USAF Aircraft Armament System Specialist explains why the A-10 Warthog can’t effectively provide CAS

[rangerrebew]

USAF Aircraft Armament System Specialist explains why the A-10 Warthog can’t effectively provide CAS in a near-peer war

By Dario Leone
Jul 7 2023
 

‘The properties that make the A-10 a great CAS platform, are also some of its biggest weaknesses,’ Scott Moser, former USAF reserve Aircraft Armament System Specialist.
As already reported US Air Force (USAF) Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown Jr. said on Mar. 7, 2023 the service would likely retire all its A-10 Warthog attack aircraft over the next five or six years.

Until recently, the USAF and Congress have disagreed over what to do with the iconic CAS aircraft. While the A-10 was known and beloved for its CAS role in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last two decades, the USAF says the low-and-slow-flying plane would not be able to survive in a fight against a nation with modern air defenses, like China.

Scott Moser, former USAF reserve Aircraft Armament System Specialist, explains on Quora;
 
‘The A-10 was designed for a conventional war against Soviet armored forces in Europe. Its much lauded, GAU-8 30mm cannon, was never adequate to take out later Soviet tanks, but worked well against light armored vehicles and enemy troops.

‘The properties that make the A-10 a great Close Air Support platform, are also some of its biggest weaknesses. The A-10 is relatively slow, which allows it to better visually spot advancing enemy vehicles and troops. Unfortunately, it also leaves it vulnerable to enemy fighters and MANPADS. The great successes of the A-10 in Close Air Support, have been in conflicts where the US military quickly established air superiority, and maintained it.’

https://theaviationgeekclub.com/usaf-aircraft-armament-system-specialist-explains-why-the-a-10-warthog-cant-effectively-provide-cas-in-a-near-peer-war/

[rangerrebew]

The A-10 was designed by whites which automatically makes it no good for Gen. Brown's military.

[PeteS in CA]

‘The A-10 was designed for a conventional war against Soviet armored forces in Europe. Its much lauded, GAU-8 30mm cannon, was never adequate to take out later Soviet tanks, but worked well against light armored vehicles and enemy troops. 1

‘The properties that make the A-10 a great Close Air Support platform, are also some of its biggest weaknesses. The A-10 is relatively slow, which allows it to better visually spot advancing enemy vehicles and troops. 2 Unfortunately, it also leaves it vulnerable to enemy fighters and MANPADS. The great successes of the A-10 in Close Air Support, have been in conflicts where the US military quickly established air superiority, and maintained it. 3’

1 While the A-10's 30 mm cannon was and is one of its primary weapons systems, it also carries other, more potent, anti-armor weapons.  And those various types of "eggs" are all effective against personnel and lightly armored vehicles.

2 Flipping the writer's script, this means that F-16s, F-35s, etc. are less effective for CAS if they maintain higher speed. Isn't the point of CAS to support US troops on the ground?

3 When was the last time the US faced a near-peer adversary? If Iraq wasn't a near-peer, was Vietnam? At best, the combo of NoKo, Russian, and Chinese MiG pilots were the most recent near-peer adversary, or perhaps Germany and Japan were the most recent near-peers. More to the detail-points, the USAF learned about the need to escort bombers in 1943. If some future adversary has significant fighter capability, the USAF knows when and how to do SEAD preparation and escort. And the USAF also knows that SEAD means making use of MANPADS risky and difficult.

CAS is not risk-free ... nothing in war is. Effective CAS is a balance of risk and benefit, and proper doctrine will give both leadership and pilots ample room to tailor actions to situations. Dumping the A-10 for less effective, supposedly safer (for pilots), aircraft is a decision for which the PBI are likely to pay in blood.

[Bigun]

1 While the A-10's 30 mm cannon was and is one of its primary weapons systems, it also carries other, more potent, anti-armor weapons.  And those various types of "eggs" are all effective against personnel and lightly armored vehicles.

2 Flipping the writer's script, this means that F-16s, F-35s, etc. are less effective for CAS if they maintain higher speed. Isn't the point of CAS to support US troops on the ground?

3 When was the last time the US faced a near-peer adversary? If Iraq wasn't a near-peer, was Vietnam? At best, the combo of NoKo, Russian, and Chinese MiG pilots were the most recent near-peer adversary, or perhaps Germany and Japan were the most recent near-peers. More to the detail-points, the USAF learned about the need to escort bombers in 1943. If some future adversary has significant fighter capability, the USAF knows when and how to do SEAD preparation and escort. And the USAF also knows that SEAD means making use of MANPADS risky and difficult.

CAS is not risk-free ... nothing in war is. Effective CAS is a balance of risk and benefit, and proper doctrine will give both leadership and pilots ample room to tailor actions to situations. Dumping the A-10 for less effective, supposedly safer (for pilots), aircraft is a decision for which the PBI are likely to pay in blood.

  

[DefiantMassRINO]

USAF wants out of the CAS business ... they want newer, shinier, glamrous, expensive things ... they want to sit inside a mountain with a keyboard and joystick and conduct warfare like a video game ... lasers, satellites, drones.

[ironhorsedriver]

Just think what the Marines could do with the A-10.