U.S. Marine Corps Could Be Left With No Effective Amphibious Warfare Fleet
ByDaniel GourePublished18 hours ago
The Russia-Ukraine war should be a lesson in the dangers of hubris in defense planning. After the Cold War, it was generally concluded that the world had seen the end of large-scale protracted land warfare. As a result, many NATO members virtually disarmed, ridding themselves in particular of the heavy forces that are now central to the Ukraine conflict. Now, in the aftermath of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. and its allies are scrambling not only to provide necessary military assistance to Kyiv, but also bolster NATO defenses in Eastern Europe, rebuild depleted stocks and buy newer, more capable systems, and platforms.
Today, proposals to radically change the size and composition of the amphibious warfare fleet center on the operational requirements of a single scenario: a confrontation with the People’s Republic of China in the Western Pacific. In the views of many, the primary threat in that situation would come from Chinese air and missile forces that would hold at-risk fixed facilities, force concentrations, and even large platforms such as U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. To a cadre of senior decisionmakers, the value of platforms and forces was judged by a single criterion: how well they could survive a missile salvo.
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/10/u-s-marine-corps-could-be-left-with-no-effective-amphibious-warfare-fleet/
