The Knife’s Edge
Adapting Army Combatives for Tomorrow’s Fight
By CPT Luke Hodsden
Article published on: September 1, in the Fall 2025 Issue of the infantry journal
Earlier this year, a chilling viral video out of Ukraine emerged depicting the stark reality of modern warfare. The footage showed a Ukrainian soldier engagIng in brutal hand-to-hand combat with a Russian soldier, who mortally wounds the Ukrainian with his knife. As the Ukrainian soldier lay dying, he spoke to his enemy: “This is the end. Let me die in peace… You were better.” The raw footage is a reminder that even in the age of drone warfare and precision strikes, hand-to-hand engagements remain a real possibility for Soldiers on the ground. The video is a testament to the fact that the technical skills required to fight and survive on the modern battlefield are not merely advantageous; they are essential for survival.
The Modern Army Combatives Program (MACP) has been a cornerstone of the U.S. Army’s close-quarters combat (CQC) training for nearly two decades. Born at the onset of the global war on terrorism (GWOT), MACP was forged in the fires of Iraq and Afghanistan, where it provided a vital skillset for Soldiers operating in environments characterized by asymmetrical warfare and frequent dismounted patrols. However, the strategic landscape has now shifted from counterinsurgency to the focus on Great Power Competitors, particularly China and Russia. This change necessitates an evolution in the current iteration of Army combatives to address the evolving threat. This article argues that while the foundational principles of MACP remain valid, adjustments to the program are necessary to best prepare Infantry Soldiers for the realities of potential large-scale conflict.
The Evolving Threat: A Different Kind of Enemy
The problem sets posed by potential adversaries such as China and Russia are complex and markedly different from those faced during GWOT. These countries have shown an ability and willingness to employ aggressive offensive tactics of varying scale. Their strategies encompass both conventional large-scale assaults and small-unit actions designed to disrupt, delay, or isolate U.S. forces. These can involve probing attacks, feints, and audacious maneuvers aimed at overwhelming key positions.
https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/Infantry-Archive/Infantry-Fall-2025/Knifes-Edge/
