Political Graphics 2023

[Bigun]

@Right_in_Virginia

BTW,Miss Miley did NOT earn ANY of those combat awards. Not even the CIB awards. ANY time she was assigned to a combat zone,she was either on the General Staff handing papers to and carrying the briefcases of senior officers,or she was in command of a unit in combat and never fired a shot or was fired at because she was always at the rear.

Which,come to think of it is probably a little backwards because I suspect she prefers having men to her rear.

I'm sure there are laws against wearing decorations not earned @sneakypete . I KNOW that the UCMJ covers that thoroughly.

[Smokin Joe]

I've kept quiet about the matter so far, but I got to weigh in,

In my career I oversaw response to several dozens  of  spills of varying sizes and substances at petrochemical facilites.  On and off site.    I do know based on those materials and sizes, each response may be different to a certain degree.  I will tell everyone with 100% certainty that between 1982 to 2013 I was never gave authorization, or got an approved response for the state or feds to intentionally set fire to a spill as an appropriate response.  That is insane.

From what I have read from what were on manifests, all the substances including most serious (vinyl chloride monomers) should have been responded by tradional means, of:

1. Proactive air monitoring of the communtiy, and the spill area to insure proper PPE.
2. Census of vulnerable wildlife, and remove to safe distances where possible
3. Laser Focus on containment of the spill to the smallest area possible.  Take all necessary steps to minimize any losses to streams or ground water sources.
4. Application of absorbants to help mitigate #1, and allow collection for additonal disposal or treatment.  Or liquid recontainment where practical.
5. Sealed containment for all contaminants removed in this emergency response.
6. Likely High Temperature thermal incineration for disposal to what we called 7-"9:'s efficiency.  Meaning all collected contaminants incinerated until 99.99999% of material has been reduced to that substance's elemental substrates.

Never Never Never, would have I authorized , or would have been given agency authorization to simply torch the spill. 

This is levels of ineptitude, I can not believe has happened.

Who the "F" is running EPA nowadays?

Tree huggers, in response to your last question.
In your list, 3-6 require the proper PPE, which may have been a day away. They require trained people, who may have been as far out. This is a small town along the rail line, and like hundreds, if not thousands of others, they are not ready for a major HAZMAT event, and cannot be ready for them all and keep the streets paved, too.
It is likely, in this event first responders are largely volunteer. That doesn't mean they aren't competent to handle 99.99% of what happens in their first-due area, just that this is beyond the scope of their training except to be able to find out what they are dealing with and try to get people away from it in a timely fashion--and request assistance.
If that assistance was supposed to come from a Federal Level, maybe that's why this whole thing has had a media lid on it until it became too obvious to cover up. This had been going on for days before the story broke.
Whether intentional or not, smoke signals may still be an effective means of communication.

Keep in mind they had five carloads of vinyl chloride and a wrecked train. It may not have even been torched on purpose, but with the LEL/UEL and a leak, that would be almost inevitable, anyway, considering the mess they had. These are people who may have never had to deal with or had even the training to deal with the spill, PPE they needed may well not have been available. Keep in mind also the carcinogenicity of the cargo, and with untrained personnel, and no response crew like a chemical handling or processing facility should have, someone may have considered this the best option. Who, I don't know.

It isn't uncommon at all in the upstream end of the oil patch to let something burn ('wild well', tanks on a production location) until you have the ducks in a row to control it once it is put out, otherwise you just have an increasing area of fire/explosive risk and a growing spillage incident.

[catfish1957]

CF1957 response in blue

Tree huggers, in response to your last question.
In your list, 3-6 require the proper PPE, (inferred in no. 1 of my list) which may have been a day away. They require trained people, who may have been as far out. This is a small town along the rail line, and like hundreds, if not thousands of others, they are not ready for a major HAZMAT event, and cannot be ready for them all and keep the streets paved, too

.  Initial IC of course was likely local Fire Chief, who would have reliqunished in a upward dominoing fashion, as the level of expertise and response increased.  That Chief should have been supporting on the sidelines at the 2-3 hour point. 

