A Post-Mortem of the Red Sea Crisis: NATO versus the European Union
April 25, 2025 Guest Author
NATO Naval Power Week
By Anna Matilde Bassoli
After more than a year of disrupted global trade, the Red Sea Crisis appears to have no end in sight. Rather, in a series of leaked messages, senior U.S. officials have cast doubts over U.S. involvement and “having to bail Europe out again.” However, while frustration on each side of the pond is understandable, emotions fail to address the root causes of growing transatlantic distrust. The disjointed approach of the U.S. and the European Union to the Red Sea Crisis deserves thorough analysis as a critical yet overlooked cause of transatlantic distress. Indeed, the issue between the transatlantic allies is not who has to bail out whom. Instead, the emergence of the European Union (EU) as a security actor in the maritime domain has weakened the U.S. grip on NATO’s naval strategy. A coherent NATO naval strategy requires the United States and its European allies to align their postures, without the EU as the third wheel.
On December 18, 2023, the United States called upon allies to respond to the Houthi attacks on global shipping with the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian. This multinational coalition was intended to include the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and others. However, only the UK, Canada, and Norway upheld their commitment. A few days after this announcement, most European navies withdrew to join the EU-led Operation Aspides, an overlapping defensive mission. Specifically, European navies explicitly rejected US leadership and command in an unprecedented transatlantic schism. The establishment of the EU-led Operation Aspides has resulted in a divided naval commitment and undermined efforts in the Red Sea Crisis in three crucial ways.
First, this divided effort has effectively deprived Prosperity Guardian of European naval assets over the past year. The Italian Navy has committed two destroyers and two frigates to Aspides, contrary to the single frigate initially announced in support of Prosperity Guardian. The French Navy has provided three frigates to Aspides, while it remains unclear what role they would have played in Prosperity Guardian. Similarly, the German and Belgian navies each contributed a frigate. Other European navies have divided their limited commitments between both missions, although it is unclear under which command. For example, the Hellenic Navy provided two frigates to Aspides, while the Royal Netherlands Navy contributed one frigate, a joint support ship, and aviation assets. Even the newest members of NATO, Sweden and Finland, have shown inconsistent commitment, with both countries providing only limited personnel. Despite its initial commitment to the US-led effort, Spain made no contributions. Interestingly, however, Spain’s ports benefited from the crisis, placing the country in an ambiguous position.
https://cimsec.org/a-post-mortem-of-the-red-sea-crisis-nato-versus-the-european-union/
