The Mobile Command Post: Allowing the Commander to Command
by Scott Henderson
09.15.2025 at 06:00am
Abstract:
Military Command, Control, and Communications systems have become increasingly complex as the military has scaled its intent for increasing joint operations. While these systems have been designed with good intent, evidence has shown that too much technology and information is both difficult to adopt at scale and can slow down operational tempo when it doesn’t work properly – which is likely in conflict. To solve this, this article has defined the principles of a modular (based on mission set), light, and sustainable Mobile Command Post that leverages currently-approved communication devices and vehicles to create an edge-based tactical command node. The intent is purely to unburden the unit commander from technology complexity and put that burden on the technology itself by using AI/autonomy-infused radios, sensors, and systems in one light command vehicle. This generates speed of decision-making and operations unseen in warfare.
The Wakeup Call Was 22 Years Ago:
In March 2003, a young, inexperienced US Army company commander unknowingly veered off course. The commander’s unit was supporting the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s push toward Nasiriyah. But a wrong turn off Highway 8 placed them directly on Highway 7—into the heart of the city and into the jaws of a waiting Iraqi Army ambush.
The young officer realized the mistake only after passing the Al-Quds News Headquarters, a landmark not listed in his planning materials. Minutes later, the convoy was engulfed in small arms, rockets, mortar, and tank fire. Eleven American soldiers were killed. Six were captured. The firefight lasted 30 minutes before Alpha Company of the 2nd MEB, led by USMC Major Bill Peoples, arrived to rescue the survivors.
This wasn’t just a tragic navigation error. It was a failure of command-and-control systems—a breakdown in connectivity, interoperability, and technological readiness. The Army company was the last in a 600-vehicle convoy. Mechanical issues had slowed them down, separating them from the main force and cutting them off from higher headquarters. The Marines they were supporting operated on a different frequency and network. The officer’s only tools were a CD-ROM mission plan, a SINCGARS radio that lost power, and a handheld Garmin GPS—which was jammed as soon as contact was made.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/09/15/the-mobile-command-post-allowing-the-commander-to-command/