Every car requires the Chemtrec number to be posted, evident, which at least when I was in industry, was a typical 6-12 hour response after beng called.  Part of that call, would be a frank discussion between the IC (or EOC, if command center was established) and Chemtrec contact, who would have given appropriate initial local response, ususally real time.

It is likely, in this event first responders are largely volunteer. That doesn't mean they aren't competent to handle 99.99% of what happens in their first-due area, just that this is beyond the scope of their training except to be able to find out what they are dealing with and try to get people away from it in a timely fashion--and request assistance.

That is why like, I mentioned above that the local initial IC's early role should have been scene evaluation, product ID,  phone calls to those with advanced means to do the ambient air modeling to run plume scans to evacuate the necessary actions and scope of an evacuation.  These plume scans should have been done hourly, and response handled accordingly.

If that assistance was supposed to come from a Federal Level, maybe that's why this whole thing has had a media lid on it until it became too obvious to cover up. This had been going on for days before the story broke.
Whether intentional or not, smoke signals may still be an effective means of communication.

Even in the old days, Federal response and their contractors (FEMA) in conjuncton with rail road, or other responsible party likely in this these scenarios would (should) establish Media operation centers, and pre-schedule press briefings every 4-6 hours, depending on the serverity or fluidity of the event.  Public communicaton on disasters is not a new science.

Keep in mind they had five carloads of vinyl chloride and a wrecked train. It may not have even been torched on purpose, but with the LEL/UEL and a leak, that would be almost inevitable, anyway, considering the mess they had.

I have seen it reported in at least 2 locations, that this was an intentionally initiated burn, which I find insane.    And the ambient/flammability ignition issue?  Possibly, but if enough fire suppresants were applied, and since  there was plenty of time (Zero +120 in that response) , I don't think that observation is valid.

These are people who may have never had to deal with or had even the training to deal with the spill, PPE they needed may well not have been available. Keep in mind also the carcinogenicity of the cargo, and with untrained personnel, and no response crew like a chemical handling or processing facility should have, someone may have considered this the best option. Who, I don't know.

That is why the Chemtrec call should have been the very first thing in this emergency response, and was critical.  I am dying to know what happened in those initial hours of that response.    They should have directed the IC, on exactly what to do, as resouces rolled in to do a proper response..   

It isn't uncommon at all in the upstream end of the oil patch to let something burn ('wild well', tanks on a production location) until you have the ducks in a row to control it once it is put out, otherwise you just have an increasing area of fire/explosive risk and a growing spillage incident.

That is a common practice in the E/P area, but those spills are pretty one or two dimensional to either crude, or natural gas well blow outs.  But also realize that  maybe 95+% of those operations are in remote locations where the impact to human health and the environment is significantly limited, and/or is more easily mitigated.

[Right_in_Virginia]

[Smokin Joe]

I reiterate: In your list, 3-6 require the proper PPE, which may have been a day away.They require trained people, who may have been as far out. This is a small town along the rail line, and like hundreds, if not thousands of others, they are not ready for a major HAZMAT event, and cannot be ready for them all and keep the streets paved, too.

A lot of small-town fire chiefs. especially in areas where these chemicals are only a pass-through item, and not used nor generated nearby, simply don't deal with this sort of incident on a regular basis. Even in the middle of the oil patch here, a HAZMAT response to a town in a different part of the county will require a couple of hours to get someone with the highest levels of local training on scene. From there, the nearest team may be 8-12 hours out at best.

I'm talking about a rail related HAZMAT incident involving materials generally not produced nor used here (we're a major rail shipping corridor, too), not something as 'mundane' as an oil well fire. One such in Minot (a bigger town) years ago involved spillage, and one of my granddaughters suffered serious ill effects from that (which she has since, after two rounds of chemo, recovered from).

That leaves a guy who deals normally with car accidents and house fires in charge of a chemical spill with a class 2 health hazard in town with none of the resources common to an area where these chemicals are ordinarily handled, with an uncontrolled situation, establishing a perimeter and evacuating people, likely to the next town over. For all we know,he may have been told to light it off, or the Feds may have done it.

