How to Unsettle an Alliance: Subordinate Extended Deterrence to Antiquated Arms Control Initiatives
.By Keith B. Payne & Michaela Dodge
Dr. Keith B. Payne is a co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, professor emeritus at the Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and former Senior Advisor to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Dr. Michaela Dodge
Dr. Michaela Dodge is a Research Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy and an adjunct professor at the Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University.
Russia’s war in Europe and China’s expansionist, militarist foreign policy, and the quasi-alliance of these two predators seeking to re-order the globe,[1] have put the long-standing U.S. goals of extended deterrence and allied assurance under considerable strain. A complicating factor in this challenging context is the continuing U.S. propensity to pursue initiatives that appear to show relative disregard for allied concerns regarding extended deterrence—occasionally, it appears, in an effort to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons; this at a time when opponents are placing ever greater prominence on their nuclear capabilities for coercive and war-fighting purposes.
Illustrative of this propensity are the cases of Washington’s retirement of the 1980s vintage sea-based nuclear cruise missile, the Tomahawk Land Attack missile (TLAM-N), contemporary opposition to a new sea-based cruise missile, and repeated cycles of expressed interest in the adoption of “sole purpose” or “No-First-Use” (NFU) policies. In these cases, U.S. moves and expressions of policy goals conflict with repeatedly-expressed allied concerns that these U.S. initiatives threaten to degrade the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent—a key to their security positions. These cases illustrate well allied perceptions and expectations regarding extended deterrence and Washington’s apparent willingness to subordinate allies’ concerns to American domestic political pressures. They underscore the need to improve two-way understanding and communication about the realities of extended deterrence and assurance requirements as Western security measures must adapt to a dynamic threat environment. Without such an understanding, smoothing out the “rollercoaster” of U.S. and allies’ relations will be a matter of luck rather than a deliberate effort.
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/08/15/how_to_unsettle_an_alliance_subordinate_extended_deterrence_to_antiquated_arms_control_initiatives_972958.html
