Per the article: "“There are only two classes of persons who can be called reasonable: those who serve God with all their heart because they know him, and those who seek him with all their heart because they do not know him."
Fair enough, but Pascal’s wager is all about risk-weighting the odds; to wit: even if there is only a tiny probability that God exists, the rational wager is to believe in God, because when those minuscule odds are risk-weighted by the pain of spending an infinite amount of time in Hell for not believing, those risk-weighted odds are greater than the similarly risk-weighted odds that God does not exist, because in that alternative, the pain is merely the small pain that accompanied the realization that you believed a falsehood for a limited number of years (100 or so at the most if you are long-lived).
But that leads inexorably to the next issue: we have been presented with any number of claimants to the title of God, from the Hindus, the Buddhists, the Christians, etc, etc, etc. if I risk-weight the probability that any one of those is correct, I end up with an infinite risk if I don’t believe in any of them (except perhaps for the Buddhists), which means, if I apply Pascal’s logic consistently, I have to believe in all of them, despite the fact that this is incoherent and impossible.
In short, Pascal’s wager only makes sense in a world where there is only one God on offer, so that belief is a binary choice.