Lethal Force, Risk, and LSCO
Preparing for Permissive Rules of Engagement in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Lt. Gen. Milford “Beags” Beagle Jr., U.S. Army
Lt. Gen. Joseph B. Berger III, U.S. Army
Lt. Col. Jack D. Einhorn, U.S. Army
Battlefield Next
Maj. Casey, the chief of the Joint Air Ground Integration Center (JAGIC), grabs a seat at his workstation and starts his day. Less than five minutes into his shift, the fire support NCO calls out, “Fire mission … GMTI [ground movement target indicators] suggest enemy vehicles heading into what appear to be a group of apartment buildings.” Casey pulls up the grid coordinates for the apartment buildings on his Command Post Computing Environment (CPCE) map. As he is looking at this location on the CPCE map, the field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO) comes by to discuss this target. “Sir, we assess that this GMTI indicates enemy movement because the majority of the civilian population has long since evacuated this area. Also, the GMTI pattern is indicative of a military convoy.” Casey presses the FAIO on what type of enemy vehicles he assesses this to be, to which the FAIO replies, “Sir, armor and ADA [air defense artillery] that the G-2 assesses defends critical assets in the area. Other intelligence indicates that industrial buildings in the vicinity are being utilized to repair and refit rocket artillery. Finally, there is a planned offensive operation with an air assault to seize that portion of the city within the next forty-eight to seventy-two hours.” Casey looks over at the high-payoff target list (HPTL) that is taped to the analog map in the center of the JAGIC table and sees that ADA is number one on the HPTL.
Maj. Casey’s initial instinct is that this is a valid military target, and he knows he has the delegated authority under the rules of engagement (ROE) to authorize the strike, but he would like to get his judge advocate’s (JA) advice on this.1 However, the JAGIC is operating as a dispersed command node, and the JA is back at the current operations integration cell. Undeterred, he mentally walks through the five law of armed conflict (LOAC) principles—military necessity, distinction, proportionality, humanity, and honor—and confirms to himself that this is a lawful target.2 For proportionality, that mental analysis requires slightly more thought. Even with weaponeering solutions designed to minimize civilian casualties, any aerial delivered munitions are likely to cause a significant but unknown amount of damage to what he believes may be apartment buildings, and further, may cause civilian casualties if not all of the civilians evacuated the area or if some civilians returned to the area. Thinking through the military advantage to be gained by destroying enemy weapons systems that are at the top of the HPTL, Casey confirms to himself that potential civilian casualties would not be excessive in relation to that military advantage. Yet, Casey still struggles to approve a strike on this target. While he knows that he is on solid LOAC ground to strike this target, Casey is concerned about the information operations (IO) risk. His mind goes back to his time in Afghanistan in 2019, when the United States came under scrutiny for civilian casualties resulting from attacks on drug labs that the Taliban used to fund operations.3 He is worried that this strike might come under the same scrutiny. His mind then races further back to his time as a battery commander. He remembers the frustration he felt when he was prohibited from delivering an aerial strike on an improvised explosive device cell operating in broad daylight because there were too many civilians in the area.
Unsure if the commanding general (CG) is willing to accept that level of collateral damage or assume the IO risk of striking this target, or if he has the authority to pass on the target, Casey starts to reach for the phone to get the division’s main command post on the line. Then he remembers that communications with that command post have been down for the last four hours. As Casey realizes that this decision is now his—and his alone—to make, the senior air director informs him that they will only have air assets on station for another five minutes.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2025-OLE/Lethal-Force-Risk-and-LSCO/