Author Topic: FBI Director Says Investigators Unable to Unlock San Bernardino Killer's Phone Content  (Read 3301 times)

0 Members and 1 Guest are viewing this topic.

Offline Fishrrman

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 35,941
  • Gender: Male
  • Dumbest member of the forum
This story compliments another one also posted today regarding the San Bernardino iPhone case.

I guess it was a week or so back, when I first posted an article about this.

After that posting, a few forum members responded to the effect that, "if the government wants the data on that phone, they'll crack it."

Well....   they can't.
That's how powerful Apple's personal user security has become.

Once the phone leaves Apple's hands, and it's in yours, once you set a password and encrypt the data on the phone, even Apple can't bypass your encryption and get to the data.

The feds have to go back to Apple for help, but as I've posted before, even Apple itself cannot "crack the encryption". The phones have been intentionally designed this way, again, to protect user privacy.

I believe that what the feds are pressing Apple for goes like this:
- The phone is designed so that it can be programmed to "erase itself" after several unsuccessful attempts are made to enter a password.
- Even Apple can't "backdoor" the password, BUT -- they may be able to disable the "self-erase" feature...
- ...after which the feds will be able to make repeated attempts to enter a password.
- Note: even though the data remains encrypted, the feds can start a "brute force" attack at obtaining the password. That may mean many MILLIONS of attempts to "guess the password" (using a computer) to crack into the phone.
- Ultimately, all the feds can do is "shoot guesses" at the phone. They may eventually "guess right", but then again, they may not.

But again, short of the phone's owner providing THE password to overcome the encryption, there is no "direct and certain way" into the phone.

Remember that for as many extremely bright computer guys working for the feds, there are probably xxxx times as many more working for themselves or for private corporations...!

Offline EdinVA

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 8,584
  • Gender: Male
Quote
"But in iOS 8, Apple has essentially thrown away the key so it can’t access the data anymore.

Don't buy it... They have to have a way to test the hardware/software and verify it actually does what it is supposed to do.
The only way to verify it is to have a "backdoor" to dump the memory and see what is there.
So Apple has the tools, they would rather side with the terrorists and stymie the safety of the American people... consistent with their normal position...

Offline Fishrrman

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 35,941
  • Gender: Male
  • Dumbest member of the forum
From MacRumors.com:
Tim Cook: Apple Won't Create 'Backdoor' to Help FBI Access San Bernardino Shooter's iPhone:
http://www.macrumors.com/2016/02/17/cook-open-letter-backdoor-fbi-san-bernardino/
====
Apple CEO Tim Cook has posted an open letter to Apple customers announcing that the company would oppose an order from a U.S. Federal judge to help the FBI access data on an iPhone 5c used by San Bernardino shooter Syed Farook. Cook says that this moment is one for public discussion, and that the company wants its customers to understand what's at stake.

Cook starts the letter noting that smartphones have become an essential part of people's lives and that many people store private conversations, photos, music, notes, calendars and both financial and health information on their devices. Ultimately, Cook says, encryption helps keep people's data safe, which in turn keeps people's personal safety from being at risk.

He then goes on to say that Apple and its employees were "shocked and outraged" by the San Bernardino attack and that Apple has complied with valid subpoenas and search warrants from federal investigators. Apple has also made engineers available to advise the FBI in addition to providing general advice on how they could go about investigating the case. However, Cook says that's where Apple will draw the line.

"We have great respect for the professionals at the FBI, and we believe their intentions are good. Up to this point, we have done everything that is both within our power and within the law to help them. But now the U.S. government has asked us for something we simply do not have, and something we consider too dangerous to create. They have asked us to build a backdoor to the iPhone."

"Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession.


Cook says that while the government is suggesting that bypassing a feature that disables an iPhone after a certain number of failed password attempts could only be used once and on one device, that suggestion is "simply not true." He says that once created, such a key could be used over and over again. "In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks -- from restaurants and banks to stores and homes," Cook says."

The move, Cook says, would undermine Apple's decades of work on security advancements that keep its customers safe. He notes the irony in asking Apple's security engineers to purposefully weaken the protections they created. Apple says they found no precedent of an American company being forced to expose its customers, therefore putting them at a greater risk of attack. He notes that security experts have warned against weakening encryption as both bad guys and good guys would be able to take advantage of any potential weaknesses.

Finally, Cook says that the FBI is proposing what Apple calls an "unprecedented use" of the All Writs Act of 1789, which authorizes federal courts to issue all orders necessary or appropriate "in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." The chilling effect of this use, Cook argues, would allow the government power to capture data from any device or to require Apple to create a data collection program to intercept a customer's data, potentially including infringements like using a phone's camera or microphone without user knowledge.

