Force Design: Where is the Evidence of Revolutionary Change?

[rangerrebew]

Force Design: Where is the Evidence of Revolutionary Change?
By John F. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Dinsmore
July 20, 2024
 
U.S. Marines fire an M777 Howitzer during Artillery Relocation Training Program 24.1 at Combined Arms Training Center, Camp Fuji, Japan, May 15, 2024. ARTP is an exercise held to strengthen the defense of Japan and the U.S.-Japan Alliance as the cornerstone of peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region. The skills developed at ARTP increase the lethality and proficiency of the only permanently forward-deployed artillery unit in the Marine Corps, enabling them to provide precision indirect fires. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Michael Taggart)

In his recent RCD article “Operational Misconceptions: A Response to Operational Incompetence 2030,” Colonel Mark Desens offers a strongly worded rejoinder to General Walter Boomer and General James Conway’s critique of Force Design 2030 (“Force Design 2030:  Operational Incompetence,” RCD, 15 June 2024).  Col. Desens makes the same two-fold rebuttal that many FD2030 proponents have made: that the retired generals are old and out of touch and that warfare has undergone revolutionary change.  He articulates his argument with more clarity than most.

“The root of the problem,” he begins, “is that their [Boomer and Conway’s] experiences are from a different era. The character of warfare has shifted.”  He repeats the assertion later, in slightly different language, by stating that “the paradigm of warfare has shifted while they haven’t.”  Perhaps.  Generals are often famously accused of preparing to fight the last war.  At the same time, Generals Boomer and Conway, and numerous other Marines who oppose FD2030, possess the wisdom of experience to know that the more things change, the more they stay the same—to use another well-worn phrase—and we should not be too quick to declare our current situation fundamentally new and unique.


For at least the last half-century, technology enthusiasts have been heralding an imminent revolution in warfare wrought by long-range precision weapons and sensors. We are still waiting.  Revolutions in warfare are rare.  Much more common over that time frame have been predicted revolutions that did not live up to the hype.  They bring change, to be sure, but that change tends to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, so we can forgive the skeptics their skepticism.  One common factor in unrealized transformations seems to be the repeated tendency to underestimate the ability of the other side to develop countermeasures that mitigate the predicted transformative effect—a dynamic that Generals Boomer and Conway with their experience are well-positioned to appreciate.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/07/20/force_design_where_is_the_evidence_of_revolutionary_change_1045934.html

[rangerrebew]

The "revolutionary change" is a change to wokeness, not enhancing military skills.

[Smokin Joe]

Wokeness is a fad that, hopefully, we will survive. Some will get squared away, others can be marginalized in the future or drummed out of the corps.

The mission of the armed forces remains, no matter who you sleep with or what you think you are owed, when you face someone who only owes you your death, that 'woke' worldview will change. Adapt and overcome, and all that.

As for adapting to changes in warfare, the change in warfare evidenced by the events in Ukraine, is that drones, including suicide, recon, and bomber drones, have changed the nature of the battlefield. Without being able to deploy drones and drone countermeasures, and effectively combat the threat, no force is going to fare well on the battlefield against an enemy who does.

Not Billion dollar weapons systems, but four figure setups (at most) that can get the job done.
While that may not be as appealing as the profit from an F-35, you make up in volume what you don't get in margin. There is money to be made, there.
There has to be a shift in focus, at least in part, to dealing with and being able to deploy unmanned aerial, surface, and even ground based weapons systems and counter those deployed against our forces.
Put just one billion dollars into that, and protect the billions spent otherwise, not to mention the personnel on the ground.

Right now, UAV development is somewhere equivalent to 1918 in the development of fighter aircraft and bombers. Failure to address the inevitable advances in that technology and be ahead of them will result in a poorer outcome than necessary, if not defeat.