Why The US Chose Turbines Over Diesel Engines For Its M1 Abrams Tanks
Story by UmmeAimon Shabbir • 18h
When the Army launched the M1 tank program in the early 1970s, it was determined to avoid the cost overruns and failures that plagued earlier efforts like the MBT-70 and XM-803. This time, the Army set a strict cost cap, limited requirements, and demanded working prototypes instead of paper designs. General Motors and Chrysler went head-to-head, with GM proposing a new variable compression diesel engine and Chrysler pushing for a gas turbine. Tests at Aberdeen Proving Ground showed GM's diesel-powered tank performed better overall, offering superior armor protection and more reliable fire control. The Army had made its choice and was ready to award the contract.
But in July 1976, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld halted the decision. Against Army recommendations, he ordered a redesign to accommodate the turbine. Deputy Defense Secretary William Clements and other Pentagon officials pushed the shift, arguing the turbine represented the future of armored propulsion. Four months later, the contract went to Chrysler, and the Army was forced to adopt the turbine engine.
The move was controversial. The turbine was lighter, quieter, and had fewer moving parts, but it also consumed far more fuel (one of the M1 Abrams' biggest weaknesses), emitted dangerous exhaust, and required complex air filters to handle battlefield dust. Army leaders feared the engine was too immature. But outside pressures, including Chrysler's worsening financial condition and broader defense politics, meant the safer choice was overridden. The M1 Abrams would enter service with a turbine, not the proven diesel the Army had preferred.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/why-the-us-chose-turbines-over-diesel-engines-for-its-m1-abrams-tanks/ar-AA1LgWQx?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=HCTS&cvid=68aefda25bf64583bf189a7887ba9cd2&ei=109
