Mine Warfare Could Be Key
With a different strategic approach, current mine warfare capabilities could help deter or defeat Chinese aggression. More advanced capabilities could be decisive.
By Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
December 2023 Proceedings Vol. 149/12/1,450
Mines are perhaps the most pernicious and frustrating obstacle a ground or maritime force can face. They can halt an offensive or counteroffensive operation, funnel forces to where they are most vulnerable, or simply cut off trade.
These “weapons that wait” have long wielded their disproportionate impact. U.S. offensive mine warfare during Operation Starvation was a substantial factor in the Japanese defeat in World War II, sinking more than a million tons of shipping. The only five U.S. Navy vessels sunk in combat during the Korean War were lost to mines. Three U.S. warships were mission kills in the Arabian Gulf as a result of Iraqi or Iranian mines, and mines were one reason an amphibious assault was not included in the liberation of Kuwait. More recently, floating mines in the Black Sea have disrupted both naval operations and Ukrainian grain exports. These diabolical weapons have enormous potential to influence future conflicts.
Unfortunately, at this pause point in the American Sea Power Project scenario, offensive mine warfare is largely foreclosed as an option, the result of an overarching strategic concept that undervalues offensive maritime mine warfare and decades of inattention on the part of the U.S. Navy. It is not surprising that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would control the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and areas around Taiwan or that the PLA would have established a lodgment on the island.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/december/mine-warfare-could-be-key?mc_cid=afd2d08646&mc_eid=99456f4911