Concerning is the media blackout, including accounts of reporters being arrested (possibly for violating the perimeter to 'get the story' without realizing what they were facing in terms of materials or fire risk).  That media blackout may conceal an inept or lackadasical response from the very people who were supposed to back up the locals in this case (IOW, Federal Level FUBAR).

Considering that local Fire Chiefs are usually just that, local, and that in volunteer departments are part and parcel of the community they serve, they will want to get this right and defer to people more expert, simply because they are one of the locals, too. No one wants to be 'that guy' who wrecked the town, and they are going to do everything to get it right because they live there, too.

What that indicates to me is that failures in this, be they in strategy or in execution, are more likely at the Federal level, no matter who ends up getting gigged with the blame.

[Right_in_Virginia]

[Right_in_Virginia]

[Right_in_Virginia]

[Kamaji]

[Kamaji]

[Kamaji]

[Right_in_Virginia]

Perfect.   

[catfish1957]

I reiterate: In your list, 3-6 require the proper PPE, which may have been a day away.They require trained people, who may have been as far out. This is a small town along the rail line, and like hundreds, if not thousands of others, they are not ready for a major HAZMAT event, and cannot be ready for them all and keep the streets paved, too.

And I reiterate, PPE, even the most rudementary, at the local level, have Level "A", and should have been able to do a size up of the incident in decent enough quality to give the necessary details to Chemtrec, and the first tier of competent emergency responders. PPE is and should be a given.  Even at the local level.    At if the the Chemtrec operates at advertised levels should be on the scene at 2-3 hours to respond.  And again, the locals should have been working with plume monitors focusing more on what level of safe initial evacuaton should have been enacted.

A lot of small-town fire chiefs. especially in areas where these chemicals are only a pass-through item, and not used nor generated nearby, simply don't deal with this sort of incident on a regular basis. Even in the middle of the oil patch here, a HAZMAT response to a town in a different part of the county will require a couple of hours to get someone with the highest levels of local training on scene. From there, the nearest team may be 8-12 hours out at best.

Nope, see above- 2-3 hours should or, during my time 10+ years ago been the norm.  I was not directly involved, but another site  had a post Hurricane Ike event, and the big guns got there in an hour and a half.  In a hurricane disaster, no less.  Equipment was there 4-6. 

I'm talking about a rail related HAZMAT incident involving materials generally not produced nor used here (we're a major rail shipping corridor, too), not something as 'mundane' as an oil well fire. One such in Minot (a bigger town) years ago involved spillage, and one of my granddaughters suffered serious ill effects from that (which she has since, after two rounds of chemo, recovered from).

That leaves a guy who deals normally with car accidents and house fires in charge of a chemical spill with a class 2 health hazard in town with none of the resources common to an area where these chemicals are ordinarily handled, with an uncontrolled situation, establishing a perimeter and evacuating people, likely to the next town over. For all we know,he may have been told to light it off, or the Feds may have done it.

No disagreements there, except a well planned out, and executed congingency plan would have gotten the notificaitions and reponses there in no more, (and with margin of error) 8 hours.  Chemtrec as a fulcrum could have unleashed a response pulling in massive amounts of mutual aid response.  As it should have, but apparently didn't.  This whole event in almost every aspect does not add up, in the realm of emergency response.  And I really want to know why!!!!

Though I have to disagree, that no self respective Emergency Manager would have directed the IC to intentionally light off the spill in a manner described.   If they did, I want to know who it was. 

Concerning is the media blackout, including accounts of reporters being arrested (possibly for violating the perimeter to 'get the story' without realizing what they were facing in terms of materials or fire risk).  That media blackout may conceal an inept or lackadasical response from the very people who were supposed to back up the locals in this case (IOW, Federal Level FUBAR).

A proper Media Emergency Center, (even a tent if needed) should have been established within an hour or two of the event by local city government.  And periodic schedlued press briefing intiated at the onset.   That's SOP, and in fact if this town has an RMP, even for their potable water chlorinators, this should have well known, understood,  and established.


