The Merchant Marine and U.S. Strategy
By Seth Cropsey
January 19, 2023
U.S. Navy photo illustration by Brian Suriani
How to Revitalize the U.S. Merchant Fleet Before a Great Power War
Supplying an attacking and defending force has been an issue since the decade-long Trojan War. In more than 3,000 years, this has not changed. The U.S. continues to benefit from unrestricted resupply access in the Ukraine War. However, future Eurasian conflicts will not resemble Ukraine. The U.S. requires the capabilities to win the next war, not fight the last. This demands, in turn, a Merchant Marine capable of sustaining the U.S. and its allies through prolonged combat.
The Ukraine War marks the beginning of armed Eurasian dispute between the American-led coalition and the authoritarian entente of Russia, Iran, and China. Prior to 24 February, the U.S.’ adversaries poked and probed, but refrained from a direct challenge to the Eurasian military balance. Even as Russia and Iran displaced the U.S. in the Middle East, there remained few direct conflicts between the U.S., Russia, and Iran. The exceptions were remarkable instances of the shadow war bubbling to the surface. The 2017 and 2018 U.S. airstrikes in Syria, 2018 Battle of Khasham, and 2020 Soleimani Assassination, broke the norm of below-threshold intelligence and proxy conflict.
The earlier Gulf and Iraq Wars defined hostile military strategy throughout the 1990s and 2000s because they demonstrated the threat that the U.S. could pose when allowed time to establish massive nearby arsenals. In 1990-1991, the U.S. built up a million-man coalition, including nearly 3,000 aircraft, in neighboring Saudi Arabia, and invaded Iraq after an extended air campaign that gained absolute American air supremacy. In 2003, a far lighter force toppled Saddam’s regime, but only after an air campaign and, once again, a buildup in neighboring Saudi Arabia.
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/01/18/the_merchant_marine_and_us_strategy_876521.html
