Neither history nor the American people will judge the Corps’ actions as wise.
BY P. K. VAN RIPER | PUBLISHED APR 20, 2022 8:29 AM
Editor’s Note: This is the second in a four-part series challenging a major multi-year reorganization of the Marine Corps known as Force Design 2030. In this article, retired Marine Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper shares his view of changes underway for Marine ground combat forces.
Marine leaders today speak often of the ability of Marine units to operate across the spectrum of conflict or of its broad range of military operations and capabilities; yet the new force structure the Corps is planning to implement by 2030 is designed for only one type of conflict, despite pronouncements to the contrary: a naval war with China. Moreover, that future force structure seemingly ignores 80 years of operational experience, for its design reverses long-held and proven operational and tactical fundamentals. The following are examples of the reversal of these fundamentals:
Fires and sensors will take precedence over maneuver warfare.
Defense will be favored over offense.
Marines will not possess the type of units and equipment needed to “close with and destroy” an enemy.
Infantry will no longer be the mainstay of the Corps; missiles and technologies are to be its strength.
Without tanks and sufficient cannon artillery, there will be no basis for combined arms.
Marines will not have a mobile, protected, direct-fire weapons system for the first time since 1923.
The conviction that every tactical unit must have an integral direct and an indirect fires capability will no longer exist (Loitering precision munitions may alleviate this to some degree).
Smaller rifle companies and infantry battalions will belie the preference for large units that can cover more ground and absorb significant casualties and continue to fight. In short, these battalions will be less resilient.
III MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) will no longer be a repository of capabilities used to form task-organized units for missions across the spectrum of conflict. The capabilities of I MEF and II MEF to do the same will be reduced greatly.
https://taskandpurpose.com/opinion/marine-corps-force-design-infantry/
