We Don’t Own the Night Anymore
Jon Tishman and Dan Schoen | 01.22.21
“We own the night†has been an Army mantra for decades. It is also growing increasingly less true. Despite the current ubiquity of night-vision and thermal imagers, the Army has failed to adequately codify its night-fighting doctrine and remains overly reliant on technological advantage, which it wielded for nearly two decades of counterinsurgency operations against a poorly equipped enemy but which is steadily disappearing. Even as late as 2017, elite units like the 75th Ranger Regiment have failed to recognize friendly signals at night, resulting in tragedy. Though the Army may have owned the night for decades, the pressing reality of large-scale combat operations against a similarly equipped force means it cannot expect to continue that dominance without a major effort to codify its night-fighting doctrine, reduce the signature of soldiers operating at night, and re-examine its overreliance on night dominance at the combat training centers.
The Seductiveness of “Owning the Nightâ€
Night operations have historically been a valuable but niche capability units employed to gain a temporary tactical advantage. At the end of the Second World War, all major belligerents began experimenting with infrared light sources to improve vehicle mobility and provide an enhanced night targeting capability for key weapons systems. In the Korean War, the Army faced adept North Korean and Chinese opponents, leading the service to develop an expanded night operations doctrine. In 1954, Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations devoted considerable attention to night combat, discussing tactical and technical strengths and weaknesses of night operations, as well as special considerations for attack and defense.
https://mwi.usma.edu/we-dont-own-the-night-anymore/
