Special Forces Identify Crisis; Déjà vu all Over Again
by Mark Grdovic
|
11.24.2025 at 06:00am
Special Forces Identify Crisis; Déjà vu all Over Again Image
(Author’s note: The majority of the current Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) doctrinal publications, although unclassified, are restricted behind a firewall and not publicly accessible, which further reduces their circulation with potential readers.)
In the last few weeks, there has been a fair amount of debate regarding the recent JSOU publication Special Forces has an Identity Crisis, Who are the Green Berets Supposed to Be, by Colonel (Retired) Ed Croot. If you haven’t personally seen the data from that study, I strongly recommend reviewing it before commenting. You may disagree with the results, but it’s hard not to acknowledge the data and the rigorous analytical process applied during Croot’s research. The data clearly indicates that there is, in fact, an identity crisis. For those of older generations, you might recall a similar period in the 1990s. Arguably, the twenty years of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) provided only a temporary reprieve from the post-Cold War Special Forces identity crisis debate.
Considering why the force responded the way that it did, one cannot help but feel that many of the underlying issues are not as complicated as they are often portrayed.
As a young detachment commander in 1995, I had to wrestle with an emerging doctrine that explained how various activities were now to be categorized as new forms of unconventional warfare. Some of these activities included Joint Combined Exercises for Training (JCETs), de-mining operations, and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), when conducted by Special Forces soldiers (referred to as an Unconventional Assisted Recovery Team, or UART). This all culminated in June of 2001, with the new FM 31-20, Special Forces Operations manual that explained the “traditional” unconventional warfare construct of guerrillas, auxiliary, and the underground was now expanded to include working with “conventional coalition forces”. The manual states, “The conventional coalition forces trained, organized, equipped, and led in varying degrees by SF represents the newest evolution in UW-related surrogate forces. SF units conducting UW as part of coalition support operations are task organized as Special Forces Liaison Elements (SFLEs). These elements collocate with military forces of coalition partners and provide essential U.S. command, control, communications, computers and intelligence links.” This would allow anything and everything to be labeled as unconventional warfare.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/24/special-forces-identify-crisis-deja-vu-all-over-again/
