It All Comes Down to Sea Control
Winning the surface fight in this scenario would require first rolling back the Chinese Navy’s sea control from east to west, and then going on the offensive.
By Captain Scott Tait, U.S. Navy (Retired), and Commander Anthony LaVopa, U.S. Navy
December 2023 Proceedings Vol. 149/12/1,450
The first 60 days of this scenario are eye-opening but realistic—unlike anything the U.S. Navy has experienced since the 1940s. Wartime success in the surface domain will require tactical and technical innovation as well as industrial mobilization. If Trent Hone, Scott Mobley, Mark Wilson, and Arthur Herman have been correct in their writings, then preparing for such a scenario should have started years ago.1
The scenario posits that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has preemptively sunk or badly damaged the U.S. Seventh Fleet strike force deployed east of Taiwan. This rueful possibility compels deep thinking on what it would take to meet the readiness challenge for a potential war in 2026. Indeed, with the U.S. Navy survivors having moved east to repair and regroup, what might their assessment be regarding what should have been done years before to get ready?
The Surface Force in 2024
Early losses in the scenario result from the surface navy having failed to effectively adapt in peacetime to changes in technology and operating concepts and its overreliance on exquisite and expensive but low-quantity and relatively short-range capabilities.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/december/it-all-comes-down-sea-control