Cook concludes Apple's open letter by saying the company's opposition to the order is not an action they took lightly and that they challenge the request "with the deepest respect for democracy and a love for our country." Ultimately, Apple fears these demands would "undermine the very freedoms and liberty our government is meant to protect."
« Last Edit: February 17, 2016, 03:03:26 pm by Fishrrman »

Offline Fishrrman

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 35,941
  • Gender: Male
  • Dumbest member of the forum
More from MacRumors.com:

Apple Ordered to Help FBI Recover Data From San Bernardino Shooter's iPhone 5c

http://www.macrumors.com/2016/02/16/apple-ordered-unlock-san-bernardino-iphone/

A U.S. Federal judge today ordered Apple to help federal investigators access data on the iPhone 5c used by San Bernardino shooter Syed Farook, reports NBC News. According to court papers, Apple "declined to provide [assistance] voluntarily."

"The judge ruled Tuesday that the Cupertino-based company had to provide "reasonable technical assistance" to the government in recovering data from the iPhone 5c, including bypassing the auto-erase function and allowing investigators to submit an unlimited number of passwords in their attempts to unlock the phone. Apple has five days to respond to the court if it believes that compliance would be "unreasonably burdensome."

Prosecutors argued that despite providing a warrant authorizing the search of Farook's device, the "government was unable to complete the search because it cannot access the iPhone's encrypted content." The FBI argued that Apple has the "technical means" to assist the government and, in a statement, U.S. attorney Eileen M. Decker said that the order was a "potentially important step" in finding out "everything we possibly can" about the San Bernardino attack.

Authorities said they were able to access several backups of Farook's iCloud data, which were saved a month before the attack took place. Prosecutors argued that the evidence in his iCloud account indicated he was in communication with both his victims and his wife, who assisted him in the attack. They allege he may have disabled iCloud data saves after that point to hide further potential evidence.

Last October, the Cupertino company reiterated that it "would be impossible" for the company to access data on a device using iOS 8 or later, but federal authorities are asking Apple to disable a feature that erases the iPhone's data after a certain number of failed password attempts. It's not clear if Apple is able to do so.

Apple stopped storing encryption keys after the release of iOS 8, making it impossible for the company to bypass passcodes to gain access to a device. Additionally, Apple CEO Tim Cook has consistently insisted that providing back-door access past its encryption for authorities would open the door for "bad guys" to gain access to its users' data.

Offline Fishrrman

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 35,941
  • Gender: Male
  • Dumbest member of the forum
I found this while exploring the subject over at TOS:
It describes how Apple's current iOS secure encryption works:
========
Apple uses a dedicated chip to store and process the encryption. They call this the Secure Enclave. The secure enclave stores a full 256-bit AES encryption key.

Within the secure enclave itself, you have the device’s Unique ID (UID) . The only place this information is stored is within the secure enclave. It can’t be queried or accessed from any other part of the device or OS. Within the phone’s processor you also have the device’s Group ID (GID). Both of these numbers combine to create 1/2 of the encryption key. These are numbers that are burned into the silicon, aren’t accessible outside of the chips themselves, and aren’t recorded anywhere once they are burned into the silicon. Apple doesn’t keep records of these numbers. Since these two different pieces of hardware combine together to make 1/2 of the encryption key, you can’t separate the secure enclave from it’s paired processor.

The second half of the encryption key is generated using a random number generator chip. It creates entropy using the various sensors on the iPhone itself during boot (microphone, accelerometer, camera, etc.) This part of the key is stored within the Secure Enclave as well, where it resides and doesn’t leave. This storage is tamper resistant and can’t be accessed outside of the encryption system. Even if the UID and GID components of the encryption key are compromised on Apple’s end, it still wouldn’t be possible to decrypt an iPhone since that’s only 1/2 of the key.

The secure enclave is part of an overall hardware based encryption system that completely encrypts all of the user storage. It will only decrypt content if provided with the unlock code. The unlock code itself is entangled with the device’s UDID so that all attempts to decrypt the storage must be done on the device itself. You must have all 3 pieces present: The specific secure enclave, the specific processor of the iphone, and the flash memory that you are trying to decrypt. Basically, you can’t pull the device apart to attack an individual piece of the encryption or get around parts of the encryption storage process. You can’t run the decryption or brute forcing of the unlock code in an emulator. It requires that the actual hardware components are present and can only be done on the specific device itself.

