Ignore the Fanfare in Beijing: Chinese-Iranian Relations Leave Room for U.S. Engagement With Tehran
By Behrooz Ayaz & Julian Spencer-Churchill
September 04, 2023
A man watches a large screen showing CCTV broadcasting news of Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers his speech at the BRICS Summit held in South Africa, at an outdoor shopping mall in Beijing, Thursday, Aug. 24, 2023. Iran and Saudi Arabia were among six countries set to join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in the BRICS economic bloc from next year, the bloc announced Thursday, a move that will likely throw more scrutiny on Beijing's political influence in the Persian Gulf. (AP Photo/Andy Wong)
U.S. President Joseph Biden administration’s engagement with Iran is well timed to leverage Tehran’s persisting strategic isolation, despite Tehran’s arms transfers to Russia amid the war in Ukraine, a signed strategic agreement with Beijing in March of 2023, and a Beijing-brokered rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. One measure, which is giving Tehran access to US$5bn in funds held in South Korea, is worth more than the US$1.5bn in investment from China in any year since 2005, despite China’s fanciful promise of US$400bn in in investment over the next 25 years. In fact, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, while on a state visit to Beijing, remarked that the inflow of Chinese investment has been disappointingly meagre. Critics under-appreciate the payoff of a less hostile Iran, and exaggerate the enthusiasm of Tehran’s relations with Moscow and Beijing. Instead of advocating the exploitation of the opportunities of the regional balance of power, critics focus on ideological issues that are also issues with every other country in the Middle East. In fact, the inherent contradictions in Russian and Chinese diplomacy in the region almost immediately undermine the supposed strength of their diplomatic relationships, making U.S. engagement with Iran propitious.
Aside from trepidations of Iran pushing ahead with nuclear weapons, the main security issue in its relations with China is that there is a concern that Iran will either close the Straits of Hormuz or harass passing Western ships in the event of a diversion of the U.S. Navy, such as in the case of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. In early 2008, the U.S. warned Tehran when Iranian warships threatened to interfere with three U.S. navy vessels. Iran threatened to close the Strait January 2012 and July 2018 in reaction to U.S. sanctions, and in May of 2019, four tankers, including two under Saudi ownership, were attacked in the UAE port of Fujairah, by what the U.S. believed to be Iranian proxies. A worst case scenario for Washington would be an Iranian attempt to block the straits with aircraft, missiles, mines and ships. Although not proxies of Tehran, attacks by al-Qaeda affiliates in July of 2010 against the Japanese oil tanker "M Star," demonstrate the level of disruption possible by engaging non-state actors in littoral interdiction of maritime commerce. Given that Japanese imports 75 percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf, in the event of a war over Taiwan in which Tokyo intervenes, Iran may assist China in inflicting economic harm on U.S. allies.
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/09/04/ignore_the_fanfare_in_beijing_chinese-iranian_relations_leave_room_for_us_engagement_with_tehran_977149.html
