The seeds for Custer's defeat were planted in the winter of 1868, at an Indian Camp on the Washita River. Custer, on the orders of Gen. Philip Sheridan , and his Seventh Cavalry Regiment were engaged in one of, if not the first, winter campaigns on the Plains. The objective was to run down, and kill, or capture, hostile Cheyenne, Kiowa and Comanche Indians who had been raiding Kansas and the Southern Plains all summer. In sub zero weather, Custer struck a hostiles' trail, and followed it to an Indian village; the village of Black Kettle, a well known Cheyenne peace chief, and the victim of the Sand Creek massacre four years earlier.
Custer attacked at dawn, to the strains of "Garry Owen". The cavalry, unable to risk discovery if they reconnoitered, attacked from three directions. the attack was a success, except for two things. First, Custer's then XO, Major Joel Elliot had led some 19 men away from the village in pursuit of fleeing hostiles, declaring "A brevet or a Coffin". Elliot and his men quickly disappeared. They failed to return when Custer, having captured prisoners, killed ponies, recovered property stolen by Indians on their raids, and having killed a number of ponies, sounded "Recall". the second problem then arose. Black Kettle's village was the first of several along the Washita, and sizable numbers of warriors began to appear, and open fire. Despite the remonstrances of CPT. Frederick Benteen, one of his troop commanders, a fellow Civil War veteran, and a close friend of Elliot, Custer did not go looking for Elliot. Gathering his regiment, he withdrew. [Elliot and his men were later found, killed to the last man.
The next Spring, Custer reached a peace accord with the Southern Cheyenne. He became a hero, and Sheridan's golden boy. But Benteen never forgave him. He wrote anonymous letters, and newspaper articles castigating his commanding officer. The relationship was poisonous at best.
In the Spring of 1876, the 7th was part of a massive operation to bring the last of the holdouts on the Northern Plains onto the reservation. The holdouts included Lakota, Dakota, Northern Cheyenne, some Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho. their 'political' leader, for want of a better word was the Holy Man Sitting Bull. Their principal war chief was an Oglala named Crazy Horse. Army intelligence estimates placed the number of hostiles at about 800. The estimates were wrong. Those estimates were largely based on information provided by the Indian Agents, who neglected to report large numbers of reservation Indians who left to join the holdouts for a Buffalo hunt. In point of fact, the total number of hostiles exceeded 2,000, with at least 800 warriors.
The plan was to use three converging columns, George Crook from the southeast, John Gibbon from the northwest, and Alfred Terry from the east to locate and settle the Indians' hash. The overarching concern was not to let the Indians escape if found. It was a core belief in the Army, borne out by prior operations, that the Indians would flee if a village was attacked. Sheridan was that the Indians not escape.
First contact when to Crook, or rather Crazy Horse, at the Rosebud River. Crazy Horse caught Crook's column having lunch. The Indians fought as a mass, not as individuals. But for the bravery of his Shoshone and Crow scouts, Crook would have been heavily defeated. As it was, he retreated to his supply base, but failed to notify anybody of his defeat [similarly, Gibbon, who saw the village, and its size from across a river, twice, never reported the sightings to Terry, the over-all commander].
While Crook was being defeated, a column of the 7th, under the XO, Major Marcus Reno, struck an Indian trail, but didn't follow it up. Reno, who had been undermining an absent Custer [who had testified against Pres. Grant's brother and others], in order to supplant him as field commander of the 7th [Custer was actually the XO, the regimental commander being in D.C], ran afoul of Terry, and the returned Custer. Custer was then dispatched to follow the trail, wherever it led. The plan was to simultaneously attack in conjunction with Terry and Gibbon on June 26th [The Army was reasonably sure the Indians were in the vicinity of the Big Horn Mountains].
Custer pushed hard, and by the morning of the 25th, the 7th was some 15 miles from the Little Big Horn, at a place called the Crows' Nest. His scouts reported a large pony herd in the distance. Custer planned to rest the regiment, recon later in the day, and attack at daybreak on the 26th. Then he received a report of contact with Indians on his back trail. Concerned that they would alert the village [They didn't. they were returning to the reservation], Custer prepared an immediate attack. He sent his old nemesis, Frederick Benteen to the west with three troops. Benteen was to look for hostiles, and prevent escape in that direction. Custer then ordered Reno to charge the village frontally with some three troops, while Custer and some five troops rode off to the bluffs to the right, promising to support Reno. It was at that point that things went wrong.
Reno stopped his charge, despite initial surprise, and his orders some 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the village. He dismounted his troops and established a skirmish in a grassy meadow. His left flank was in the air, and his combat strength was down 20% [horse holders] before a shot was fired. And shots soon were, as warriors attacked Reno while sitting Bull started to evacuate the village [Custer saw Indians fleeing north]. With pressure building, Reno withdrew to a copse of trees near the river. It was a good position. But a rifle shot blew the brains of Bloody Knife, Custer's favorite Arikara scout all over Reno. Reno jumped on his horse, said "follow Me" and fled across the river and up onto the bluff that now bears his name. The retreat became a rout, as many troopers had not heard the order to withdraw, and fled piecemeal. On the bluff, they began digging in and driving off probing attacks by the Indians. But as an offensive force, Reno's command was done.
Custer apparently saw, from the bluffs where he was, Reno's rout, and feinted down Medicine Lodge Coulee in an effort to relive the pressure on Reno. He succeeded all to well. The Indians facing Reno, and many more, began converging on Custer. Custer then sent a note to Benteen telling him to "Come Quick", that they had struck "a big village" and to bring "the [ammo] packs".
When Benteen got the message, he re-traced his steps, at a pace that might best be described as leisurely [he even stopped to water his horses]. Custer's nephew, Autie Reed, who had been with the pack train, rode ahead and joined, and died, with his uncle. Benteen got as far as Reno, and stopped to join the defense.
And Custer? He continued to maneuver to the north and northwest, until he was trapped on Custer hill, where he fell, facing his enemies [some of them, anyway] with some 200 + of his men. They were found two days later, when Terry [a day later than agreed on] arrived in the Valley.
