The Army and the New Paradigm of Ground Combat: Lessons from Ukraine’s Failed 2023 Counteroffensive
Bryan J. Bonnema and Moises Jimenez | 02.18.25
The current battlefield is riddled with multiple forms of contact. The combination of indirect fires, efficient and increasingly shortened kill chains, electromagnetic interference, the proliferation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)—including, one-way attack UAS, thermal optics, mines, and antitank guided missile favor the defender and impose considerable risk to offensive operations. In May 2023, it is estimated that the Ukrainian Army expended around ten thousand UAS a month to conduct reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and shaping operations. The US Army is working to adapt to these operational realities with, for instance, expanding its transformation in contact initiative to include new organizations and move into transformation in contact 2.0. But much of what that the Army envisions under that initiative—including its emphasis on short-, medium-, and long-range reconnaissance UAS—falls well short of what current battlefield conditions demand. Even if it could muster a more robust magazine of UAS platforms, the Army has not refined its offensive framework to account for the changing paradigm of ground combat. This paradigm favors the defender; it punishes decisive battle and humbles tactical leaders who believe they can simply suppress, breach, and seize their way to victory. The previous paradigm of maneuver-centric activity massed combat power, massed fires and effects, and required extensive rehearsals and synchronization. The current paradigm requires a framework that accounts for layered, multidomain threats, finite resources, tactical innovation and expedited decision making.
The characteristics of this new paradigm will require tactical leaders to employ a framework that extensively isolates enemy objectives, mutually suppresses key frontline positions and nodes, and selectively disintegrates or destroys enemy formations. To produce battlefield success, this framework must provide a governing logic to UAS employment and fires allocation, and it must fundamentally seek to preserve our most precious resource—our soldiers. The crucible of combat in today’s operational environment will expend resources and lives that the US Army, and the American people, have not experienced since the Korean War. As leaders, we owe it to our soldiers and families to assess the palatability, sustainability, and efficacy of offensive operations in today’s environment.
Ukraine and the Shattering of the Legacy Paradigm
The current tactical revolution of UAS—and its operational consequences—is illustrated by the attempted large-scale Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023. This episode in the Russia-Ukraine War deserves its own series of monographs and deeper analysis; however, even a brief description of what occurred highlights the doctrinal gaps and tactical limitations presented to mechanized formations conducting a deliberate breach in today’s environment—like the US Army’s armored brigade combat teams. To paraphrase the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz, we must do more than retell the actions between belligerents—we must apply critical analysis of Ukrainian tactical leaders and their thought processes as they negotiated challenging strategic and political constraints.
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-army-and-the-new-paradigm-of-ground-combat-lessons-from-ukraines-failed-2023-counteroffensive/
