Sorry, Obama: A Grand Bargain with Iran Was Never Going to Happen
Obama holding his Nobel Peace Prize, 2009.
Iran's strength is one of its biggest weaknesses. As long as that's true, it won't fit in with its neighbors.
John Allen Gay
October 13, 2015
There’s also little evidence that Iran is ready to take on a larger regional role. Zarif’s new proposal for Yemen? It’s the same thing he proposed months ago. The nuclear-weapons-elimination pact? A nonstarter for a number of reasons—first among them, eliminating nuclear weapons can only come as a product of reduced tensions among the nuclear powers, not at the say-so of a regional player. Zarif’s nuclear-elimination column contains a curious phrase—“countries outside the [Non-Proliferation Treaty], or Israel”—that betrays a second problem. Does Zarif not see Israel as a country? The Israelis certainly have that perception, and as long as they have large, unfriendly neighbors, they have little reason to give up their nuclear deterrent. Basing a major policy initiative on the notion that they would do otherwise suggests Iran has a quixotic streak unbecoming of a stabilizing power; the alternative reading of this initiative, that it is merely an effort to stir up energy against Israel and the great powers, suggests Iran continues to be opponent of the current order more than a prospective anchor of a plausible new order. And it should go without saying that Iran’s own nuclear program, while hamstrung and unlikely to produce a weapon in the medium term, does not inspire renewed enthusiasm for nonproliferation among its neighbors. Zarif can crow about Israel’s bomb, but that bomb doesn’t challenge the current regional-security arrangements; Iran’s nuclear program, with or without a bomb, does.
And that gets to the fundamental problem: The current regional system was built without Iran—in some cases built in opposition to it, and in some cases simply bypassing it. The system will have to adjust to admit Iran, and Iran will have to adjust to be admitted. But with Iran’s influence having grown enormously over the wreckage of Iraq and Syria, historically regional powers in their own right, adjusting and finding peace may allow Iran to make disproportional gains relative to its neighbors. Iran has effectively bought Iraq and Syria on the cheap as fixer-uppers. They’re enormous security and financial liabilities for Iran right now, and will remain so as long as the neighborhood can’t agree on settling their conflicts. But if that agreement comes through, the value of Tehran’s investment will skyrocket, and they may find themselves looking for new ventures. That’s not to say that we’d see the Islamic Republic moving its capital to the ruins of Ctesiphon and proclaiming the restoration of the Persian empire. A restored Iraq and Syria would not be puppets, as their renewed strength would allow them to pursue their own interests. But Iran could enjoy deeper influence and friendship with both than it has had for centuries. This would be a major alteration of the regional balance, and it would be very unfavorable to countries that have the power to play spoiler. Iran’s growing power would work against it.
And we haven’t even mentioned the role of the United States here, which, for all the talk of grand bargains, would face both internal political constraints and external pressures from its allies in shifting toward Iran. We’re not exactly the best at understanding other countries’ interests, either, and the lack of diplomatic contact with Iran—now apparently amplified by Khamenei’s latest ukase—doesn’t help.
All this means that there are high structural barriers to Iran reentering the regional system. The nuclear agreement only addresses these barriers indirectly—by stopping the economic damage of sanctions and creating the possibility of fuller cooperation with Russia and China, it can eventually make itself stronger. But as long as its neighbors see that strength as fundamentally threatening, it will only be able to make gains using naked force. The Iranians may soon discover the truth of Chesterton’s adage about fascism: used alone, without legitimacy, raw power “is the weakest thing in the world.” In regional geopolitics, the deal is simply not that big of a deal.
John Allen Gay, an associate managing editor at The National Interest, is coauthor of War with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic Consequences (Rowman and Littlefield, 2013). He tweets at @JohnAllenGay.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/sorry-obama-grand-bargain-iran-was-never-going-happen-14042?page=2
