Mon, 02/20/2023 - 3:13pm
Challenging the “Problem of Special Operations and USSOF”
2-20-2023
By Charlie Black
In America’s Special Operations Problem Colonel R.D. Hooker, PhD former combat leader turned scholar offers a necessarily useful criticism of US Special Operations and SOF. His real argument relates more to USSOF than special operations. I urge everyone interested in national security, especially those in the special operations community to read it closely. As the Department of Defense shifts its strategy priority to great power competition it is prudent to reflect on over two decades of war. The lack of a dispassionate assessment of the recent Afghanistan withdraw suggests other priorities. Hooker makes some points worthy of consideration to be discussed later. Unfortunately, some of the argument is a misinterpretation of recent historical events, dependent context, and derives generalized conclusions from a relatively small number of incidents or events. What follows is my response to advance the discussion and debate.
First, the argument that US Special Operations Command is expensive is invalid. SOF perform different missions and capabilities than the conventional forces thus requiring a difference in kind making a “soldier-to-soldier” comparison invalid. The proffered comparison between US resourcing of US Special Operations Command and Poland’s military or any other European country is a false proposition. A more holistic perspective is an assessment of military spending as a percentage of GDP. The US GDP is over $23 Trillion as compared to Poland’s $680 Billion. Until the Ukraine crisis Poland spent ~2% of GDP on defense, whereas the US 3.4% funding of a global nuclear military has remained relatively steady. The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act approved $816.7 Billion of which $12.6 Billion (<1.6%) for US Special Operations including on-gong overseas contingencies.[1] An interesting comparison is the totality of US military aid to Ukraine in the past two years ($27.5B) which is more than what has been spent to sustain US special operations forces globally in support of every Combatant Command.[2]
The second counter point is more critical than one about resourcing. Hooker states that SOF are optimized for the low end of the conflict spectrum and given the emergence of great power competition less useful. His framing does not accurately characterize the operating environment or threat confronted by US SOF past, present or future whether irregular, hybrid or conventional. Historical, doctrinal, operational authorities, strategic guidance, and operational precedence overwhelmingly discount his assertion. Moreover, US SOF are playing an increased role in support of Combatant Commanders and intergovernmental partners to advance policy aims that seek to prevent conflict in the first place.[3] Contemporary conflict escapes the bifurcated framing of war or peace and the associated characterization of traditional high-end war as that between conventional formations. Whether we look to Ukraine, the Nogorno-Karabakh conflict, or Syria we can see that the character of war is evolving rapidly exposing USSOF to continued conflict since the larger drawdown of conventional forces. For example, to closely examine our extended time in Syria, USSOF (and integrated conventional forces) have confronted Russian mercenaries, a convoluted sea of partners, divergent collection of adversaries, expanded use of advanced technologies like EW and drones all framed by high political sensitivity. In comparison to Hooker’s description, one would likely not describe the environment as the “low end of the conflict.” Although considered backwater, out of sight and mind, many of the operating environments and threats expose USSOF to a high degree of violence.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/challenging-problem-special-operations-and-ussof
