http://www.aim.org/benghazi/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CCB-Interim-Report-4-22-2014.pdfSummary of Findings:
The war in Libya was unnecessary, served no articulable U.S. national security
objective, and led to preventable chaos region-wide. In the period since the 2011
revolution in Libya, the country has remained fragmented, poorly governed, and overrun
with violent militias, the majority of which are jihadist Al Qa’eda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) affiliates. Yet, at the time of his overthrow, Muammar Qaddafi was an ally of
the United States in the Global War on Terror.
On 17 March 2011 the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1973 for a “No
Fly Zone,” ostensibly to protect Libyan civilians caught up in the hostilities between
Libyan government forces and the rebel forces, which were dominated by the Libyan
Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qa’eda. The following day in London, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton announced U.S. government support for the Brotherhood-led Libyan
Transitional National Council in its revolt against Qaddafi.
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The Citizens’ Commission on Benghazi (CCB) has discovered, however, that the ensuing
civil war may well have been avoided, had the U.S. chosen to permit it. Within days of
that declaration of U.S. government support for the Libyan rebels, Qaddafi sought to
enter into negotiations with the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) under a flag of truce
for the purpose of discussing his possible abdication and exile. On 21 March 2011, Rear
Admiral (ret.) Chuck Kubic began email and telephone contact between Tripoli and
AFRICOM Stuttgart regarding the possibility of talks under a white flag of truce. Over
the following days, Qaddafi expressed interest in a truce, and possible abdication and
exile out of Libya. He even pulled his forces back from several Libyan cities as a sign of
good faith.
RADM Kubic telephoned LTC Brian Linvill, the U.S. AFRICOM point of contact for all
military matters regarding the Libyan situation, to advise him of Qaddafi’s desire to enter
into military-to-military discussions. General Carter Ham was advised immediately on 21
March 2011 of these communications and conveyed them up his chain of command to the
Pentagon. After two days of back-and-forth with the Libyans, however, General Ham had
received no positive affirmation of consent from Washington, D.C. to pursue Qaddafi’s
offer. The war continued and ultimately cost tens of thousands of lives. The U.S. failure
to even consider Qaddafi’s request for talks, and its determination to enter and pursue this
war in support of al-Qa’eda-linked rebels, presents the appearance of a policy intent upon
empowering Islamic forces with no measurable benefit to U.S. national security.