Ending Production of This Warship Is a Mistake
The Navy’s new shipbuilding plan would replace all but three more LPD-17s with a vague plan to get started on a replacement class.
BRYAN MCGRATH | MAY 16, 2022 10:20 AM ET
Observers have rightly criticized the recent release of the “Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023” (“annual” of late more honored in the breach than the observance) for its insufficiency and inconsistency with the requirements of great power competition. This essay focuses on the unfortunate decision to truncate the LPD-17 Flight II production line, a topic treated in greater analytical detail in the May 4 release from the Congressional Research Service authored by the indispensable Ronald O’Rourke.
Amphibious ships are the most obvious manifestation of the historic and symbiotic operational relationship between the Navy and the Marine Corps. Amphibious ready groups, or ARGs, typically consisting of three ships (a dock landing ship, or LSD; an amphibious transport dock, or LPD; and an amphibious assault ship, or LHD/LHA) serve as a critical component of the Department of the Navy’s forward-deployed conventional deterrence and crisis response capability. Embarked on these ships are about 2,200 combat Marines ready to move ashore with aviation, artillery, light armor, and infantry capabilities. This powerful marriage of the benefits of sea-maneuver and power-projection ashore provides combatant commanders with options for deterrence of aggression and assurance of friends and allies, not to mention the oft-used capability to provide humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters.
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/05/ending-production-warship-mistake/366689/