Considering that local Fire Chiefs are usually just that, local, and that in volunteer departments are part and parcel of the community they serve, they will want to get this right and defer to people more expert, simply because they are one of the locals, too. No one wants to be 'that guy' who wrecked the town, and they are going to do everything to get it right because they live there, too.

Agree, and just hope that there just wasn't that one "cowboy" who thought he was smarter than anyone else. Local response will be part of the investigative and root cause analysis once this CF is done.

What that indicates to me is that failures in this, be they in strategy or in execution, are more likely at the Federal level, no matter who ends up getting gigged with the blame.

If it comes out this thing was intentionally torched with residents still in plume range, there will be hell to pay. Not wanting to really politicize this thing, but  If Biden's DOT and EPA is in that (no pun) blast range, I hope reprecussions are swift and severe.

[Smokin Joe]

@catfish1957

I'm not doubting what is available in your area, nor the response times you expect, just saying that in other areas those resources may not be on the hook by the door, so to speak.

There are entire counties out here with populations under 10K, so keep that in mind considering what resources are available to locals. Someone has to fund this stuff, and often that someone just isn't there. I know of fire departments who only in the last decade could afford the sort of victim extrication equipment other areas have considered standard for forty years. It takes this a long time to trickle down.

Consider, too, that rather than being something often trained and drilled for, these events hold much less local sway (which directly affects local (the majority of ) funding and community support) than saving aunt Tillie's chicken coop or prying someone's kid out of the car they have wrecked--so the vast majority of drill time will be spent on the most relevant situations, not everything that is rolling past on the train tracks.

Should it be that way?

Well, incidents like this, no matter how rare, are certainly an indicator that something needs to be done to improve response actions, but just identifying what that is and how to go about it is another kettle of worms, and needs to be done right.

Obviously, going about it the wrong way, will destroy industry, and degrade the esteem with which all small town and rural firefighters are regarded, and in so doing, cause degradation in the services which those departments may even excel, because of their perceived inability to handle what are situations they may never have to face bleeding over into a general disregard for their competence in other more relevant matters in their first due areas and mutual aid penumbra.

Forcing a redirection of seriously limited local resources for hypothetical situations can reduce the resources available to deal with those situations much more likely to occur, and involves training people on their own time (away from work/family) and even their own dime (which many do, anyway). It isn't that people aren't willing, but to go to a centralized training facility in this state, for instance will require days off from work, a 600+ mile round trip, accommodations,  etc. etc. etc. which may not be do-able for many members of rural departments who also have jobs and families to take care of.

If the ball was dropped at the Federal or even State level, then something needs desperately to be fixed.  If it is a matter of notifying local resources of what is available to them, that needs to be fixed. I seriously doubt that some local went 'cowboy' and decided to burn the cargo without some serious talk with someone up the line from them and the railroad as well. Someone gave/got the order. The question is one of where it came from.

[240B]

[catfish1957]

@catfish1957

I'm not doubting what is available in your area, nor the response times you expect, just saying that in other areas those resources may not be on the hook by the door, so to speak.

There are entire counties out here with populations under 10K, so keep that in mind considering what resources are available to locals. Someone has to fund this stuff, and often that someone just isn't there. I know of fire departments who only in the last decade could afford the sort of victim extrication equipment other areas have considered standard for forty years. It takes this a long time to trickle down.

Consider, too, that rather than being something often trained and drilled for, these events hold much less local sway (which directly affects local (the majority of ) funding and community support) than saving aunt Tillie's chicken coop or prying someone's kid out of the car they have wrecked--so the vast majority of drill time will be spent on the most relevant situations, not everything that is rolling past on the train tracks.

Should it be that way?

Well, incidents like this, no matter how rare, are certainly an indicator that something needs to be done to improve response actions, but just identifying what that is and how to go about it is another kettle of worms, and needs to be done right.

Obviously, going about it the wrong way, will destroy industry, and degrade the esteem with which all small town and rural firefighters are regarded, and in so doing, cause degradation in the services which those departments may even excel, because of their perceived inability to handle what are situations they may never have to face bleeding over into a general disregard for their competence in other more relevant matters in their first due areas and mutual aid penumbra.

