—paradigm, and second, that militaries must have the humility to anticipate ambiguity and wars of attrition.
The Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) was a pivotal conflict between Russia and Japan over rival regional ambitions. Marked by modern weaponry, trench warfare, and industrialized logistics, it foreshadowed key aspects of World War I, including the deadly effectiveness of machine guns and artillery. Japan’s victory shocked the world and demonstrated the rise of non-Western powers in global affairs. The war also exposed the decline of tsarist Russia, contributing to domestic unrest and the 1905 Russian Revolution. It signaled (in retrospect) a transition from nineteenth-century limited wars to twentieth-century total wars, where technology, public opinion, and industrial capacity became increasingly significant factors in warfare.
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/what-is-the-us-military-preparing-for-force-design-and-the-pathology-of-lessons-learned/
