/ 2015 / July / Should the United States Buy the Long Range Strike Bomber? Yes
Andrew Hunter
July 9, 2015 · in Commentary
The United States is preparing to restart bomber production. The awarding of a contract this summer for the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) will end a 20-year production hiatus. While the Department of Defense has officially embraced the need to develop a new bomber for the past decade and has been actively pursuing LRS-B for five years, the award of the development contract represents a substantially higher level of commitment to new bomber production than at any time since shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The pressing question for the Department of Defense and Congress is whether the nation should buy LRS-B at all. They must consider whether LRS-B is cost-effective and affordable within likely budgets, unlike programs such as the Comanche helicopter and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle that were killed before entering production because they proved unaffordable.
While little has been made public about the LRS-B program, a few important details are known. It is expected to consist of 80-100 long-range aircraft with an average procurement unit cost of $550 million in 2010 dollars (or about $610 million per plane in today’s dollars). It is also expected to incorporate low observable technologies and be capable of both conventional and strategic (nuclear) missions. Combining these details with information about past acquisition programs is enough to make a preliminary assessment of LRS-B. The conclusion: A well-designed, well-executed LRS-B program would provide significant warfighting value and would be affordable within likely future budgets. The U.S. Air Force should proceed with the program, but Congress and the Department of Defense will need to reassess this question in three to four years to determine if the assumptions that underlay this decision remain valid.
The Value of the LRS-B’s Mission
Measuring the value of an individual weapon system is difficult because it requires significant judgments in putting a value to the mission it will perform and in assessing potential alternatives. This assessment is generally made within the Department of Defense acquisition system as part of the analysis of alternatives (AOA), which looks at all the practically achievable ways of performing the mission and identifies the approach that provides the needed capability at a reasonable cost. Though the LRS-B program is well past the AOA stage, the need for LRS-B continues to be challenged by commentators such as T.X. Hammes here at War on the Rocks. Such a debate is healthy and timely, as Congress will certainly have skeptical questions and the Department of Defense will need good answers.
The foundation for the need for LRS-B starts with its conventional mission and how it supports the American way of war that has evolved since at least the first Gulf War. This way of war has depended on the ability of U.S. forces to penetrate enemy air defenses to achieve one of two primary objectives. Objective one has been to suppress or destroy air defenses, thereby enabling continuous air support for U.S. ground and naval forces engaged in combat operations. Think of the role of the F-117 in the first Gulf War or how the B-2 has been used to kick down the door of enemy air defenses since its introduction to combat in 1999. Objective two has been to penetrate defended enemy airspace to identify or destroy individual high-value targets and strategic threats without directly attacking air defenses. Think of the decapitation strike designed to kill Saddam Hussein and other key Iraqi leaders on the first day of the second Gulf War. The ability to penetrate enemy air defenses is foundational to the successful prosecution of a modern combined arms campaign and also to the ability to attack with precision anywhere in the world. Hence, the value of the conventional missions that LRS-B will perform is high.
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