Author Topic: Op-ed: World War II battle holds key lessons for modern warfare  (Read 580 times)

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rangerrebew

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Op-ed: World War II battle holds key lessons for modern warfare
By: Benjamin Jensen, 

Between Aug. 7, 1942, and Feb. 9, 1943, U.S. forces sought to capture – and then defend – the Pacific island of Guadalcanal from the Japanese military.

What started as an amphibious landing quickly turned into a series of massive air and naval battles.

The campaign marked a major turning point in the Pacific theater of World War II. It also revealed important lessons about the nature of warfare itself – ones that are particularly relevant when planning for conflict in the 21st century.

Specifically, the Guadalcanal campaign shows how the old saying “the best defense is a good offense” can be turned upside-down – with a strong defense becoming an effective offensive weapon. The Japanese sought to find weaknesses, but kept running up against American power on land, on the sea and in the air.

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/07/25/op-ed-world-war-ii-battle-holds-key-lessons-for-modern-warfare/

Online Elderberry

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Op-ed: World War II battle holds key lessons for modern warfare
« Reply #1 on: July 28, 2019, 11:42:33 am »
Navy Times 7/26/2019 By: Benjamin Jensen, American University School of International Service and Brig. Gen. William J. Bowers, U.S. Marine Corps

Between Aug. 7, 1942, and Feb. 9, 1943, U.S. forces sought to capture – and then defend – the Pacific island of Guadalcanal from the Japanese military.

What started as an amphibious landing quickly turned into a series of massive air and naval battles.

The campaign marked a major turning point in the Pacific theater of World War II. It also revealed important lessons about the nature of warfare itself – ones that are particularly relevant when planning for conflict in the 21st century.

Specifically, the Guadalcanal campaign shows how the old saying “the best defense is a good offense” can be turned upside-down – with a strong defense becoming an effective offensive weapon. The Japanese sought to find weaknesses, but kept running up against American power on land, on the sea and in the air.

As scholars and military professionals, we see Guadalcanal as teaching enduring lessons about the importance of integrating planning, training and technology to generate options that confound an adversary.

We are not alone. The Chinese Navy’s official magazine recently published an article analyzing the Guadalcanal campaign for lessons useful in future wars.

In early August 1942, the United States landed Marines and other troops on Guadalcanal, taking much of the island and capturing its airfields. Initially, it was an offense-as-defense strategy, part of a larger effort to capture the Solomon Islands, so Japan couldn’t use them as a base for attacking Allied naval forces in the Pacific.

Japanese resistance took a heavy toll, especially on the U.S. Navy, which lost 29 ships and thousands of sailors. But the Japanese efforts did more lasting damage to its own military, expending pilots, aircraft and ships Japan simply could not replace fast enough to sustain the war. The U.S., by contrast, had a vast population and enormous industrial potential, and was able to replace its losses and even reinforce its positions.

More: https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/07/25/op-ed-world-war-ii-battle-holds-key-lessons-for-modern-warfare/

Offline PeteS in CA

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Re: Op-ed: World War II battle holds key lessons for modern warfare
« Reply #2 on: July 28, 2019, 02:23:19 pm »
Troops were landed on August 7th. The August 8/9 Battle of Savo Island taught three key lessons (though not necessarily learned quickly or with out repeat "teaching" events).

* Getting your troops' supplies ashore efficiently and quickly is as important as getting your troops ashore efficiently and quickly;

* Use your ships with the best radar detection as your farthest out pickets;

* Skimping on training during the 1930s, especially with regard to fighting at night, cost a lot of ships and lives.

Among the things the USN and USMC did correctly, choosing a target with an airfield, capturing it, and keeping it operational was huge. It limited what the IJN and IJA could do to counter-attack. The IJN had to keep its warships and transports outside of Henderson Field's range. That, in turn dictated that ships used had to be fast. This precluded using half of the IJN's battleships - too slow. It also indirectly made it impractical to use IJN Yamato (Musashi was in training work-up at the time), due to fuel shortage). The losses of IJN battleship Hiei and a fleet of transports in battles in mid-November illustrated what Henderson Field could do (Hiei had been crippled in a night battle).

The USN lost a lot of ships in the process, but finally learned how powerful the IJN's torpedo and tactics were.

The USN also, I think, learned that the greater number of guns and faster rate of fire of their light cruisers' 6" guns outweighed the heavier shells of their heavy cruisers' 8" guns in a surface battle.

The Solomons Campaign were an important part of the process of the USN realizing that their Mark 13, 14, and 15 torpedoes were unreliable crap.
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Millions now living should have died. Anti-Covid-Vaxxer ghouls hardest hit.

Offline skeeter

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Re: Op-ed: World War II battle holds key lessons for modern warfare
« Reply #3 on: July 28, 2019, 02:32:40 pm »
Troops were landed on August 7th. The August 8/9 Battle of Savo Island taught three key lessons (though not necessarily learned quickly or with out repeat "teaching" events).

* Getting your troops' supplies ashore efficiently and quickly is as important as getting your troops ashore efficiently and quickly;

* Use your ships with the best radar detection as your farthest out pickets;

* Skimping on training during the 1930s, especially with regard to fighting at night, cost a lot of ships and lives.

Among the things the USN and USMC did correctly, choosing a target with an airfield, capturing it, and keeping it operational was huge. It limited what the IJN and IJA could do to counter-attack. The IJN had to keep its warships and transports outside of Henderson Field's range. That, in turn dictated that ships used had to be fast. This precluded using half of the IJN's battleships - too slow. It also indirectly made it impractical to use IJN Yamato (Musashi was in training work-up at the time), due to fuel shortage). The losses of IJN battleship Hiei and a fleet of transports in battles in mid-November illustrated what Henderson Field could do (Hiei had been crippled in a night battle).

The USN lost a lot of ships in the process, but finally learned how powerful the IJN's torpedo and tactics were.

The USN also, I think, learned that the greater number of guns and faster rate of fire of their light cruisers' 6" guns outweighed the heavier shells of their heavy cruisers' 8" guns in a surface battle.

The Solomons Campaign were an important part of the process of the USN realizing that their Mark 13, 14, and 15 torpedoes were unreliable crap.

The loss at Savo was as much due to command and control, but peacetime naval doctrine - the alert conditions on the cruisers - was at fault as well.

Tactically the Japanese navy gave better than they got all through the Guadalcanal campaign, but you're right Henderson field was just too valuable as asset for the Japanese to overcome.