A Liberal Case for Seapower?
Jonathan Caverley and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell
February 25, 2021
Editors note: This essay is the third in a series of eight articles, “Maritime Strategy on the Rocks,†that examines different aspects and implications of the recently released tri-service maritime strategy, Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power. Be sure to read the first article and second article. We thank Prof. Jon Caverley of the U.S. Naval War College for his assistance in coordinating this series.
Given the many nakedly self-serving, politically desperate, and anti-liberal foreign policy moves of the lame duck administration of former President Donald Trump, the incoming team of President Joe Biden might understandably treat the recently released tri-service maritime strategy in a similar fashion to Trump’s proposed 2022 budget: with skepticism. America’s sea services have been at the forefront of the Trump administration’s last-minute national security maneuvers with the December releases of both a new 30-year shipbuilding plan and the new maritime strategy. Trump loved talking about building ships (although he did little to advance this goal), shattering precedents by sending his National Security Advisor to campaign on naval construction in battleground states and openly suggesting that the Navy consider his political prospects when choosing to build its new frigate in Wisconsin. But, despite this, the new administration should take the new strategy document seriously, as the three naval services have produced a strikingly liberal vision.
By “liberal,†we do not mean “Democratic†(or even “democraticâ€; there is no mention of democracy in the strategy), but rather, the suite of policies and beliefs associated with the long term and largely bipartisan American approach to foreign policy. While the Pentagon prefers the term “rules-based†to “liberal†to describe this international order, both terms are synonymous with the system of alliances, free trade, open global commons, conflict management, international institutions, and the more than-occasional bout of coercion that has been central to America’s approach to international politics since the end of World War II. The Biden administration has clearly signaled its intent to steer American foreign policy back in this direction as an intrinsic component to competition with China, reacting to Trump’s internationally confrontational “America First†policy.
https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/a-liberal-case-for-seapower/
