Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 30, 2025
Excerpts:
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the US-proposed peace plan aims to ensure Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and economic development, during the US-Ukrainian talks in Hallandale Beach, Florida on November 30.Rubio stated that the peace plan must not only end the war but also secure Ukraine's future and “long-term prosperity.”
Rubio stated that the US-Ukrainian meeting was “very productive” and expressed optimism about the peace negotiations’ progress but said that there is still “much work to do.”
Rubio stated that the meeting built upon the results of November 23 US-European-Ukrainian talks in Geneva and confirmed that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will travel to Moscow later this week to discuss the peace deal with the Kremlin.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on November 30 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will host Witkoff in Moscow before the start of Putin's visit to India on December 4.
Witkoff also stated that US-Ukrainian talks in Hallandale Beach went “positively” and reportedly confirmed that he will meet with Putin on December 2.
Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov led the Ukrainian delegation on November 30 and stated that the negotiators achieved “substantial progress in advancing a dignified peace” and uniting the Ukrainian negotiating positions with the United States.
Umerov reported that the United States shares Ukraine's key objectives of ensuring Ukraine's security, sovereignty, and a reliable peace, and noted that Ukraine and the United States will continue consultations and work on a joint peace framework.
Russian information space voices continue to argue that the Kremlin will likely reject a ceasefire or any iteration of the US-proposed peace plan because the Kremlin views these efforts as inconsequential and as a hindrance to Russia's goals in Ukraine and globally. A prominent Russian milblogger argued on November 30 that Russian President Vladimir Putin “clearly” outlined that he is prepared to achieve Russia's war aims via military means; therefore, all peace negotiations since the 2022 Istanbul negotiations are “not practical.”
The milblogger added that Russia's engagement in any peace negotiations “solely” relies on Russian progress on the battlefield, which Russian forces achieve through prolonged and costly warfighting.
The milblogger argued that US President Donald Trump's efforts to achieve a ceasefire on the front line do not benefit Russia, as the ceasefire would force Russia to terminate the September 2022 mobilization decree that allows the Kremlin to retain mobilized servicemen and recruits on the battlefield indefinitely, which will reduce the size of the Russian military and deplete Russia's officer corps.
ISW assessed in February 2025 that Putin fears the risks and challenges associated with reintegrating veterans into Russian society and economy and thus remains unlikely to demobilize fully or rapidly - even in the event of a negotiated settlement to its war in Ukraine.
The milblogger also argued that a ceasefire will undermine Russia's efforts to seize illegally annexed unoccupied parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts and will create new “military security threats” that Russia will need to address in the near future. The milblogger’s observations are in line with Putin's November 27 remarks that intensify efforts to set legal grounds using the false premise of Ukrainian threats to illegally annexed Ukrainian territories to justify a reinvasion of Ukraine at an opportune time.
Former Russian officer and imprisoned prominent ultranationalist, Igor Girkin, published a letter written on November 25 in which he similarly concluded that the Kremlin will not sign any agreements on the basis of the 28-point peace proposal, because the Kremlin views this peace proposal as detrimental to its goals in Ukraine and worldwide, and that the war will continue in Ukraine.
Girkin argued that the agreement is unacceptable because it would signify a loss of Russian sovereignty by ceding control over the mechanism for both negotiations and imposing punishments for violating the peace settlement to the United States. Girkin argued that the Kremlin will not commit to any mechanisms that could formally recognize Russia as an aggressor and enable the U.S. to impose punishments against Russia in the event of peace agreement violations.
Girkin claimed the peace agreement is disadvantageous to Russia as it would force Russia to formally renunciate its claims over illegally-annexed parts of Ukraine; surrender “strategically vital” offensive positions in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; grant Ukrainian forces time to rest and reconstitute; sharply decrease Russian forces’ combat readiness; and lead to a “strategic break” between Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
A columnist for Russian state newswire Rossiya Segodnya stated in an interview published on November 27 that Russia neither takes the US peace proposal seriously, nor expects the plan to work in any possible variation, and assessed that the Kremlin is “relaxed” about alterations to the original 28-point peace plan because the Kremlin can discuss any document.
The columnist argued that Russia is “pretending” that it is ready to accept the United States as a mediator but ultimately aims to conclude a treaty that provides Russia with a battlefield victory, and that Russia does not seek an immediate peace as the United States does. The columnist emphasized that Russia cannot sign any peace deals with Ukraine or Europe; that Russia's war aims include NATO's withdrawal from all of eastern Europe; and that Russia's demands for a ceasefire also include Ukraine's withdrawal from unoccupied parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts - not just Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The columnist implied that Russia is unlikely to make any further concessions because the Kremlin believes that it has already won the war in Ukraine. The columnist's statements are consistent with Putin's November 27 interpretation of the US-proposed peace plan as a mere suggestion for discussions and demands that Ukraine cede all illegally annexed oblasts to Russia.
Russian officials and ultranationalists have been consistently issuing similar public rejections of the 28-point peace plan and its subsequent iterations since it was first reported in mid-November 2025 because the proposed plan did not concede to all of Russia's absolutist war demands.
The Kremlin continues to advance a false narrative that Ukraine's front line and political stability are on the verge of collapse in an effort to convince the West to capitulate to Russian demands that Russia cannot secure militarily. ISW continues to assess that a Russian battlefield victory is neither imminent nor inevitable and that the Russian war effort has vulnerabilities the West has not exploited. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on a Russian state television program aired on November 30 that Ukraine's battlefield and internal problems worsen every day.