The secure enclave also has hardware enforced time-delays and key-destruction. You can set the phone to wipe the encryption key (and all the data contained on the phone) after 10 failed attempts. If you have the data-wipe turned on, then the secure enclave will nuke the key that it stores after 10 failed attempts, effectively erasing all the data on the device. Whether the device-wipe feature is turned on or not, the secure enclave still has a hardware-enforced delay between attempts at entering the code: Attempts 1-4 have no delay, Attempt 5 has a delay of 1 minute. Attempt 6 has a delay of 5 minutes. Attempts 7 and 8 have a delay of 15 minutes. And attempts 9 or more have a delay of 1 hour. This delay is enforced by the secure enclave and can not be bypassed, even if you completely replace the operating system of the phone itself. If you have a 6-digit pin code, it will take, on average, nearly 6 years to brute-force the code. 4-digit pin will take almost a year. if you have an alpha-numeric password the amount of time required could extend beyond the heat-death of the universe. Key destruction is turned on by default.

Even if you pull the flash storage out of the device, image it, and attempt to get around key destruction that way it won’t be successful. The key isn’t stored in the flash itself, it’s only stored within the secure enclave itself which you can’t remove the storage from or image it.

Each boot, the secure enclave creates it’s own temporary encryption key, based on it’s own UID and random number generator with proper entropy, that it uses to store the full device encryption key in ram. Since the encryption key is also stored in ram encrypted, it can’t simply be read out of the system memory by reading the RAM bus.

The only way I can possibly see to potentially unlock the phone without the unlock code is to use an electron microscope to read the encryption key from the secure enclave’s own storage. This would take considerable time and expense (likely millions of dollars and several months) to accomplish. This also assumes that the secure enclave chip itself isn’t built to be resistant to this kind of attack. The chip could be physically designed such that the very act of exposing the silicon to read it with an electron microscope could itself be destructive.
=======

OK, for the non-believers here (those who said Apple or the feds could easily break into the iPhone):
Just how are they going to do it?

Offline flowers

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 18,798
240b wrote above:
"I do not believe this is true. I think the powers that be, can break the code.
I believe that there are greater forces at work which do not want the phone code broken."


I very, very seldom disagree with what you post, 240b, but on this one I will.

I'm going to -guess- that the killer owned a recent-issue iPhone.

On the most recent iPhones (and iOS controlling software), Apple has implemented an encryption scheme in which even Apple itself is unable to crack.

Even Apple - which created the phone and the software - doesn't have "a way in" once the user sets up encryption, security codes, etc.

Of course, the feds are quite unhappy about this, and are leaning on Apple to modify the phones so that there's a "backdoor" -- but Apple [so far] has refused, citing user privacy.

If it's an iPhone, I'm sure the feds have already taken it to Apple, and have been told that there's no way into it.

I'm not sure if -other- phone makers (such as Samsung) have this level of user-encryption, but it -is- standard now on iPhones ...

Addendum:
An article of interest:
http://www.gizmodo.com.au/2012/08/not-even-the-nsa-can-hack-apples-ios-encryption/
You where correct on this one.  :patriot:


Offline 17 Oaks

  • Hero Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 341
  • Gender: Male
  • The Ranch in S Texas
About PGP encryption and Tor, what are your thoughts on them?
Sorry just caught this, been spending a lot of time on the John Deere while I got temps in the 80's around here.


PGP and TOR, are god stuff but that is all, good.  Is that bad, yes and no.  Its crackable and as long as you are not betting the farm on PGP protecting you its good to go.  TOR provides an ability to surf with anonymity and its a bit more than a notch up from the built in's on most browsers. The drawback is its a private network manned by volunteers ( now that scares me because bad actors can be a volunteer and if I am wanting to surf with anonymity then I must have something to hide!)  For that reason alone I avoid it. 
Don:  Got here thru God, Guns and Guts, I speak John Wayne, Johnny Cash and John Deere; this make ME: Christian, Conservative, Capitalist, Constitutionalist...

HonestJohn

  • Guest
Sorry just caught this, been spending a lot of time on the John Deere while I got temps in the 80's around here.


PGP and TOR, are god stuff but that is all, good.  Is that bad, yes and no.  Its crackable and as long as you are not betting the farm on PGP protecting you its good to go.  TOR provides an ability to surf with anonymity and its a bit more than a notch up from the built in's on most browsers. The drawback is its a private network manned by volunteers ( now that scares me because bad actors can be a volunteer and if I am wanting to surf with anonymity then I must have something to hide!)  For that reason alone I avoid it.

Thank you for that.

 :beer: