From Hybrid to Conventional Warfare: Three Lessons for Taiwan from Ukraine
by Tarik Solmaz
|
12.04.2024 at 07:00am
From Hybrid to Conventional Warfare: Three Lessons for Taiwan from Ukraine Image
Amid heightened geopolitical uncertainty, many defense analysts are questioning if a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is now closer than ever. There is little doubt that Beijing has long sought control of Taiwan. This desire has only become more tangible since the pro-independence Democratic Progress Party (DPP) returned to power in 2016. Since then, China has waged a prolonged and comprehensive hybrid warfare campaign against Taiwan. To put it briefly, this campaign has included isolating Taiwan diplomatically, spreading disinformation to undermine public trust, launching cyber-attacks on government systems, and exerting economic pressure to discourage public support for the Taiwanese government. Simultaneously, China has conducted frequent incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and large-scale military drills, aiming to intimidate both the public and political leadership. Russia’s shift from a lengthy hybrid warfare campaign against Ukraine to a full-scale military invasion on February 24, 2022, highlights that hybrid warfare is not the sole approach available to revisionist states. This escalation suggests that Taiwan could face a similar escalation in the future. So, analyzing the factors behind Russia’s escalation in Ukraine is crucial to draw lessons that Taiwan and its allies might apply to prepare for potential threats. Three critical insights emerge from this analysis.
Lesson 1: Greater Threat Perception Leads to Escalation
With the overthrow of Ukraine’s Moscow-friendly president, Viktor Yanukovych, in February 2014, the Kremlin concluded that diplomacy alone was insufficient to curb pro-Western sentiments in Ukraine. Hence, it decided to intervene covertly in Crimea and the Donbas region, where a significant ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking population resided. Nevertheless, Moscow still held out hope for restoring relations, prompting it to refrain from direct and high-intensity military actions against Ukraine at the time. Despite Moscow’s hybrid warfare efforts, Ukrainian policymakers remained committed to pursuing NATO and EU membership. This deepened Russia’s threat perception regarding a Western-leaning Ukraine. Consequently, on February 24, 2022, Russian armed forces launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by land, air, and sea. Arguably, the Kremlin would not have opted for a large-scale military intervention in early 2022 if it had perceived the threat as still manageable. Beijing has long warned that any de jure declaration of independence by Taiwan would mean war. Whereas Taiwanese policymakers have regularly stated that Taiwan is already a sovereign and independent country, they have refrained from making a formal declaration in order not to provoke China. This cautious stance has kept Chinese threat perception from reaching a critical level. With this threat perceived as significant but not vital, Beijing has preferred a hybrid warfare model, which lies between diplomacy and conventional warfare. However, if Taiwan were to pursue de jure independence, China’s threat perception could escalate, potentially prompting Beijing to shift from hybrid warfare to a conventional military operation.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/12/04/hybrid-to-conventional-warfare/