Peskov also accused the Ukrainian government of stalling the peace negotiations process, despite the fact that Ukrainian delegations were actively negotiating the terms of the US-proposed peace deal with US counterparts since reports of the proposal emerged in mid-November 2025, including on November 30, and agreed to terms that Russia has not.
Peskov’s latest statements are likely part of the Kremlin's consolidated cognitive effort to create a false sense of urgency over Russia's claimed inevitable victory - and that Ukraine and the West should therefore immediately concede to Russia's demands before the situation worsens for Ukraine.
Prominent Russian milbloggers continue to contradict the Kremlin's efforts to portray Russian victory in Ukraine as imminent or inevitable, however. A prominent Russian milblogger acknowledged that the tactical battlefield situation favors Russia, particularly near Hulyaipole, but stated that Russian state media coverage of Russian progress on the battlefield once again resembles “joyfully idiotic, rosy, self-indulgent nonsense” that does not support the war effort.
The milblogger stated that such narratives of an imminent Russian victory create the false perception domestically that the Russian society no longer needs to urgently support the war effort against Ukraine, a competent adversary that uses NATO equipment and intelligence. The milblogger also noted that continuing the war effort in Ukraine will cost Russia further state resources amid growing societal dissatisfaction with the introduction of new fees and rising taxes in 2026.
The milblogger added that Russia continues to face manpower shortages and that the ongoing volunteer recruitment campaign is not generating a sufficient number of forces to demobilize Russian personnel that the Kremlin involuntarily called up in September 2022. Girkin similarly assessed in a letter published on November 26 that Russia could develop its possible future seizures of Hulyaipole and Orikhiv into operational successes only if Russia has enough reserves to exploit these tactical advances.
Girkin observed that the most recent six-month Russian offensive on Kupyansk did not result in a “big victory” and assessed that Russian efforts to seize the “secondary” objectives of Pokrovsk, Vovchansk, Siversk, and Lyman are only tactical and will not be quick, will not degrade the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian military writ large, and will not collapse the front lines. Girkin implied that Russia has enough troops to support tactical advances but lacks the necessary reserves and resources to achieve its strategic goals, such as seizing Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv cities.
ISW continues to assess that while the situation in some specific sectors of the front line is serious, particularly in Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, the Kremlin's efforts to present Russia's victory in Ukraine as inevitable do not correspond to the battlefield reality.
It is notable that the Kremlin's misrepresentation of the situation on the ground was so far from reality that prominent pro-war milbloggers and ultranationalist figures continue to feel compelled to issue their own corrective statements.
The Russian effort to seize Pokrovsk remains prolonged and costly as Russian forces are optimized for positional warfare and can only achieve a slow rate of advance. Russian forces continue to make slow advances and have failed to seize Pokrovsk entirely despite occupying positions within the town for over 120 days ...
Mashovets noted that Russian forces are unable to transport armored vehicles across the Kazennyi Torets River to their foothold west of the river, forcing Russian infantry to operate unsupported in the foothold - further constraining the rate of Russian advance on the northeastern shoulder of the Pokrovsk encirclement ...
The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on November 28 that Russian forces are not fully leveraging their numerical superiority in drones and manpower and that the presence of Russian forces in Pokrovsk is not a reason for Ukrainian forces to retreat from the town.
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 30 that Russian forces sent poorly trained, recently recruited personnel into the first wave of assaults, followed by relatively better-trained personnel.
The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious, however. ...
The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces control at least half of Pokrovsk and that the Russian manpower superiority would make it difficult for Ukrainian forces to fully retake the town.
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that thick fog continues to degrade Ukrainian drone reconnaissance capabilities and that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV), Molniya, fixed-wing, and sleeper drones to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).
Russian drones appear to be violating Moldovan airspace during large, combined missile and drone strikes. The Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs reported on November 29 that 2 Russian drones violated Moldovan airspace for 1 hour and 10 minutes on the night of November 28 to 29, forcing Moldova to temporarily close its airspace ...
Ukrainian forces successfully used the Sting interceptor drone to down Russian jet-powered long-range drones for the first time as Ukraine increases technological innovation efforts to combat Russia's long-range drone and missile campaigns. Ukrainian volunteer Serhiy Sternenko reported on November 30 that the Ukrainian forces successfully used the domestically produced Sting interceptor drone to shoot down several Geran-3 jet-powered long-range strike drones for the first time on the night of November 29 to 30.[38] Geran-3 drones have a shorter flight range than typical Geran drones but can reach higher speeds and can more easily outmaneuver air defense systems.
Ukrainian drone manufacturer Wild Hornets, which manufactures the Sting drone, noted in September 2025 that Ukrainian forces have achieved interception rates of about 60 to 90 percent against typical Russian Geran-2 and Gerbera drones.
Wild Hornets noted that it was working to increase the speed of the Stinger drone interceptors specifically to counter jet-powered Russian drones, such as the Geran-3. Russia has conducted several strikes with packages reportedly including several Geran-3 drones since late June 2025.
Ukrainian industry continues to innovate and produce interceptor drones and new air defense systems as well as adapt and modify allies’ air defense systems.https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-30-2025/ 
