Broken & Unreadable: The Tragic State of Force Design Dissent

[rangerrebew]

Broken & Unreadable: The Tragic State of Force Design Dissent
By Richard Protzmann
January 29, 2024
 
The Marine Corps weathers storm after storm when the nation calls, but no storm has been more disruptive or threatening to the culture of the institution than the persistent, public criticism of Force Design 2030 by retired senior leaders and their allies in Congress and the media. Multiple examples have surfaced just in the past month, including a Wall Street Journal piece suggesting that the Marine Corps may be unable to respond to other crises around the world, and a piece by retired general officers including prior commandants also suggesting that the Marine Corps is presently unable to continue serving as a “911” force because of structural changes to the force.  Both pieces are devoid of actual evidence that the Marine Corps has been unable or unsuccessful at any mission or operation, nor do they offer analysis of the investment and reinvestments made by the Marine Corps. Finally, neither offers a meaningful solution.

Force Design 2030 was implemented in 2018 by the 38th Commandant, General David Berger. It represents a necessary paradigm shift and departure from the ground wars of Iraq and Afghanistan to near-peer, multi-domain conflicts and threats; the obvious pacing threat is China. The Marine Corps looks to restructure around the concept of a Marine Littoral Regiment that can provide a “stand-in force” and conduct distributed operations in smaller formations throughout a contest littoral environment. The purpose of Force Design 2030 is to enable Marines to provide maritime defensive and offensive capabilities to a naval expeditionary force in support of a naval campaign, which requires divestments and investments in force structure and systems. The Commandant releases an annual update that provides transparency to the process and briefs changes as they arise.


Near peer conflict will see fewer direct-action operations with much of the fighting taking place in a multi-domain environment. To maintain its relevance, the Marine Corps needed to change. The result has been a net positive to the force structure and has inspired a new generation of Marines accustomed to fluidity and critical thinking instilled during the most introductory training. Force Design 2030 has been validated on the battlefield and in testing; the notion that its implementation has been a detriment to other missions outside of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) is easily refuted.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/01/29/broken_and_unreadable_the_tragic_state_of_force_design_dissent_1008002.html

[Maj. Bill Martin]

This is an utter crock of shit.

First, the article is attacking actual dissent, and respectful, reasoned dissent on doctrine, equipment, etc.. has always been a core component of Marine Corps officer culture.  The Marine Corps Gazette is the professional magazine for Marine officers, and you can see Lieutenants all the way up to general officers duking it out on various issues.  Senior enlisted occasionally will chip in also.  It's how you avoid groupthink.

Second, the criticisms of Force Design have been well-deserved and vocal, even if some ultimately find them unpersuasive.   For me, this article actually proves the point of the critics:

"The Marine Corps looks to restructure around the concept of a Marine Littoral Regiment that can provide a “stand-in force” and conduct distributed operations in smaller formations throughout a contest littoral environment. The purpose of Force Design 2030 is to enable Marines to provide maritime defensive and offensive capabilities to a naval expeditionary force in support of a naval campaign, which requires divestments and investments in force structure and systems."

That is a pretty damn narrow mission, which is the exact point being made by the critics.  And it's also a sufficiently narrow mission that you don't need 2.5 divisions and associated support dedicated to it.