Author Topic: THE SUBMARINE WORKFORCE CRISIS: ADMITTING REALITIES AND RESTRUCTURING LONG-TERM STRATEGY  (Read 124 times)

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THE SUBMARINE WORKFORCE CRISIS: ADMITTING REALITIES AND RESTRUCTURING LONG-TERM STRATEGY
ALEXANDER GREY
APRIL 4, 2024
 
Submarine under construction
“We have to build and sustain submarines in the next 15 to 17-plus years the same way we did in the ’80s with an industrial base that’s one-third the size.” On a recent trip to Lake Charles, Louisiana, the executive director of program executive office strategic submarines laid out the stark challenge facing the U.S. industrial base.

These concerns are not new. When testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in 2012, then-Chief of Naval Research Adm. Matthew Klunder noted over 50 percent of the submarine industrial workforce would be retirement-eligible by 2020. A decade on from the U.S. Navy raising concerns, the outlook is no better. The Government Accountability Office found that by September 2022, the submarine industrial base was 25 percent below adequate staffing levels to meet their delivery schedules for Virginia-class fast-attack submarines. This workforce crisis has impacted procurement timelines to the point that the U.S. Navy’s ability to maintain an adequately sized underwater fleet for force projection priorities is at risk. As the United States continues to lag behind near-peer competitors in the development of hypersonic missiles, the role of submarines — both conventionally and nuclear-armed — is a priority for maintaining American national security. As such, the most recent 30-year ship building plan from the chief of naval operations intends to dramatically increase the scale of submarine procurement over the next several decades. This scale-up will only complicate and deepen the workforce crisis as the industrial base struggles to deliver even more submarines.

To tackle the workforce crisis and expand industrial capacity, Washington should adopt a two-pronged institutional shift. First, force projection policy should evolve to efficiently utilize resources. This means shifting from the “silent service” model to a more conspicuous submarine presence to strengthen deterrence in key regions, especially the Indo-Pacific. Second, the submarine industrial base must innovate its recruitment strategies, moving from a broad, generalized approach to a more focused targeting of regional talent around the industrial bases, capturing as much local science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) talent as possible to secure the necessary manpower for timely platform construction.

https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/the-submarine-workforce-crisis-admitting-realities-and-restructuring-long-term-strategy/
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