Granting Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping Nuclear Superiority and the Deterrence of Nuclear Weapons First Use
By Mark B. Schneider
July 29, 2023
According to White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, “…I want to be clear here—the United States does not need to increase our nuclear forces to outnumber the combined total of our competitors in order to successfully deter them. We’ve been there. We’ve learned that lesson.” He did not elaborate on what lesson the United States had “learned” from the Cold War or why Cold War nuclear strategy was regarded as mistaken. Mr. Sullivan’s remarks appear to embrace the belief that Cold War United States nuclear deterrence policy failed despite the fact that it prevented a Third World War and, ultimately, contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union.
Mr. Sullivan’s remarks are noteworthy because this is the first time that a U.S. Administration has openly stated its acceptance of nuclear numerical inferiority. The mentality behind this pronouncement is consistent with the refusal of the Biden Administration to do anything in the current Ukrainian war crisis, despite near weekly Russian nuclear threats, to enhance the U.S.’ nuclear deterrent capability.
Accepting nuclear numerical inferiority is particularly significant in the context of:1) Putin’s vicious war against Ukraine, 2) the threat Russia poses to NATO, and 3) the similar and growing Chinese threat in the Far East. Despite the fact that the United States is in the most serious crisis since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Biden Administration has stated that it has not taken any action to enhance our nuclear deterrent posture. Moreover, it has also taken no action to reduce the vulnerability of our limited non-strategic nuclear deterrent to a small low-yield pre-emptive nuclear strike by Russia (or, for that matter, China). Indeed, in May 2023, the Biden Administration released data for March 1st (the biannual New START Treaty data) which indicated that in the previous six months the United States had decreased the number of its strategic nuclear forces by one accountable warhead to 1,419. While the number of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear warheads, currently only a relatively small number of B-61 gravity bombs, was not released, there is no indication that there has been any significant change in response to the current crisis. The last available Russian data (September 2022) indicated that Russia had increased its strategic nuclear force to 1,549 New START Treaty accountable nuclear weapons. In February 2023, Russia “suspended” the New START Treaty and ceased providing New START Treaty-mandated notifications and data. Prior to these developments, the U.S. Department of State was unable to certify Russian compliance with the New START Treaty’s numerical limits because of Russian refusal to allow on-site inspections .
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/07/29/granting_vladimir_putin_and_xi_jinping_nuclear_superiority_and_the_deterrence_of_nuclear_weapons_first_use_969460.html
