Hackers Breach Dozens of Voting Machines Brought To Conference

[To-Whose-Benefit?]

thehill
By Joe Uchill - 07/29/17 06:21 PM EDT

[excerpt]

http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/344488-hackers-break-into-voting-machines-in-minutes-at-hacking-competition

LAS VEGAS — One of the nation’s largest cybersecurity conferences is inviting attendees to get hands-on experience hacking a slew of voting machines, demonstrating to researchers how easy the process can be.

“It took me only a few minutes to see how to hack it,” said security consultant Thomas Richards, glancing at a Premier Election Solutions machine currently in use in Georgia.

The DEF CON cybersecurity conference is held annually in Las Vegas. This year, for the first time, the conference is hosting a "Voting Machine Village," where attendees can try to hack a number of systems and help catch vulnerabilities.

[DB]

There's another thread here somewhere about the same story.

[Sighlass]

Articles like this don't really tell me much.

Are the hackers allowed to hook up computers to individual machines? How long? Are they secure machines? I mean, if they have to connect to each computer and break each one, how long does it take them. Is there a way for people to see if computers have been tampered with (code changed)? Can they hack these voter boxes via wireless? Can they mass program a bunch at a time? What is background of those they allowed to hack, are they prone to give the information to liberals?

[To-Whose-Benefit?]

Articles like this don't really tell me much.

Are the hackers allowed to hook up computers to individual machines? How long? Are they secure machines? I mean, if they have to connect to each computer and break each one, how long does it take them. Is there a way for people to see if computers have been tampered with (code changed)? Can they hack these voter boxes via wireless? Can they mass program a bunch at a time? What is background of those they allowed to hack, are they prone to give the information to liberals?

Ask the same questions about paper ballots.

[roamer_1]

“It took me only a few minutes to see how to hack it,” said security consultant Thomas Richards, glancing at a Premier Election Solutions machine currently in use in Georgia.

Oh! IOW, Windows.

[Drago]

"Tech minds at the annual "DEF CON" in Las Vegas were given physical voting machines and remote access, with the instructions of gaining access to the software."
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http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2017/07/hackers_in_competition_breach_voting_machine_security_in_minutes.html

Well there you go! Remote access and instructions.  All the voting machines in the counties around where I live (central CA) are the "Scantron" type "fill in the bubble" paper ballots that get scanned by a reader machine. The original paper ballots are retained for recounts, etc..  The scanner/reader machine has no remote access, so if watched over and handled like a ballot box it has about no chance of "hacking". 

[DB]

"Tech minds at the annual "DEF CON" in Las Vegas were given physical voting machines and remote access, with the instructions of gaining access to the software."
----------------------------
http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2017/07/hackers_in_competition_breach_voting_machine_security_in_minutes.html

Well there you go! Remote access and instructions.  All the voting machines in the counties around where I live (central CA) are the "Scantron" type "fill in the bubble" paper ballots that get scanned by a reader machine. The original paper ballots are retained for recounts, etc..  The scanner/reader machine has no remote access, so if watched over and handled like a ballot box it has about no chance of "hacking".

A paper record is essentially the only thing that can be audited with some faith it is legitimate. Every paper ballot should have a machine readable serial number (don't know if they do) and that would also help with ballot stuffing. The chain of custody could then be followed along with any duplicates.