Where has US leverage with Russia gone?
Much of the problem is that Washington has been averse to addressing Moscow’s relationship to the European security order.
MAY 1, 2023
Written by
Zachary Paikin
More than a year after Russia launched its full-scale attack against Ukraine, there is a growing consensus in Western policy circles about what the path to a negotiated settlement looks like.
The formula goes something like this: Ukraine will launch a successful military offensive this spring and summer — one which makes gains large enough to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin that his war is unwinnable, but does not go so far (for example, by attempting to retake Crimea) as to encourage him to escalate.
Russia will undoubtedly refuse to back down from its maximalist demands unless it suffers more losses on the battlefield. In that case, since he has deliberately left vague the definition of what constitutes “victory,” Putin could plausibly agree to cut his losses for the time being and spin his “special military operation” as a success at home. He could also frame any cessation of hostilities as a temporary strategic necessity while leaving open the possibility of future military action.
Yet this new conventional wisdom fails to account for key variables. For one, it depends on the success of Ukraine’s imminent offensive, which is anything but guaranteed. Russia’s forces are now more entrenched and better prepared than they were last autumn to repel a Ukrainian assault. And if Ukrainian soldiers and equipment are substantially attritted over the coming months for only marginal gains, then political support for Kyiv may begin to wane even before Western military-industrial production has ramped up in earnest.
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/05/01/where-has-us-leverage-with-russia-gone/
