It was America's worst military defeat in WW II. Yet it broke the back of the German Army, and virtually guaranteed Russian success in the East. The scene was familiar, the same Belgian Ardennes the Germans had gone through in 1940 on their way to destroying France. But certain factors had changed. The attack took place in December, not May. The entire German attacking force was in the Ardennes, not spread across three countries. There was no absolute air cover for the Wehrmacht. They counted on operating in weather too foul for the Allies' air power to intervene. The timetable was short, the objective not France, but Antwerp. And the plan was not Manstein's, but Hitler's.
Hitler began directing planning for the Ardennes offensive, originally codenamed WACHT AM RHEIN, in the fall of 1944. The Wehrmacht, driven out of France in a mob, had coalesced, re-grouped and set up defensive lines. They had blunted and defeated MARKET - GARDEN. Coupled with Allied supply problems, caused by German retention of the Channel ports, supplies still being trucked out from Normandy, and Montgomery's failure to clear the Scheldte estuary promptly, the Allies had ground to a halt.
Hitler was faced with several choices. The obvious one was to stay on the defensive, and build a mobile reserve against the Russians. That was the approach favored by the then German Army Chief of Staff, Heinz Guderian. Hitler rejected that. Aware of his crimes, the Allied demand for unconditional surrender, delaying the inevitable was not an option. Option two was attacking in the East. Such an offensive would be small potatoes, with no appreciable strategic gain. Door # 3 offered more promise. Hitler reasoned that taking Antwerp would split the Americans and the British, and would force a general retreat by the Western Allies, forcing them back to Normandy. He also believed this would lead to [in his mind] an anticipated breach between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union.
Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, OB West was put in charge of the operation. Marshal Walter Model was the ground commander. Neither general had ANY enthusiasm for the operation. A counterproposal for a much smaller offensive was rejected by Hitler. The start date was December 16th.
The attacking force numbered some 200,000+ men, a large body of armor [1st SS Pz., 2d SS Pz., 9th SS Pz., 12th SS Pz., 2d Pz., and several other Panzer divisions] . They were equipped with Mark V 'Panthers' , Mark VI 'Tigers', Mark VII 'King Tigers'[at 72 tons the largest tank to ever take the battlefield], and Mark IVs. They were divided [from North to south] into the 6th SS Panzerarmee [Oberstgruppenfuehrer Josef 'Sepp' Dietrich commanding; 5th Panzerarmee [General Hasso von Mantueffel], and 7th Army. Additionally there were some Luftwaffe paratroopers involved, and SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Otto Skorzeny's special ops unit, comprised of English speaking troops in American uniforms, tasked with sabotage, misdirecting Americans, and if opportunity arose, assassination. The Germans attacked weak in several areas. Som of their infantry formations, especially in the south were Volksgrenadier units, second class [at best]. There was a shortage of fuel [Tigers used a lot], and part of the plan was to continue the attack using captured Allied fuel dumps.
Was the attack a complete surprise? Yes and No. Allied intelligence had lost rack of major units in the German order of battle. Enigma was no help. But G-2s and S-2s had gathered enough information to predict the Germans were planning something, but didn't grasp the scale. At Bradley's HQ, and SHAEF, such reports were given short shrift. As at MARKET - GARDEN, the brass believed what it wanted to believe.
The attack opened with a short but intense artillery baarage, and then the Panzers rolled in. An Armerican Division was surrounded and chopped up, the 1st ss Panzer Regiment [SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Jochem Peiper],broke through the Losheim Gap, after initial delays and rampaged west. Fifth Panzer Army made significant gains. Seventh Army, screeningthe left wing of the operation advanced into Luxemburg. But problems developed almost immediately. 12th SS Panzer, tasked with assaulting across the Elsenborn Ridge was stopped by the U.S 2d Infantry Div. They never broke through. The Schwerpunkt [main axis of advance was with 6th SS, but the Ardennes in winter was a different kettle of fish than in May. The Germans were limited to road advance only. And the roads weren't much more than country lanes that had never met a King Tiger before. And the supply system was not up to snuff.
From Bradley's view, however, the sky was falling. One of the German armored columns was moving [inadvertently] toward his, and Hodges' First Army headquarters. They re-located. Eisenhower then split the defense in half, entrusting Montgomery with the norther half [including U.S divisions in his command, and giving Bradley the southern half.
Peiper's Kampfgruppe was, by now, the spearhead of the whole German attack. But the Americans kept him funneled west, blwing bridges, and more importantly, fuel dumps. Peiper's men after murdering U.S. prisoners at Malmedy, and Belgian civilians at Stavelot, were eventually cut off, and out of fuel. Abandoning his equipment, he and most of his unit then walked back to German lines.
By now the main area of action was on Mantueffel's front. Driving through Bastogne, he continued to drive for the Meuse, the intermediate objective on the way to Antwerp. The Americans moved into Batogne, the key road hub behind him, and Mantueffel was engaged on two fronts. Soon, three SS Panzer Divisions, the 2d, 9th and 12th [re-deployed] were involved in the attacks on Bastogne. But Bastogne held. And then, two things the Germans could ill afford happened. First the weather cleared just before Christmas, And with the sun came Allied airplanes. Second, the only commander who HAD believe3d the Germans were going to attack, and made provision for it, George S. Patton, Jr., was rapidly approaching Bastogne from the south to relieve it. Patton had wanted to swing deep, attack the Germans near their start line and bag them all. The ever 'prudent' Eisenhower overruled him, so after the Allies met up, they pushed the Germans back, suffering unneeded casualties as they did so.
The Germans never crossed the Meuse. U.S 2d Armored destroyed 2d Panzer near Celle, a job made easier by 2d Panzer's immobility. They had run out of gas. 2d Panzer was as close as the Wehrmacht got to Antwerp. By the time the battle wound down, the Germans had lost irreplaceable manpower, tanks and other equipment. The Luftwaffe had lost 300 planes in Operation BODENPLATZ. And the Russians had launched a massive offensive against a seriously understaffed and under armed German Army East.
And it all began 70 years ago today.
