Putin and Nukes: Déjà Vu All Over Again?The atrophy of nuclear strategy is a vestige of the “era of strategic happy talk” associated with the “end of history” narrative.
By Mackubin Owens
April 20, 2022
With his invasion of Ukraine bogged down, Vladimir Putin has ratcheted up his threats to employ nuclear weapons. He previously warned against Western interference with his assault on Ukraine and put Russian nuclear forces on alert.
U.S. officials have voiced concerns about Putin’s threats. Speaking recently at Georgia Tech University, CIA director William Burns raised the possibility of tactical or low-yield nuclear weapons in response to setbacks in Ukraine. For those of us who dealt with issues of national security during the Cold War, this has the feeling of déjà vu all over again.
Although any such threat must be taken seriously, the likelihood of Putin using nuclear weapons seems low. To understand why, it is useful to look at the history of nuclear policy and strategy.
During the Cold War, nuclear weapons policy and strategy suffused every aspect of national security, including nonnuclear strategy. For instance, the United States rejected military options during the Vietnam War out of concern that escalation might lead to a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union or China.
Nuclear weapons also shaped overall defense policy and force structure. During the Eisenhower presidency, the U.S. nuclear advantage over the Soviets justified Ike’s “New Look” strategy, which cut the size of naval and ground forces because of the belief that long-range nuclear airpower alone was sufficient to deter hostile action by the Soviet Union and China. Reliance on nuclear weapons to deter Soviet military actions was seen as a relatively low-cost strategic option.
But there were flaws in this approach.
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But would Russia consider using tactical nuclear weapons within Ukraine to break the current stalemate? On the one hand, the Russians apparently have developed very low-yield nuclear warheads that can be delivered by air or short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). Of most concern is the Iskander-M (NATO designation SS-26 Stone), which has already been used extensively to deliver nonnuclear explosives.
On the other hand, Russia possesses nonnuclear warheads (e.g., thermobaric weapons) that produce blast effects and overpressures similar to those of a small nuclear weapon without the stigma of crossing the nuclear Rubicon. The Russians no doubt also have munitions such as the U.S. Massive Ordnance Air-burst Bomb (MOAB), which was used against an ISIS tunnel complex in Afghanistan in 2017. The latter contains some 18,000 pounds of an ammonium nitrate/powdered aluminum gelled slurry detonated by a high explosive booster.
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Source:
https://amgreatness.com/2022/04/20/putin-and-nukes-deja-vu-all-over-again/