Forcing a redirection of seriously limited local resources for hypothetical situations can reduce the resources available to deal with those situations much more likely to occur, and involves training people on their own time (away from work/family) and even their own dime (which many do, anyway). It isn't that people aren't willing, but to go to a centralized training facility in this state, for instance will require days off from work, a 600+ mile round trip, accommodations,  etc. etc. etc. which may not be do-able for many members of rural departments who also have jobs and families to take care of.

If the ball was dropped at the Federal or even State level, then something needs desperately to be fixed.  If it is a matter of notifying local resources of what is available to them, that needs to be fixed. I seriously doubt that some local went 'cowboy' and decided to burn the cargo without some serious talk with someone up the line from them and the railroad as well. Someone gave/got the order. The question is one of where it came from.

Sounds like you may be attuned to the local issues, but doesn't Ohio have a State DOT with district offices that conducts drills, and emergency management systems, and reviews?  Doesn't Ohio have Mutual Aid operation programs?  Do they audit their programs?  NFPA has pretty strict standards on emergency repsonse too.    And aren't these district numerous and efficent enough to meet the needs of their populus.  This is the age of smart phones and the internet. Help should be a few clicks away at a moment, so I am not really buying too much into the Boss Hog theories. 

Again, I want to stress this point.  Who, and when was the authorization given to torch the spill?  They need to be hung from a street lamp by their testicles.

Hate to be pointing fingers in the middle of an incident, but when they are mismanaged at this level, someone needs to intervene.

[240B]

[240B]

[Bigun]

Sounds like you may be attuned to the local issues, but doesn't Ohio have a State DOT with district offices that conducts drills, and emergency management systems, and reviews?  Doesn't Ohio have Mutual Aid operation programs?  Do they audit their programs?  NFPA has pretty strict standards on emergency repsonse too.    And aren't these district numerous and efficent enough to meet the needs of their populus.  This is the age of smart phones and the internet. Help should be a few clicks away at a moment, so I am not really buying too much into the Boss Hog theories. 

Again, I want to stress this point.  Who, and when was the authorization given to torch the spill?  They need to be hung from a street lamp by their testicles.

Hate to be pointing fingers in the middle of an incident, but when they are mismanaged at this level, someone needs to intervene.

IIRC the railroads themselves are required by law to have HAZMAT response teams on call 24/7/365. I'm pretty sure CHEMTREC does as well.

[catfish1957]

Maybe the biggest underreported part of this disaster, especially if that the material has been allowed to infiltrate the Ohio River, is that the MCL (for Vinyl Chloride ) is .002 mg/l. or 2 Parts Per Billion by volume.  EPA SDWA standard. (Drinking Water Standards)

No one is giving us a clue on how much as entered the waterway, but that will be critical data for response.

And my understanding of VC, is that it in it's long chain organic structure is very difficult to remove and treat.  I don't even know if RO is a good means of removal.  We might be looking at an environmental disaster unparalled, at least in the past 50 years. Contaminating water supplies throughout the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.

[Bigun]

Linked below is the SDS for Vinal Chloride Monomer (what's in those tank cars) from one of my old employers. I've personally dealt with oceans of the stuff which was delivered to us via pipeline from the nearby Dow Badische plant where it was manufactured.

https://www.shintech.com/UserFiles/files/Safety-Data-Vinyl-Chloride-Monomer.pdf

EXPOSURE LIMITS

Vinyl Chloride: 1.0 ppm OSHA-PEL (8 Hour TWA)
5 ppm OSHA /STEL (Average, not exceeding any 15 minute
period) 0.5 ppm OSHA action level

@catfish1957 @Smokin Joe

[Kamaji]

[240B]

Gaming

[240B]

Am I going to eat today? Am I going to sleep in the rain today? Will I be raped or killed today?
These are 'real' concerns worldwide.

[Kamaji]

Am I going to eat today? Am I going to sleep in the rain today? Will I be raped or killed today?
These are 'real' concerns worldwide.